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This project presents a critical engagement with the concept of ideology.  It advances 
the view that political ideologies can be regarded as distinctive narrative styles and as such 
can be analyzed in their peculiar discursive formations.  It specifically concentrates on 
liberalism, which I regard as the dominant ideology in much of “the West” today.  My study 
contributes to the scholarship at the intersection between contemporary political theory, 
theories of language, and comparative politics.   
By employing simple instruments of semiotics I show how the discourse of 
liberalism organizes the production and deployment of political meaning.  In particular, I 
argue that a critical engagement with the texts of thinkers ranging from John Locke to John 
Stuart Mill and John Rawls can contribute to unveiling the deep structures of liberal 
discourse. I maintain that these structures constitute liberalism as a “grammar” which 
operates by organizing political content around key concepts like individual agency, 
rationality, and anthropocentrism.  Crucially, liberalism also acts as a “meta-ideology” 
capable of expressing alternative positions through its versatile grammatical infrastructure. I 
analyze contemporary theorists like Will Kymlicka, Robert Putnam, and Philip Pettit, and 
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argue that they engage in similar intellectual projects, incorporating elements of 
communitarianism and republicanism in a liberal framework.  
In the second part of my dissertation I inquire into the possibility of alternative 
meta-ideological constellations.  In particular, I focus on the contribution of Jean-Luc 
Nancy: I argue that his characterization of “being-in-common” as the fundamental position 
of existence can replace the liberal tenet of individualism as the basic assumption on human 
nature.  Finally, I ground these abstract reflections in the concrete reality of the community 
of Badolato, in southern Italy, where locals and immigrants alike seem to understand and 
organize their relationality outside of a paradigm of liberal toleration.  I present the results of 
the ethnographic research that I conducted in Badolato and I characterize that experience of 
encounter with the other as an example of the practices of hospitality envisioned by the late 
Jacques Derrida.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
A PRELIMINARY INTRODUCTION TO IDEOLOGY 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
As the ideological debris of the twentieth century still clutters the political atmosphere 
of the twenty-first, the abrasion of different clusters of meaning is likely to recombine sense 
in new units, and to incline old ones in new ways. Faced with the seemingly chaotic friction 
of ideas in politics, the uninquisitive observer is tempted to quickly declare their irrelevance, 
or to predicate their essential immutability in the face of apparent clashes. It is the task of the 
patient meteorologist of meaning, however, to study the formation of nebulas of sense, their 
mutual interrelations, and the processes by which they eventually precipitate in phenomena 
of political action. Inscribing both the subject and the object of its studies in the same world 
of indeterminacy, a science of ideas would reject the very pretense of an objective 
knowledge. It would conduct its investigation with no illusion of neutrality and no delusion 
of ever accessing the ultimate source of an unencumbered truth.  
In this chapter I start delineating the contours of such a mode of inquiry, as I envision 
it. The contemporary field of the political appears to pullulate in particular with liberal ideas; 
though I argue that non-liberal ideas can germinate from this same humus, I start by 
orienting my inquiry toward the object of liberalism.  Because ideas in politics are typically 
organized in more or less stable patterns of descriptive, normative, and action-oriented 
propositions, I premise my analysis with a brief introduction to the history and the 
development of the concept of ideology. In particular, I approach the study of ideology 
without evoking the abstract categories of truth and falsity as they pertain to the external 
world of politics; instead, I concentrate on the dimension of meaning as the internal matter 
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of which ideas are constituted. After this preliminary discussion, I draw attention to the field 
of semiotics, and to the productive intersection between the study of systems of 
signification, and the study of political ideologies as systems of ideas. I argue that borrowing 
simple interpretive tools from semiotics, and adapting them for their specific purposes can 
sustain the effort of political theorists in their quest for an accurate understanding of the 
processes that govern the functions and mutable configurations of ideas in politics. 
My intervention in the current debates on the study of ideology emphasizes the extent 
to which political ideologies can be productively regarded as analogous to “languages” (and 
to systems of signification more generally). This, in turn, prompts a reflection on the kind of 
analysis that can be fruitfully applied to ideological discourses. In this spirit, an overview of 
the various claims that have historically emerged on the definition, scope, and validity of the 
notion of “ideology” can be helpful in illustrating the genealogy of the position which is 
currently prevalent in political theory, and which concentrates on how different ideologies 
organize meaning in the political field. Michael Freeden, one of the most distinguished 
contemporary scholars of ideology, characterizes his approach as “morphological,” and 
defines ideologies as “combinations of political concepts organized in a particular way.”1 
Each ideology, then, displays a peculiar structure with certain concepts at its core, 
complemented by adjacent and peripheral concepts.2
 
 The field of political meaning would 
thus appear to be first parceled into discrete units (concepts like equality, liberty, community, 
order, etc.) which would then be arranged differently by different ideologies, like furniture in 
a room, to borrow the metaphor that Freeden repeatedly uses: 
Ideologies may be likened to rooms that contain various units of furniture in 
proximity to each other. Two important, if obvious, observations need to be kept in 
mind: (1) rooms may be distinguished by the kinds and combinations of units of 
furniture they accommodate (kitchens will have sinks and cookers; studies will have 
desks and bookshelves; (2) the same type of room will appear in an infinite variety of 
                                                 
1 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory. A Conceptual Approach (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1996), p. 75 
 
2 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 77 
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furniture combinations (there are hundreds of different don’s studies in Oxford). 
This is precisely the position with regards to ideologies. Though it is impossible to 
give a clear-cut definition of liberalism, it is empirically ascertainable that liberalism 
has always contained such units as liberty, human rationality, and individualism. 
Subtract one of them from the liberal configuration and profound question marks 
begin to appear. Subtract a second and it is no longer liberalism.3
  
 
According to Freeden, then, there exist “liberal rooms,” for instance, in which there are 
certain pieces of “ideological furniture” (core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts) arranged in 
a variety of ways. Upon entering two such rooms, an observer would be able to recognize 
their distinctly liberal character despite their not being identical; upon comparing two pieces 
of discourses which exhibited different core concepts and different morphologies, on the 
other hand, an observer would categorize them as different ideologies, like entering a kitchen 
and a bedroom would immediately suggest more differences than similarities. This is a very 
perceptive way of thinking about ideologies, as it highlights the fact that their morphologies 
are both flexible (various forms of liberalism can produce rather dissimilar instances of 
liberal discourse), and not infinitely elastic (after a while, an ideological configuration ceases 
to be classifiable as liberal, and it breaks off into something else). Nevertheless, in keeping 
with Freeden’s metaphor, if different bedrooms arrange the same basic pieces of furniture 
(beds, nightstands, dressers, etc.) in different combinations (and sometimes also add 
idiosyncratic elements), it is also true that a bedroom and a living room, while containing 
different objects, might share a similar ambiance. A rococo style bedroom might be more 
“like” a rococo living room than a Bauhaus bedroom. Something intangible, and yet very real 
and easy to perceive characterizes two different rooms as similar in style. How are two 
otherwise different rooms “alike” in certain key aspects? Out of the metaphor, can two 
pieces of different ideological discourses exhibit some level of similarity despite the fact that 
they organize different units of political content, in different configurations? Is there 
anything like “style” that can cut through the content of different ideologies? I argue that 
                                                 
 
3 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 86 
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there is, and that the mode of expression that informs different instances of ideological 
discourse is a crucial component in the study of ideology.  
Most of the theorists who engage in the project of studying ideologies as systems for the 
production and deployment of meaning, however, concentrate their analyses on the level of 
content; I argue that the modalities employed for the expression of that content are of 
paramount importance in explaining what kind of content gets articulated and how (and, 
concurrently, what content remains excluded from political discourse). In other words, while 
debates on the truth or falsehood of ideology have mostly subsided in contemporary political 
theory, the turn toward semantics has remained substantially oblivious to the syntactic 
aspects of ideologies. Considering ideologies as more or less stable configurations of political 
concepts, the morphological approach focuses on how, and how cogently determinate units 
of meaning fit with each other in the economy of a given discourse, like pieces of furniture 
in a room. I, on the other hand, propose to supplement this analysis with a more careful 
consideration of the role of combinatory rules akin to those of grammar in shaping the 
morphology of ideological discourse. Like words follow each other in a sentence according 
to patterns that owe both to the meaning of those words and to the grammatical functions 
that they absolve, so in the articulation of ideological discourse different concepts are 
concatenated because of both their specific content and because of the underlying 
grammatical structure that preexists their actual usage.  
In characterizing the mode of expression of an ideology as a “grammar” I draw 
inspiration from Antonio Gramsci’s discussion of language and politics. “How many forms 
of grammar can there be?,” he asks, and he answers “Several, certainly.”4
                                                 
4 Antonio Gramsci, “How Many Forms of Grammar Can There Be?,” in David Forgacs, ed. by, The Antonio 
Gramsci Reader. Selected Writings, 1916-1935 (New York University Press, New York: 2000), p. 353 
 On the one hand, 
Gramsci identifies “the grammar 'immanent' in language itself, by which one speaks 
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'according to grammar' without knowing it, as Moliere's character produced prose without 
knowing it.”5
 
 On the other hand, he observes:  
Besides the ‘immanent grammar’ in every language, there is also in reality (i.e., even if 
not written) a ‘normative’ grammar (or more than one). This is made up of reciprocal 
monitoring, reciprocal teaching and reciprocal 'censorship' expressed in such 
questions as 'What did you mean to say?', 'What do you mean?', 'Make yourself 
clearer', etc., and in mimicry and teasing. This whole complex of actions and 
restrictions come together to create a grammatical conformism, to establish 'norms' 
or judgments of correctness and incorrectness. But this 'spontaneous' expression of 
grammatical conformity is necessarily disconnected, discontinuous and limited to 
local social strata or social centers. (A peasant who moves to the city ends up 
conforming to urban speech through the pressure of the city environment. In the 
country, people try to imitate urban speech; the subaltern classes try to speak like the 
dominant classes and the intellectuals, etc.)6
 
 
For Gramsci, normative grammar acts in conjunction with the ideological domination of the 
ruling class. On the one hand, he notes, there can be virtually as many “spontaneous” 
immanent grammars as there are speakers of a language; on the other hand, this virtual 
fragmentation is compensated by the actual “movements of unification” operated by 
normative grammar, with the end result of “creat[ing] a unitary national linguistic 
conformism.”7
 
 Bernard Susser has also commented on the interplay of constraints and 
creative possibilities that regarding grammar as a political object entails: 
Grammar is, paradoxically, identical with the spontaneous will of the grammatical 
speaker. Simultaneously, however, grammar is a framework that controls his will, it 
permits great freedom for change and choice but is itself not freely chosen or easily 
                                                 
 
5 Antonio Gramsci, “How Many Forms of Grammar Can There Be?,” in David Forgacs, ed. by, The Antonio 
Gramsci Reader, p. 353 
 
6 Antonio Gramsci, “How Many Forms of Grammar Can There Be?,” in David Forgacs, ed. by, The Antonio 
Gramsci Reader, p. 354 
 
7 Antonio Gramsci, “How Many Forms of Grammar Can There Be?,” in David Forgacs, ed. by, The Antonio 
Gramsci Reader, p. 354 
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changed. Grammar, then, highlights both the creative will of the speaker within the 
framework and the constraining force of the framework on the speaker’s will.8
 
  
Grammar preexists and shapes individual speech acts; yet it allows (and enables) a virtually 
infinite number of speech acts to happen; over time, the accumulation of speech acts also 
affects the codification of grammatical rules, confirming or slowly changing them. Likewise, 
a certain mode of expression allows the articulation of political content consistent within the 
morphology of a given ideology; and yet it is not neutral with regards to how that content 
gets expressed. Susser’s analysis focuses on how a peculiar modernist sensibility enables 
ideologies to negotiate the tension between the claim that “value, meaning, significance […] 
are conventional constructs with only relative validity;” and the claim that “the world is 
fundamentally knowable.”9
                                                 
 
 On the other hand, I intend to apply the concept of grammar to 
the study of ideologies in a more intuitive way. I consider ideology as a peculiar style of 
discourse, and as such I argue that it is amenable to textual analysis; hence, I argue, focusing 
simply on the level of content, as Freeden seems to do, overlooks the ways in which the 
mode of expression structures, organizes, and affects that content. In this sense I will refer 
to “the grammar of liberalism,” “the grammar of socialism,” “the grammar of 
conservatism,” etc., rather than to a more abstract “grammar of modern ideology.” In my 
analysis, each ideology does not only exhibit morphological regularities at the level of 
content, but is also characterized by a certain recurrent mode of expression. In particular, I 
will concentrate on the grammar of liberalism, which I regard as the hegemonic mode of 
expression which sustains the hegemonic ideological constellation in much of “the West” 
today. As I will point out, the commitment of liberalism to the value of the individual relies 
crucially on a grammar characterized by the primacy of the subject over the verb. In the 
primacy of the subject-verb formation I identify the premise of the success of liberalism. 
Moreover, I argue that the mode of expression does not necessarily predetermine the 
8 Bernard Susser, The Grammar of Modern Ideology (Routledge, London and New York: 1988), p. 5 
 
9 Bernard Susser, The Grammar of Modern Ideology, p. 91 
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content of a certain piece of ideological discourse. Certain grammars may be flexible enough 
to accommodate and express concepts that are typical of different ideologies. In this vein I 
follow Noam Chomsky’s groundbreaking work on linguistics: “the notion ‘grammatical,’” he 
argues, “cannot be identified with ‘meaningful’ or ‘significant’ in any semantic sense.”10
In general, political ideas seem to be caught in a web of mutual presuppositions that is 
not fully accounted for by the ramifications of their content. In both everyday language and 
in political ideologies, ideas are not simply juxtaposed based on the contiguity of their 
meaning, but are typically organized in formations that express meaning according to certain 
predictable patterns. In turn, I argue, these predictable patterns for the organization of 
meaning (which are typically regarded as grammatical rules), are not neutral in relation to 
content, but affect the value and interaction of ideas as well. Yet, I observe, the intrinsically 
political nature of grammar (and of language by extension) has often gone underappreciated 
by canonical political theorists; to the extent that the “linguistic turn” in contemporary 
political theory has called attention to it, the analysis has often lacked methodological 
accuracy. Consider, for instance, one of the most influential claims in the history of Western 
political theory: Man is by nature a political animal. If it has been said, influentially, that “the 
European philosophical tradition […] consists of a series of footnotes to Plato,” it might be 
equally legitimate to affirm that Aristotle’s assertion has provided political theory with an 
 
Separating the judgment on grammatical correctness from any considerations on the 
semantic value of a statement, Chomsky points to the existence of certain linguistic 
structures that cannot be reduced to the content of which they allow the expression. Much 
like, in his famous example, it is perfectly grammatical, and yet nonsensical to claim that 
“colorless green ideas sleep furiously,” likewise I argue that a statement might be 
“grammatical” from the perspective of an ideology, and yet express content that does not 
conform to the political universe envisioned by that ideology.  
                                                 
 
10 Noam Chomsky, Syntactic Structures  (Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, New York: 2002) [1957], p. 15 
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ideal justification for its own intellectual enterprise, and at the same time with a minimal unit 
of sense to engage in an unending process of critical interpretation and re-signification.  
In exploding the manifold possibilities of sense entailed by the qualification of “man” as 
a political animal, an assortment of diverse thinkers over the centuries has called into 
question the more or less explicitly exclusionary character of that category. And so “men,” 
regardless of their status and census, have gradually been recognized as legitimate candidates 
for that position as political animals. Additionally, the women’s movement has fought some 
of its most successful struggles to discard the assumption of masculinity contained in the 
definition of the political animal, later supplemented by a critical reflection on 
heteronormativity that has attempted, among other things, to establish “humans” as political 
animals. Much less successfully, also some of the qualifying attributes for being regarded as 
fully human have been disputed, advancing the notion that even “defective” human beings 
(lacking conventional rationality, for instance) deserve the right to be political animals; and 
some rights traditionally ascribed only to humans have also been advocated for animals, on 
the presumption that the capacity for suffering and not rationality should be the defining 
criterion.  
In an orthogonal movement of problematization, the “nature” of the “political” has 
been subjected to increasing scrutiny as well by different political approaches. On the one 
hand, republicanism has delved into the notion that a profound engagement with politics 
manifests an essential characteristic of humans and sublimates their true nature. On the 
other hand, liberalism has critically redefined the nature of humans as political animals, 
claiming that that trait does arise from the state of nature, but that it typically corresponds to 
an instrumental concern for the defense and advancement of largely pre-political individual 
interests. Marxism, then, has unabashedly protested the irrelevance of the political, 
summoning all the revolutionary energies of the proletariat for the struggle in the social 
realm, against the injustice of the dominant relations of production. Postmodernism, finally, 
has contributed to the ongoing debate on the nature of humans as political animals by 
challenging the idea of “nature” itself, and by calling for the multiplication of the sites of 
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struggle in ways that politicize what was traditionally understood to be outside the political, 
ultimately blurring the line(s) between the political and the non-political. 
Considerably less developed has been, however, the critical engagement of canonical 
political theory with another aspect of Aristotle’s axiom. Long ignored as inert matter, the 
grammar of a phrase like “man is by nature a political animal” already constitutes a universe 
of meaning before its syntactic elements are invested with semantic value. Grammar, in 
other words, subtends a net in which meaning gets caught and organized. While the content 
that different ideological claims articulate constitutes the most obvious object of political 
analysis, I argue that the grammar that characterizes and distinguishes different ideological 
discourses is endowed with political significance at a deeper level. A committed Marxist 
literary critic like Terry Eagleton, on the other hand, would reject the claim that grammar is 
intrinsically political. Postulating a distinction between “language” and its “context,” 
Eagleton maintains that it is the latter to make certain uses of the former “ideological,” 
whereas certain other uses remain “non-ideological.” “You could not decide,” he affirms 
“whether a statement was ideological or not by inspecting it in isolation from its discursive 
context,” as he explains that “[i]deology is less a matter of the inherent linguistic properties 
of a pronouncement than a question of who is saying what to whom for what purposes.”11 
Language somehow appears to exist outside of its context, and in this abstract space it has 
the potentiality of either being or not being ideological: “the same piece of language might 
be ideological in one context and not in another.”12
Eagleton’s point is convincing, at one level. Context is indeed an irreducible element in 
assessing the meaning of any utterance, as even envisioning the existence of language, let 
alone meaning, is problematic, without context. And he is right in observing that decoding 
certain statements as ideological is crucially influenced by the context in which they are 
inserted. “‘Have you put the cat out yet?’” he explains “could be an ideological utterance, if 
  
                                                 
11 Terry Eagleton, Ideology (Verso, London: 1991), p. 9 
 
12 Terry Eagleton, Ideology, p. 9 
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(for example) it carried the unspoken implication: ‘Or are you being your usual shiftless 
proletarian self?’”13
  In particular, my argument is that the grammar of liberalism is especially versatile, and 
that it can express non-liberal ideas thus proffering its own expressive infrastructure to other 
ideologies. Unlike Chomsky's “colorless green ideas,” though, the non-liberal ideas that a 
liberal grammar can express continuously expand, redraw, and reshape the boundaries of 
what that ideology can meaningfully say. While the first utterance of a political concept 
incompatible with the semantic universe of liberalism can sound as nonsensical as the idea of 
“sleeping furiously,” liberal grammar is often capable to metabolize non-sense into sense, to 
discipline indocile ideas into docile ones. To the extent that the grammar of liberalism is 
indeed able to express non-liberal ideas, as I maintain, it does so by subtly changing them, 
and yet without making them fully reducible to a liberal core. At the same time, insofar as 
grammar is depoliticized, or at any rate assumed to be extra-political, the liberal 
incorporation of extra-liberal content fails to be recognized as a genuinely political 
phenomenon. On the contrary, I note how many scholars who engage the content of 
liberalism critically, still rely on its grammar to advance their arguments. I maintain that this 
is problematic as it hinders the development of a comprehensive alternative to the currently 
hegemonic discourse. Semiotics, I argue, can provide political theorists with appropriate 
 However, I disagree with the conclusion that he reaches about language 
being devoid of any ideological content that is not a direct function of context. I argue, on 
the other hand, that a different, deeper level, language possesses certain characteristics that 
prefigure and delimit the ideological content that its concrete usages will be able to express. 
The deep structures of language, its grammar, the rules that preside over the allocation of 
meaning, do not constitute a neutral universe of sense, but portend a system of signification 
which is always already saturated with ideological content, and yet capable of 
accommodating a surplus of content. 
                                                 
 
13 Terry Eagleton, Ideology, p. 9 
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instruments for studying how political ideologies organize the field of political meaning, and 
in particular how the grammar of liberalism succeeds at expressing different ideas.   
 
 
IDEAS IN ACTION: TOWARD A DEFINITION OF IDEOLOGY 
Before proceeding further, three orders of questions appear especially urgent at this 
point. First: why would the study of politics critically hinge on a study of ideas? Second: what 
is it that we are studying, in particular, when we study ideas in politics? And third: how can 
the role of ideas in politics be evaluated? Here I will briefly outline some reasons for 
defending an ideational approach to the analysis of political matters. Then I will sketch a 
tentative definition of ideology as the primary object of this investigation. Finally, advancing 
an argument about the mode and value of studying ideas in politics constitutes the 
overarching goal of this dissertation. By claiming that ideas matter in politics, and that the 
study of their dynamics can be approached as a systematic enterprise, I intend to contribute 
to the delineation of a more solid understanding of the complex articulations of meaning of 
which we often perceive only the most superficial manifestations. Beneath a surface in which 
ideas might appear volatile under the impetus of causative agents variously defined as 
interests, structures, or institutions, I argue that in a realm of pure potentiality there exist 
discernible configurations of sense that determine the morphology of ideas and their 
interrelations inasmuch as they emerge in actuality.  
 That ideas in politics should not be regarded as either irrelevant or immutable sounds 
intuitively like an unfalsifiable truism. The idea that ideas can indeed be regarded as 
inconsequential would be in itself a tremendously powerful idea in shaping a peculiar 
conception of the political, and even in affecting concrete political behavior. Likewise, 
claiming that ideas are fixed (either because of their immanent essence; or because they have 
finally reached their tèlos) would be a departure from a well established line of thinking about 
the historical reality of politics, and as such a “new” idea in its own right. Yet, despite these 
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immediate objections, both the thesis of the irrelevance of ideas in politics, and that of their 
immutability have exercised an uncanny fascination over generations of scholars, and still 
maintain a peculiar appeal among those who long for simpler ways to make sense of their 
political experience in the world (hence relying on ideas, incidentally). 
Here I concentrate my study on the issue of how ideas matter, and how it is possible for 
an analyst of political phenomena to understand that. Before undertaking this endeavor, 
however, I should like to provide a basic outline of “ideology,” in order to reduce the 
ambiguities about this frame for understanding the functions and operations of ideas in 
politics. The disagreements that dominate the contemporary scholarship have led David 
McLellan to proclaim that “ideology is the most elusive concept in the whole of social 
science.”14 Terry Eagleton has glossed that “[t]he word ‘ideology’ […] is a text, woven of a 
whole tissue of different conceptual strands; it is traced through by divergent histories.”15
In the most restrictive sense, some critics like Frederick Watkins voice the widespread 
distrust of ideologies, indicting them as simplistic political projects grounded in extremism 
and utopianism, prone to militancy, and not immune to violence.
 
16 David Ingersoll and 
Richard Matthews, on the other hand, define ideology less dismissively, and propose a 
tripartite scheme that includes: an assessment of the status quo; a view of a desirable future; 
and, crucially, a plan of action for implementing the changes that are envisioned.17 Similarly, 
Freeden has noted that ideologies “straddle the worlds of political thought and political 
action, for one of their central functions is to connect the two.”18
                                                 
14 David McLellan, Ideology (Open University Press, Houston: 1995), p. 1 
 Terrell Carver, then, 
 
15 Terry Eagleton, Ideology (Verso, London: 1991), p. 1 
 
16 Frederick Watkins, The Age of Ideology: Political Thought, 1950 to the Present (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, 
NJ: 1964) 
 
17 D. Ingersoll and R. Matthews, The Philosophic Roots of Modern Ideology (Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
1991) 
 
18 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 76 
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defends a looser understanding of ideology, characterizing it as “an agenda of things to 
discuss, questions to ask, hypotheses to make.”19
Moreover, as the reach of the concept of political ideology extends well beyond the field 
of political science, the debates over its definition also stimulate contributions from different 
corners of the social sciences. Clifford Geertz, for instance, has argued for an understanding 
of ideology as a system of symbols, through which a given culture attributes meaning and 
order to the world.
  
20 Paul Ricoeur linked ideology to national identity, rooting it in the 
creation of certain “foundational myths” and in their deployment for fostering a sense of 
community.21 Paulo Freire emphasized the role of ideology in the social construction of 
categories like gender, race, ethnicity, or class, and the necessity of education for a critical 
engagement with it.22
It is indicative that this second set of accounts of ideology, eccentric from the 
perspective of canonical political science, introduces a peculiar element that was not at the 
forefront of the first set of definitions. Whether they are understood as systems of symbols, 
as originating from common foundational myths, or as crucially engaged in the processes of 
social construction of reality, ideologies function by telling stories. This narrative approach is 
especially clear in Lyman Sargent’s contention that: “[i]deologies are stories about the world 
we live in and our place in that world […] When we read a story, we often suspend our 
disbelief in it, and while we are still reading the story […] the story is real.”
   
23
                                                 
 
 This accent on 
19 Terrell Carver, “Ideology: The Career of a Concept,” in Terrence Ball and Richard Dagger, Ideals and 
Ideologies: A Reader, 6th ed. (Pearson Longman, New York: 2006), p. 9 
 
20 Clifford Geertz, “Ideology as a Cultural System,” in D. Apter, ed. by, Ideology and Discontent (Free Press of 
Glencoe, New York: 1964) 
 
21 Paul Ricoeur, Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (Columbia University Press, New York: 1985) 
 
22 Paulo Freire and Donald Macedo, Ideology Matters (Rowman and Littlefield Publishers: 2002) 
 
23 Lyman Sargent, Contemporary Political Ideologies: A Comparative Analysis (Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 
Belmont, CA: 2009), p. 3 
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the effects of sense (effects of reality, in particular) that the narrative character of ideology 
elicits, combined with a clear analysis of the tripartite structure of the meaning that ideology 
organizes, inclines toward a more satisfactory definition of ideology. This is in turn 
supplemented by Freeden’s morphological analysis of ideology. An ideology is for Freeden a 
distinctive configuration of political concepts, a network in which different concepts 
entertain specific relations with each other, and through these relations are given relative 
value and meaning. Furthermore, he argues: 
 
Ideologies […] aim at cementing the word-concept relationship. By determining the 
meaning of a concept thy can then attach a single meaning to a political term. 
Ultimately, ideologies are configurations of decontested meanings of political 
concepts […]. ‘This is what liberty means, and that is what justice means,’ [an 
ideology] asserts.24
 
 
Deconstestation, then is the characteristic function of ideologies: anchoring the political 
meaning of certain key concepts, they organize the surrounding and fluid universe of politics 
on the basis of those fixed elements. Ernesto Laclau defines this operation as “closure,” and 
notices that it is “impossible but at the same time necessary; impossible because of the 
constitutive dislocation which lies at the heart of any structural arrangement, necessary, 
because without that fictitious fixing of meaning there would be no meaning at all.”25
                                                 
 
 This 
fundamental aporia of meaning calls into question the punctual correspondence of signifiers 
and signifieds, and radically redefines systems of signification away from the characteristics 
of fixity and immutability that early structuralists had attributed to them. Incorporating 
Freeden’s morphological focus with the aspects outlined above, I would like to propose a 
working definition of ideology that takes into account its narrative, structural, and semantic 
dimensions. An ideology:  
24 M. Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 76 
 
25 E. Laclau, “The Death and Resurrection of the Theory of Ideology,” in Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol. 1 
Issue 3 
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1) Tells a story about the world of politics;  
2) This story is structured around a tension between the status quo and a better future, 
and this tension is resolved through political action; 
3) Meaning is organized in this story according to a specific grammatical configuration.  
While this quick sketch certainly cannot aspire to capture all the complexities of an 
essentially contested concept like ideology, I argue that it presents the advantage of avoiding 
the flatness of some other definitions by placing the object of study in a three-dimensional 
space. Highlighting the narrative character of ideology allows the critic to study it as a 
distinctive genre, thus making use of interpretive instruments developed in other disciplines. 
Keeping the focus on the descriptive, normative, and action-oriented elements prevents the 
analyst from losing sight of the political specificities of an ideology. Finally, considering the 
allocation of meaning and the distinctive systems of values that ensue permits a critical 
assessment of the modalities in which different ideologies impact politics, and their relative 
degrees of success at that. This third dimension, in particular, is the level at which I wish to 
concentrate my analysis. I regard the specific configurations of meaning that are 
characteristic of each ideology as akin to “grammars.” In this sense, a “liberal grammar” can 
express non-liberal content; without concentrating on the grammar itself, the power of a 
certain mode of expression to channel and delineate political content remains 
unacknowledged. Being cognizant of the grammatical aspect, on the other hand, exposes the 
peculiar patterns for the production of meaning that a mode of expression establishes. 
Taken together, the three components of my definition of ideology constitute a 
convenient vantage point from which to defend the constitutive role of ideas in the political 
sphere. If ideas are, with various rationales and to different ends, expunged from politics, a 
call for direct, unmediated action is likely to occur. Divorcing by decree the cognitive from 
the performative (despite the indissoluble mutuality of their relations), figures as diverse as 
scientific socialists and liberal-bourgeois pragmatists have declared the battle of ideas passé, 
and have concentrated their efforts on action. Dispensing with ideas in the exercise of 
politics, these positions have typically also discredited the study of ideas in politics. “Critique 
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of ideology” became the stock phrase utilized by self-defined free-thinking theorists eager to 
mark their difference from obtuse, unrefined zealots trapped in their closed systems of 
thought. Rescuing “the real” from “the ideological,” some thinkers saluted the coming of a 
post-ideological era as one in which the real exigency of action would emerge unfettered by 
distortive mental schemes.  
The mystification that a purer form of political action can exist somewhere outside the 
reach of mystifying ideas and ideologies, however, hardly goes unquestioned. Without 
responding to the maladroit actionism of “critics of ideology” with an equally apodictic 
belief in a rigid form of ideational causality, it is possible to value the role of ideas in politics 
and to elaborate a method for the systematic study of their configurations in the space of the 
political, a space neither insulated from action, nor ultimately reducible to it. Slavoj Žižek is 
provocatively clear in his scandalous “plea for Leninist intolerance”:  
 
One is therefore tempted to turn around Marx’s eleventh thesis: the first task today 
is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to act, to directly intervene and change 
things […] but to question the hegemonic ideological coordinates. If, today, one 
follows a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space; it will be 
an act within the hegemonic ideological coordinates […]26
 
  
Political action never happens in a void: its space is always already defined by ideas that 
constitute at the same time the conditions of thinkability of action, and its boundaries. 
Action has in itself the potential to act on the same system of ideas in which it takes place; 
but in order to do so, it needs to challenge at the margins the very conditions of its own 
thinkability: it needs to redraw the extant boundaries between organized sense and non-
sense. Short of this radical engagement with ideas, with all the power that a political actor 
can deploy, what can be done is to a large extent pre-determined by what can be thought 
beforehand. Recuperating the language of ideology and ideological hegemony from the 
dustbin of history to which it had been consigned, then, Žižek, among others, presents the 
                                                 
26 Slavoj Žižek, “A Plea for Leninist Intolerance,” in Critical Inquiry vol. 28, no. 2 (Winter 2002), p. 545 
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contemporary scholars of ideology with the fascinating task of engaging with an object of 
study that requires political theorists to open up to a repertoire of linguistic and semiotic 
analysis to which vast sectors of the discipline have often looked with diffidence in the past.  
To establish that ideas matter, in fact, is far from understanding how they do so. In this 
project I claim that semiotics can provide an aperture into that alleged black box of political 
theory. A necessary premise to this investigation is that the relevant object of study are not 
single ideas (to the dubious extent that such a thing is even thinkable), but more or less 
organized systems of ideas. Never does a single idea matter in politics: ideas are always found 
in relation to each other; or rather: a fluid, multi-dimensional space of ideas is segmented 
into discrete entities as the necessary and necessarily inadequate simplification of an 
irreducibly complex matter. Much like words in a language are never fully present to 
themselves one at a time, but rather always carry within themselves the traces of each other’s 
absences, so are ideas in politics always caught in webs of mutual inter-definitions and 
deferrals. Much like in Saussure’s language there are only differences, so ideas too negotiate 
their boundaries with each other and continuously reshape the space of the political that 
constitutes both their substantial essence, and their interstitial outside.  
Studying systems of ideas is, crucially, studying the combinatory rules that preside over 
their interactions. A topography of sense needs to be conceived in order to envision the 
roads, obstacles, detours, cliffs, bridges, even “secret passages” that connect ideas to each 
other (and self-reflexively to themselves) in a given system. How sense flows and organizes 
itself within the system of ideas that we call political ideologies is the question that I consider 
in this work. In order to draw a map of sense I will employ a conceptual framework and 
some basic tools derived from the discipline that studies signification, the process by which 
sense is segmented into signs and as such it is made expendable in languages. A recourse to 
semiotics carries with it the challenge of introducing a terminology and a style of thinking to 
which canonical political theory has remained largely impermeable; but at the same it also 
suggests the possibility of achieving a greater clarity in understanding the working of ideas, 
dispelling the misconception that rigor and intellectual discipline can only be achieved at the 
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expenses of applying to the study of politics quantitative methodologies developed in realms 
of knowledge too distant from it. The promise of this project amounts not only to the 
vindication of qualitative research in general, but to a specific contribution to contemporary 
political theory. 
 
 
IDEOLOGY: SEMANTIC, NOT APOPHANTIC 
In the introduction to this chapter I have exposed some basic reasons for regarding 
ideas as a primary focus of attention in the study of politics. Analyzing political ideas in their 
specificity as ideas, without dissolving them into other explanatory factors (interests, 
structures, institutions), is one of the fundamental tasks of political theory, and one of the 
preconditions for its defense as a vital contributor to the conversation of political science. 
Moreover, I have argued, elements of semiotic analysis can facilitate the advancement of a 
clearer understanding of the roles, functions, and peculiarities of political ideology as the 
characteristic mode of organizing ideas in politics. Here I will start by briefly recounting 
some of the main approaches and some of the most enduring debates around the concept of 
ideology.  
In order to facilitate the navigation through a profoundly complex subject matter, I shall 
start by organizing the discussion on a continuum stretching from positions maintaining the 
“falsity” of ideology to positions emphasizing its “reality.” In a somewhat similar fashion, 
Nancy Hirschmann identifies two dimensions that have historically defined the debate on 
social construction: the level of “ideological misinterpretation,” intuitively familiar for most 
people and not uncommon even among theorists; and that of “materialization,” 
corresponding to the belief that “how we think about, talk about, interpret, and understand 
 19 
 
social phenomena produces material effects on the phenomena themselves.”27 Lamenting 
the inadequacy of both these positions, Hirschmann also proposes a third level of social 
construction, that she calls “the discursive construction of social meaning:” this move out of 
an otherwise inescapable logical impasse proves very fruitful for the concrete analysis of the 
workings of ideological discourses.28
Approaching ideologies as systems for the organization of political meaning in discourse 
first requires an engagement with the meaning of “ideology” itself. Philologically, that points 
to Antoine Destutt de Tracy's usage of the term as its first recorded occurrence. In the 
intellectual milieu of the French Enlightenment, Destutt de Tracy “sought to establish ideals 
of thought and action on an empirically verifiable basis, from which both the criticism of 
ideas and a science of ideas would emerge.”
 The discursive construction of social meaning, in fact, 
amounts to a process of signification: an investment of sense is needed in order to actualize 
the pure potentiality of social meaning. Signs are constructed through discourse as signifiers 
are devised that correspond to given signifieds. While this correspondence is never as fixed 
and immutable as early structuralists maintained, that through signs content is invested with 
sense and organized, and not only rendered manifest through expression, remains a seminal 
intuition for the study of systems of meaning more generally.  
29
                                                 
27 Nancy Hirschmann, The Subject of Liberty: Toward a Feminist Theory of Freedom (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton: 2003), pp. 78-79 
 While the strong positivistic overtones of this 
enterprise tend to discredit it with much of the contemporary epistemological sensibility, 
some of its elements are not to be dismissed altogether. In particular, the ambition to 
systematize the study of ideas, and of political ideas in particular (a hopelessly disorderly 
universe by most accounts), provides an ideal aspiration that, when purged of its rationalistic 
hubris, can usefully orient the scholarly treatment of ideology. 
 
28 N. Hirschmann, The Subject of Liberty, p. 81 
 
29 M. Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2003), p. 4 
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Over the last two centuries the intellectual status of ideology has been at the center of 
countless debates among political thinkers and cultural analysts, and different positions on 
how to approach its academic study have emerged. In particular, to Marx’s early 
marginalization of ideology, as a purely derivative and superstructural category, other 
theorists have responded, both within and without the traditions of Marxism. Ideology has 
gradually become an object of study in its own right, as its dismissal as “false consciousness” 
and epiphenomenon has evolved into a full appreciation of its importance and even 
materiality. As the question on the falsity or truth of ideology seems to have receded, then, 
the focus must shift to the study of its actual mechanisms, and in particular it must 
concentrate on ideology’s capacity of eliciting effects of sense that can determine political 
action.  
 For the purpose of presenting the vast array of positions that have historically emerged 
on the subject of ideology, here I propose a categorical distinction originally elaborated by 
Aristotle in De Interpretatione. In his systematic discussion of linguistic elements, Aristotle 
distinguishes between “phásis (“what is said”) and katáphasis (an “affirmation”).”30 To this 
opposition corresponds the opposition between meaning and truth conditions: only 
katáphasis can be discussed as being true or false, whereas phásis is not concerned with this 
question, and it can only be considered in the definition of its meaning.31
                                                 
 
 As an example, 
Aristotle speaks of names taken on their own (a “cat” cannot be said to be either true or 
false, but what a cat is can certainly be discussed) as opposed to propositions (that “the cat is 
on the mat” can be contextually true or false). To the first category of linguistic statements 
(those in which questions of meaning are pertinent) “semantic” judgment can be attached; to 
the second category (in which questions of truth and falsehood are relevant) “apophantic” 
judgments can be referred. Moreover, semantic judgments are “governed by rules which are 
very different from those of referentiality:” in Aristotle’s example, the tragélaphos, a 
30 G. Manetti, Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity (Indiana University Press, Bloomington: 1993), p. 76 
 
31 G. Manetti, Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity, p. 76 
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monstrous creature half goat and half stag, cannot be stated to be true or false, but judgment 
on what it means can be passed nonetheless.32
In this sense, then, the status of ideology resembles closely that of Aristotle’s tragélaphos. 
Ideologies typically organize pieces of discourse into more or less coherent wholes. They 
take certain descriptions of reality and juxtapose them to accounts of alternative and yet 
possible allocations of resources, values, power, or other political fungibles; crucially, then 
they also point to concrete ways for implementing the changes that they envision. Each of 
these elements is rarely found disjointed from the others in actual examples of ideological 
discourse, but these different rhetorical styles (respectively: descriptive, normative, and 
action-oriented) can be generally identified.  
 
A normative claim cannot, by its very nature, be regarded as true or false: it pertains to 
reality as it ought to be, not as it is. Action-oriented statements are also neither true nor false: 
they aim at the production of effects of sense that in turn stimulate intervention on the 
world; as such, they point to reality as it becomes (or can become), not as it is or it is not. 
Strictly speaking, then, apophantic judgments could only apply to the descriptive element of 
ideology. However, since the latter cannot be understood as a stand-alone piece, but only 
acquires meaning from its relations to the normative and action-oriented components, 
considering it under the rubric of truth-falsehood, would miss the point of its specificity. 
Within the conceptual economy of an ideology, descriptive claims are clearly functional to 
the normative and action-oriented edifice that they need to sustain. They don’t need to be 
either true or false: they need to be solid enough so that the project will not collapse. Such 
solidity is given on the one hand by the verisimilitude of the description: if it is patently 
fabricated, it also disqualifies the claims that rest on it. On the other hand, and most 
crucially, the value of the descriptive element in an ideology does not lie in its 
correspondence to some metaphysical, external notion of “truth,” but in how “true” it is to 
its normative and action-oriented counterparts. In other words, I argue that the study of 
                                                 
 
32 G. Manetti, Theories of the Sign in Classical Antiquity, p. 76 
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ideology needs to concentrate on how well its elements hold with each other, and not how 
accurately one of those elements captures the intrinsic truth of the world. Yet, for a long 
time, apophantic themes have been prominent in most debates. I will now briefly recount 
the development of these debates; then, in the following section I will turn to a possible 
outline for a semantic study of ideology. 
The classic apophantic statement was formulated by Marx in The German Ideology. There 
Marx famously affirmed the fundamental falsity of ideology as a legitimate object of analysis, 
and dismissed it as the immaterial by-product of the real, material conditions of production: 
 
The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly 
interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the 
language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at 
this stage as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to the 
mental production as expressed in the language of politics, laws, morality, religion, 
metaphysics, etc., of a people.33
 
 
He also specified the dynamics by which certain ideas emerge as dominant in a given society, 
confirming an attitude scarcely interested in assessing their “meaning,” and more 
immediately concerned with discrediting their claims to truth.  
 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e., the class which is 
the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. 
[….] The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant 
material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of 
the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its 
dominance.34
  
  
Whereas the phrase and the very concept of “false consciousness” are to be imputed more 
to orthodox Marxism (as codified primarily by Engels) than to Marx himself, it is undeniable 
                                                 
33 Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in R. Tucker, ed. by The Marx-Engels Reader (W.W. Norton & Company, New 
York: 1978), p. 154 
 
34 K. Marx, The German Ideology, pp. 172-3. Emphasis in the original. 
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that the emphasis placed on the economic factor paved the way for this oversimplification. 
Confronted with the incongruence between objective class conditions and inconsequential 
class consciousness, Marxist thinkers liquidated the latter as plainly mistaken, and elaborated 
the category of false consciousness as an umbrella term to explain the “error.” As Chantal 
Mouffe has observed, “the economistic problematic of ideology” entailed both a dismissal of 
superstructures as epiphenomena of the structure, and an acknowledgment of their possible 
efficacy.35
 
 Similarly, McLellan sums up Marx’s pejorative treatment of ideology as being 
comprised of two main elements: 
[F]irst, ideology was connected with idealism which, as a philosophic outlook, was 
unfavourably contrasted with materialism: any correct view of the world had to be, in 
some sense, a materialist view. Second, ideology was connected with the uneven 
distribution of resources and power in society: if the social and economic 
arrangements were suspect then so was the ideology that was part of them.36
 
  
Faced with these largely contradictory claims, Marxist theory was in need of creative 
rethinking and disambiguation. As Mouffe points out, within the tradition of Marxism, 
“Antonio Gramsci must surely be the first to have undertaken a complete and radical 
critique of economism.”37 While the second of the two points identified by McLellan 
remains a central aspect of all Marxist thinking on ideology, the first critique is crucially 
relaxed in Gramsci’s reflection. Responding mostly to the codification of orthodox Marxism, 
as well as to the elaborations of revisionism and revolutionary syndicalism, Gramsci 
explicitly denounces as an error the reduction of ideology to a purely negative or trivial 
concept.38
                                                 
 
 Instead, he distinguishes between “historically organic ideologies” and “ideologies 
35 Chantal Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London: 1979), p. 169  
 
36 D. McLellan, Ideology, p. 9 
 
37 C. Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory, pp. 169-170 
 
38 see E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Verso, London: 1985) 
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that are arbitrary, rationalistic, or “willed”.”39 Rather than being just the passive, inert 
perspiration of the material conditions of production, “[t]o the extent that ideologies are 
historically necessary they have a validity which is “psychological”; they “organise” human 
masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, 
struggle, etc.”40
In this sense, then, Gramsci radically redefines the significance of ideology within a 
Marxist paradigm. Lenin too, in What Is To Be Done?, had vigorously questioned the 
reductionist economicism of early scientific socialists, countering that the social reality of 
Russia required an active role for intellectuals in mobilizing ideas, and ultimately forming the 
party into a revolutionary vanguard. With Gramsci, in particular, not only is the alleged 
falsity of ideology contested, but ideology itself becomes a productive force in turn, both in 
preserving the structures of the status quo, and in potentially challenging them. In keeping 
with the metaphor of strategy, whereas for Lenin ideas acted as a “vanguard,” in Gramsci’s 
“war of position” the ideological battleground is the primary site of contestation. Moreover, 
Gramsci affirms an almost tangible materiality of an “ideological structure,” embodied in 
agencies like the press, “its most dynamic part,” but also: “libraries, schools, associations and 
clubs of various kinds, even architecture and the layout and names of the streets.”
   
41
 
 As 
Laclau and Mouffe observe:  
Ideology is not identified with a ‘system of ideas’ or with the ‘false consciousness’ of 
social agents; it is instead an organic and relational whole, embodied in institutions 
and apparatuses, which welds together a historical bloc around a number of basic 
articulatory principles. […] In fact, through the concepts of historical bloc and of 
                                                 
 
39 Antonio Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks, in M. Durham and D. Kellner, ed. by, Media and Cultural Studies: Key 
Works (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford: 2001, 2006), p. 15 
 
40 A. Gramsci, The Prison Notebooks, p. 15 
 
41 Antonio Gramsci, “Cultural Themes: Ideological Material,” in M. Durham and D. Kellner, ed. by, Media and 
Cultural Studies: Key Works (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford: 2001, 2006) 
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ideology as organic cement, a new totalizing category takes us beyond the old 
base/superstructure distinction.42
 
 
Central to Gramsci’s political thought is the concept of hegemony, intended as the moral 
and intellectual leadership that emanates from a class, but that at the same time transcends 
the old strategy of “class alliances” and purports to become the “collective will” of a 
“historical bloc”.43
 
 This result can only be achieved through a patient “war of position” 
aimed at the constitution of a new historical bloc, i.e.: the capillary penetration of society and 
the proposal of a counter-hegemony capable of insinuating itself within the system of the 
dominant values, and ultimately capable of replacing it. This process, and the political finesse 
of the project, are clearly explicated by Mouffe: 
[A] class is hegemonic when it has managed to articulate to its discourse the 
overwhelming majority of ideological elements characteristic of a given social 
formation, in particular the national-popular elements which allow it to become the 
class expressing the national interest. A class’s hegemony is, therefore, a more 
complex phenomenon than simple political leadership [which depends on] the 
creation of a unified coherent ideological discourse which will be the product of the 
articulation to its value system of the ideological elements existing within a 
determinate historical conjuncture of the society in question.44
 
  
Gramsci’s contributions, then, include both the formulation of the concept of hegemony, 
with a strategy to achieve it, and also the full appreciation of the productive and material 
aspects of ideology. A paradigmatic shift is inaugurated by Gramsci, from a purely 
apophantic indictment of “false consciousness,” toward the semantic distinction between 
“historically organic ideologies” and those that are “arbitrary, rationalistic, or ‘willed’.” The 
theme of the materiality of ideology, as opposed to its truth or falsehood, is also central in 
Louis Althusser’s reflection. In Mouffe’s account, Althusser’s structuralist position: 
                                                 
42 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (Verso, London: 1985), p. 67 
 
43 E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, pp. 66-67 
 
44 C. Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London: 1979), p. 195 
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understan[ds] by ideology a practice producing subjects. The subject is not the 
originating source of consciousness, the expression of the irruption of a subjective 
principle into objective historical processes, but the product of a specific practice 
operating through the mechanism of interpellation.45
 
 
For Althusser the materiality of ideology is embodied in the Ideological State Apparatuses: 
“a certain number of realities which present themselves to the immediate observer in the 
form of distinct and specialized institutions,” such as the religious, the educational, the 
family, the legal, the political, the trade-union, the communications, the cultural Ideological 
State Apparatuses (ISA).46
To this state-centric conception of Althusser reacts Michel Foucault. For Foucault the 
reproduction of the structures of power in society always happens from below, without any 
central point of origin, in a complex web of interrelations. However, as Slavoj Žižek 
observes, “one can never arrive at Power this way – the abyss that separates micro-
procedures from the spectre of Power remains unbridgeable.”
 Alongside the Repressive State Apparatuses, such as the army or 
the police, these ISAs ensure the societal function of the reproduction of labor-power, both 
in is skills and, crucially, in its submission to the ruling order, to the ruling ideology.  
47
 
 Foucault, nevertheless, has 
other reasons too to reject the very notion of ideology, and to prefer speaking of 
“discourse.” Among these one is especially relevant in this context: 
The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to make use of, for three 
reasons. The first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to 
something else which is supposed to count as truth. Now I believe that the problem 
does not consist in drawing the line between that in a discourse that falls under the 
category of scientificity or truth, and that which comes under some other category, 
                                                 
45 C. Mouffe, Gramsci and Marxist Theory, p. 171 
 
46 Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation),” [1969] in S. 
Žižek, ed. by, Mapping Ideology (Verso, London: 1994), pp. 110-111 
 
47 S. Žižek, “Introduction: The Spectre of Ideology,” in S. Žižek, ed. by, Mapping Ideology (Verso, London: 1994), 
p. 13 
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but in seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within discourses which 
in themselves are neither true nor false.48
  
 
Foucault’s position is clear here. Especially the last sentence seems to complete the 
expulsion of any apophantic overtones in the debate on ideology, together with distancing 
Foucault from the Marxist tradition. In spite of his discomfort with the concept, and of his 
rejection of the very term, Foucault’s contribution expresses the fundamental crux of the 
contemporary discussion on ideology. Moving from “truth” to the “effects of truth” 
produced by and through language critically reframes the study of ideology as a project of 
discourse analysis. The analysis of ideological discourse, then, needs to remain attuned to the 
specificity of this particular “genre,” but at the same time it can borrow from the repertoires 
of practices developed in the fields of literary interpretation.  
On the one hand, this has inspired a cultural anthropologist like Arjun Appadurai. 
Without attempting to solve the Gordian knot of the inner nature of ideology, Appadurai 
focuses on the workings of ideological forces in action, bracketing more intricate definitional 
questions. In his study on the contemporary global dynamics of cultural homogeneization 
and cultural heterogeneization, he introduces the vocabulary of ethnoscapes, mediascapes, 
technoscapes, financescapes and ideoscapes.49
 
 According to the author:  
The suffix –scape allows us to point to the fluid, irregular shapes of these landscapes 
[…] These terms […] also indicate that these are not objectively given relations that 
look the same from every angle of vision, but, rather, that they are deeply 
perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political 
situatedness of different sorts of actors: nation-states, multinationals, diasporic 
communities, as well as subnational groupings and movements […].50
 
  
                                                 
 
48 Michel Foucault, “Truth and Power” in Power/Knowledge (Pantheon Books, New York: 1980), p. 118 
 
49 Arjun Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy,” in Public Culture, 2:2 (1990), 
in M. Durham and D. Kellner, ed. by, Media and Cultural Studies: Key Works (Blackwell Publishing, Oxford: 2001, 
2006), p. 589 
 
50 A. Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference,” p. 589 
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Considering cultural elements through the lens of these landscapes presents the advantage of 
offering a view that is at the same time general enough to allow interrelations to be observed, 
but without projecting an overarching sense of unity that might be unwarranted, especially in 
the contemporary conditions of disjuncture. Between Althusser’s structuralism and 
Foucault’s radical refusal to acknowledge any overarching structure of society, Appadurai 
seems to present a third position that, while probably closer to Foucault, still makes it 
possible to consider the ideological elements at work in society, as well as the real 
displacements and syncretic recombination that happen at the encounter of different cultural 
and ideological systems.  More precisely, ideoscapes are: 
 
concatenation of images [and] they are often directly political and frequently have to 
do with the ideologies of states and the counterideologies of movements explicitly 
oriented to capturing state power or a piece of it. These ideoscapes are composed of 
elements of the Enlightenment worldview, which consists of a chain of ideas, terms, 
and images, including freedom, welfare, rights, sovereignty, representation and the 
master term democracy. […] But the diaspora of these terms and images across the 
world, especially since the nineteenth century, has loosened the internal coherence 
that held them together in the Euro-American master narrative and provided instead 
a loosely structured synopticon of politics, in which different nation-states, as part of 
their evolution, have organized their political cultures around different keywords.51
 
 
As Appadurai notices, thinking in terms of ideoscapes requires placing a special attention on 
the semantics of ideological elements. In fact, as the local adaptation, cultural contamination 
and political appropriation of ideas, terms, images that are the basic components of 
ideologies becomes a more frequent phenomenon, it is all the more important to be sensitive 
to the polysemic possibilities of meaning encompassed by those elements. While most of 
these possibilities might remain latent in a given context, being cognizant of their existence 
may render us more intelligent of the real functioning of ideologies on the ground. 
Most importantly, the concept of ideoscapes points to the plural, diverse character of 
ideologies. Rather than thinking of ideologies as discrete objects, endowed with definite 
                                                 
51 A. Appadurai, “Disjuncture and Difference,” p. 591 
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boundaries and a clear “outside,” Appadurai’s formulation accounts for the idiosyncratic 
patterns of continuities and discontinuities that can be observed in political landscapes. 
Ideoscapes, in fact, do not dissolve political ideas in a world of pure indeterminacy, but 
recognize the clusters that form, contingently and sometimes ephemerally in different 
political, historical, and cultural contexts. Despite his rejection of the category of “ideology,” 
Foucault’s analysis of the variations that characterize the discursive formations of liberalism 
and neoliberalism are illustrative on this subject.  
Foucault identifies neoliberalism as a distinctly new phenomenon in the development of 
an art of governing, both society and the self. The genealogy of this art of government 
points to a first discontinuity around the middle of the eighteenth century, when liberalism 
supplants the notion of raison d’État as the organizing principle of the state. According to 
Foucault this corresponds to a shift from the goal of managing social, economic, and even 
cultural forces so as to ensure the state’s unlimited growth, to the idea of limiting the 
exercise of power in government.52 “Frugal government,” though, is for Foucault “not 
something other than raison d’État, an element external to and in contradictions with raison 
d’État, but rather its point of inflection in the curve of its development.”53
 
 The liberal 
principle of limited government, while proclaiming the retreat of an overly intrusive state, at 
the same time produces a number of new governmental practices. These changes center 
primarily on the role of the market as a “site of truth”:  
In the middle of the eighteenth century the market no longer appeared as, or rather 
no longer had to be a site of jurisdiction. On the one hand, the market appeared as 
something that obeyed and had to obey “natural,” that is to say, spontaneous 
mechanisms […] On the other hand – and this is the second sense in which the 
market becomes a site of truth – […] when you allow the market to function by itself 
                                                 
52 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979, ed. by Michel Senellart, 
translated by Graham Burchell (Palgrave MacMillan, New York: 2008), p. 27 
 
53 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 28 
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according to its nature, according to its natural truth […] it permits the formation of 
a certain price which will be called, metaphorically, the true price […]54
 
 
The market gets constituted as a mechanism for the production of truth. State intervention 
on the market would distort this truth, and as such it has to be limited to a minimum. This 
principle of political economy becomes the cornerstone of what Appadurai might term the 
ideoscape of liberalism for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Moreover, the 
liberal discourse of limited government also justifies the concrete practices that Foucault 
calls by the collective name of “governmentality.” Linking together power techniques 
(government) and modes of thought (mentality), Foucault emphasizes his idea about the 
mutual constitution of power and knowledge. As one commentator has noted: “On the one 
hand, the term pin-points a specific form of representation; government defines a discursive 
field in which exercising power is ‘rationalized’ […] On the other hand, it also structures 
specific forms of intervention.”55
These interventions, the deployment of the power of the state, become especially 
relevant at the inception of what Foucault identifies as a new phase in the development of 
the discourse of liberalism. Reacting to both external shocks, and its own internal 
congestions, the ideoscape of liberalism morphs in the twentieth century and spurs the 
formation of the distinctive discursive formation of neoliberalism. In what Foucault 
indicates as a German variant of this phenomenon, the traditional liberal commitment to the 
market as a natural entity, to be left alone by the state as much as possible, gives in to the 
belief that market mechanisms in general, and competition in particular can only function 
only inasmuch as they are actively promoted by the practice of government.
  
56
                                                 
 
 Rather than 
being mutually exclusive, “the state” and “the market” are mutually constitutive, and their 
54 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 31 
 
55 Thomas Lemke, “‘The Birth of Bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-
liberal  Governmentality,” in Economy and Society, vol. 30, no. 2, May 2001, p. 191 
 
56 See Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, Lecture of 7 February 1979, pp. 101-128  
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joint mode of operation relies on a peculiar art of government, both at the level of society, 
and of the individual. The state must intervene on society to create the conditions for 
efficient markets; in the context of the German reconstruction effort after the Second World 
War this amounts to the principle of Gesellscchaftspolitik, a comprehensive scheme of social 
policies that the state assumes as its fundamental task: “the object of governmental action is 
what the Germans call ‘die soziale Umwelt’: the social environment.”57
Whereas the European version of neoliberalism is strongly statist, its American 
counterpart is characteristically inimical to the very idea of an interventionist state. Though 
the category of “neoliberalism” is typically taken today to refer to just the (Anglo-)American 
experience, or to (attempted) replicas of it around the world, Foucault traces the 
independent genealogy of a European variant. In Thomas Lemke’s analysis: “Whereas the 
Ordo-liberals in West Germany pursued the idea of governing society in the name of the 
economy, the US neo-liberals attempt to re-define the social sphere as a form of the 
economic domain.”
 The ideoscape that 
had been centered on the principle of limited government now gets restructured in order to 
justify a strongly interventionist state.  
58 The economic sphere becomes the model itself of rationality and of 
conduct: homo oeconomicus is understood to be both a comprehensive descriptive 
representation and a normative goal.59 However, crucially, this process of marketization of 
society does not amount to a rejection of the state on anarchist grounds. As Maurizio 
Lazzarato has pointed out: “Only the social, civil society, the nation, the state, etc., can 
provide the territorial limits, the boundaries of ‘community’ and the social bonds that the 
economy lacks.”60
                                                 
57 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 146  
Without these social bonds the mere interaction of pre-political individuals 
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59 See Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitic, Lecture of 28 March 1979, pp. 267-289 
 
60 Maurizio Lazzarato, “Neoliberalism in Action: Inequality, Insecurity, and the Reconstitution of the Social,” in 
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cannot ensure the functioning of the economy; it is the role of the state to constitute those 
individuals as members of an “enterprise society.”  
In both its German and American configurations, neoliberalism is clearly distinct from 
the liberalism of “frugal government.” Moreover, though the neoliberal state is an 
interventionist one, it is so in the pursuit of social values significantly different from, if not 
diametrically opposed to, the principles of welfare liberalism that I have briefly discussed at 
the beginning of this chapter. In light of so much variation, the question might be raised of 
whether or not it even makes sense to qualify all these positions as “liberal” in some sense. 
In other words, when does an ideoscape cease to be identifiable as such, and it becomes 
something else? This is a central question in the study of ideology, as it pertains to the 
mechanisms for the production, allocation, and contestation of political meaning that define 
the political field of an ideoscape. Though I regard Appadurai’s terminological innovation as 
a conceptual advancement over the old vocabulary of ideology, I prefer referring to the 
object of my study as “ideological discourse.” In fact, I believe that placing the emphasis 
more explicitly on discourse illuminates a distinctive aspect of my analysis. There is 
something about the linguistic structure of specific ideological configurations that explains 
both their elasticity with regards to the semantic ground that they can cover, and their 
specificity with regards to how they articulate and express a variety of political views. This 
dimension points to what I have introduced above as the “grammar” of ideology. In the next 
chapter I will present some instruments for analyzing ideological discourse in both its 
semantic and syntactic dimensions. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have introduced the object of my study. My main argument is that 
ideology can be fruitfully regarded as a peculiar narrative genre. In my analysis ideological 
discourses are characterized by the recurrence of certain characteristics, both semantic and 
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syntactic. However, while the study of the morphology of different ideologies at the level of 
content has been systematically pursued by a line of thinkers of which Michael Freeden is 
the most illustrious contemporary exponent, I argue that the grammatical structure that 
ideologies exhibit has not received an adequate amount of attention. Semiotics, I contend, 
can significantly contribute to the analysis of how systems of ideas operate in the field of 
politics. 
I identify three main elements of ideology, or rather three different angles from which 
ideology can be studied; taken together these three elements define the boundaries of my 
analysis. First, at a very intuitive level, an ideology tells a story about politics; as such, an 
ideological text can be studied as a distinctive narrative genre, with its own peculiar narrative 
formulas. Secondly, the standard narrative formula of ideology is centered around a tension 
between a status quo, which is described as unsatisfactory, for some reason, and an 
alternative future, which is instead normatively qualified as desirable. Connecting the 
descriptive and normative elements there is the action-oriented characteristics of ideology: in 
order for the transition to happen, the change needs to be effected by certain forces 
(individual agents, classes, divine intervention, etc.). Finally, the third element of my 
definition is that, along with the different semantic investments that distinguish different 
ideologies, it is also important to pay attention to the regularities with which meaning is 
configured by various ideological discourses. In other words: liberalism, socialism, and 
conservatism differ from each other for the story that they tell to justify the welfare state. 
But they also differ from each other for how they tell their story: who/what operates the 
relevant transformation of the status quo, and how that process is narrativized.  
Historically, though, the critique of ideology has been more concerned with the 
question of whether ideologies faithfully represent the reality of politics, or unavoidably 
distort it. A standard position within the tradition of Marxism has been that of indicting 
ideology as false and/or irrelevant (to the extent that those two things are not contradictory). 
Gramsci’s intervention clearly rescued ideology from irrelevance, and introduced a 
distinction between “historically organic” (hence “true”), “arbitrary, rationalistic, or ‘willed’” 
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(hence “false”) ideologies. Moreover, Gramsci emphasized the materiality of ideology, a 
theme that was then critically developed by Althusser and his analysis of Ideological State 
Apparatuses. This structuralist, state-centric view of ideology was then contested by 
Foucault: questioning the very category of ideology, Foucault calls for a shift from an 
abstract notion of “truth” to the actual “effects of truth” produced in discourse. I regard this 
move as fundamental in defining my own intervention: I propose to study the specific 
mechanisms for the production of “effects of truth” that characterize what Appadurai aptly 
terms ideoscapes, unsettled conglomerations of ideas that define a political landscape within 
given cultural and historical coordinates.  
In conclusion, I argue that, moving beyond the classic question of whether ideologies 
are “true” or “false,” a pertinent question to ask about ideologies today is about how they 
organize political meaning. To the extent that different ideologies can be studied as distinct 
narrative styles, attention must be paid not only to the political story that they tell, but also to 
how they convey meaning in telling that story. I argue that, by systematizing the study of 
what I have termed the “grammar” of specific ideologies, it is also possible to expose deep 
homologies among seemingly incongruous political arguments. As I have noted above, 
commenting on Freeden’s metaphor, much like different rooms can perform different 
functions (a bedroom, a living room, etc.), and yet be similar with regards to their style or 
ambiance (rococo, Bauhaus, etc.), I argue that different ideological positions can also exhibit 
patterns of similarity with regards to their deep expressive structure. In Chapter III, in 
particular, I will construct a possible account of the deep grammar of liberalism, by looking 
at the work of some key liberal thinkers. In Chapter IV, then, I will use that basic sketch 
toward the definition of a liberal grammar to study political arguments that originate from 
outside the core of a liberal ideology, and yet seem to conform to the deep expressive 
structures of liberalism.  
Before engaging in the analysis of actual examples of ideological discourse, I present 
some general considerations on what I regard as a fruitful way to approach the question of 
how ideologies should be studied as narrative objects. Typically ideologies organize, create 
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and contest political meaning by attempting to produce effects of truth and motivate their 
selected target to action. How exactly are these effects of truth produced? How can they be 
study in the specific narrative genre of political ideologies? In order to address these 
questions I now turn to Chapter II and to an illustration of some of the ways in which 
semiotics can contribute to the study of ideology. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF SEMIOTICS TO THE STUDY OF IDEOLOGY 
  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the previous chapter I have introduced political ideology as a specific style of 
discourse characterized by certain structural features. In particular, I have identified three 
elements for a possible definition: 1) an ideology tells a story about politics; 2) the story 
moves from the description of an unsatisfactory status quo, and envisions a desirable future, 
to be reached via the deployment of political action; 3) the narration arranges meaning in 
certain recurrent configurations. Two general considerations follow from this. First, 
regarding ideology as a narrative genre suggests that the critique of ideology should be less 
concerned with the correspondence between the narration and some extra-discursive truth, 
and more poignantly aimed at unveiling the effects of truth produced within the narration 
itself. Secondly, focusing on the peculiar configurations of meaning of different ideological 
discourses renders pertinent, or even necessary, the analysis of the “grammar” of different 
ideologies, irreducible to, if not quite independent from, the semantic investment in actual 
political values. 
In this chapter I argue that semiotics can provide analytical instruments useful for 
addressing these two questions: 1) How are effects of truth produced within ideological 
discourse? 2) How can the grammar of ideology be studied as a political construct? Here I 
will present some basic concepts of semiotics that I will then employ in the next chapters as 
I analyze pieces of ideological discourse. Redefining the question of ideology away from 
traditional apophantic concerns to frame it as an investigation of how sense is made available 
for political discourse requires a vocabulary and a mode of analysis that integrate and 
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complement the repertoire of canonical political theory. Studying concrete ideologies as 
mechanisms for the allocation, production and contestation of political meaning and value 
underscores the necessity for a general theory of how human beings come to terms with the 
complexity of the real and enter in a relation with it and with each other. Crucially, this 
involves elaborating a shared system for apportioning sense to discrete units, and organizing 
the relations between them. This process can be referred to as signification, or semiosis: “the 
operation which, by establishing a relationship of mutual presupposition […] between the 
signified and the signifier (F. de Saussure), produces signs.”61
The notion of “sign” was defined by Medieval logicians according to the formula aliquid 
pro aliquo: something (which stands) for something (else), an entity used in lieu of the object 
it refers to. Augustine explained: “a sign is a thing which, over and above the impression it 
makes on the senses, causes something else to come into the mind as a consequence of 
itself.”
  
62 This dyadic model (the sign vehicle and its referent) was understood by Thomas 
Hobbes as an instance of causation: “When a man hath so often observed like antecedents to 
be followed by like consequents, that whensoever he seeth the antecedent, he looketh again for 
the consequent; or when he seeth the consequent, maketh account there hath been the like 
antecedent; then he calleth both the antecedent and the consequent signs of one another, as 
clouds are signs of rain to come, and rain of clouds past.”63
                                                 
61 Algirdas J. Greimas and Joseph Courtés, Sémiotique. Dictionnaire Raisonné de la Théorie du Langage (Hachette, 
Paris: 1979), p. 339. My translation.  
 Real clouds (the observed 
referent) are a sign of rain to come (the idea of rain evoked in the observer), much like for 
Augustine “a thing” brings to mind “something else.” In both cases, the aliquid pro aliquo 
relation includes referents (objects of the real world) as its components.  
 
62 Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, 2.1.1, cited in W. Noth, A Handbook of Semiotics (Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington: 1990), p. 85 
 
63 Thomas Hobbes, The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic (1640: 4.9), cited in W. Noth, A Handbook of Semiotics, 
p. 86 
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This referential account of the sign is critically revised by John Locke, who in the Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding proposes a two-stage model of signification. First, ideas are 
developed as signs of things, Locke explains: “For, since the things the mind contemplates 
are none of them, beside itself, present to the understanding, it is necessary that something 
else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these 
are ideas.” But then, in order to communicate these ideas, words are needed as the signs of 
those very ideas: “Words […] stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them.”64 
This theory of the sign presents several shortcomings and limitations (I will discuss some of 
them, as well as the genuinely political implications of Locke's general theory of language in 
Chapter III); however it also introduces the fundamental conception that signs, understood 
as the relation between words and ideas, exist in a sphere separate from that of referents. 
This intuition is crucially developed in 1916 by Ferdinand de Saussure, whose Course de 
Linguistique Générale espouses a theory of the sign as a double entity, constituted by the 
relation between “a concept” (the signified) and “a sound-image” (the signifier).65 Having 
expunged the referent from the sign relation, Saussure famously declares “the bond between 
the signifier and the signified” to be “arbitrary.”66
Moreover, Saussure shifts the emphasis from sign to signs, from singular to plural, from 
part to whole, from parole to langue: if the relation between signifier and signified is 
arbitrary, that alone cannot explain the value of the sign that results from their combination. 
Before the process of signification takes place, no ties of presuppositions link any two 
particular portions of “the indefinite plane of jumbled ideas” and “the equally vague plane of 
 Contrary to the necessary relation that 
Hobbes had envisioned between “clouds” and “rain to come,” this notion of arbitrariness 
between the aliquid and the aliquo locates phenomena of signification in the realm of 
convention, not nature.  
                                                 
64 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690, IV.21.4; and III.2.2.), cited in W. Noth, A 
Handbook of Semiotics, p. 87 
 
65 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics (McGraw-Hill, New York: 1959) pp. 66-67 
 
66 F. de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, p. 67 
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sounds.”67 Nothing in the sound-image /freedom/ evokes the concept that will be 
associated to it. The meaning of each sign, on the contrary, depends on its interrelations with 
other signs within language, defined as: “a system of interdependent terms in which the 
value of each term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others.”68
If ideology is regarded as a system in which units of political meaning (“signs” like 
freedom, justice, equality, the individual, community, etc.) acquire sense from each other and 
from their concrete usages by human beings in their function as political actors (in 
descriptive, normative, and action-oriented articulations), then semiotics can offer a valuable 
contribution to the understanding of how political meaning is continuously recombined and 
deployed in concrete acts and practices of discourse. Much like different languages (English, 
Latin, Korean) connect “jumbled ideas” and “vague sounds” differently, thus creating signs 
that acquire value from each other, within a system, so different ideologies (liberalism, 
socialism, feminism) also configure their expressive and semantic space differently. 
Sometimes they connect the same signifier to different signifieds (how liberalism and 
socialism intend “equality” differently, for instance); sometimes they introduce new 
significations into the political (the emphasis placed by feminism on “patriarchy,” for 
instance); sometimes they arrange the relations of interdependence among signs differently 
(how liberalism endows the “individual” with “freedom” and “reason,” and then configures 
the “private” as the realm of “freedom,” and the “public” as a sphere of “reason,” for 
instance). 
 Semiotics, 
as envisioned by Saussure, is the field of inquiry which studies both the production of 
individual signs, and the functioning of the complex codes that operate as systems of signs. 
As I point out in chapter I, Michael Freeden's morphological approach to ideology is 
certainly insightful in highlighting how the (arbitrary) word-concept relation gets “cemented” 
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through processes of decontestation. Here I propose to develop and integrate that intuition 
by shifting the focus from the decontestation of single word-concept relations (“this is what 
'freedom' means”) to a study of how in concrete examples of ideological discourse different 
ideas gain value from each other and hold together like grammatical functions in everyday 
speech (for instance, the idea of “equality of opportunity” might be predicated upon the idea 
of “justice as meritocracy,” which in turn is predicated on the idea of “individual freedom”). 
Semiotics, I argue, provides a formidable repertoire of analytical tools that the study of 
ideological discourse may fruitfully adjust to its specific needs and employ toward its 
distinctive investigative goals.  
Semiotics also contributes to this study by providing a possible framing of ideology as a 
discursive phenomenon. Umberto Eco declares his purpose to show: “in what sense many 
of the discussions about 'ideology' and 'ideological discourse' come within the scope of a 
semiotically oriented rhetoric and how the entire problem of ideology can be studied from a 
semiotic point of view.”69 Technically, classical rhetoric distinguished itself from other styles 
of discourse because of its reliance not on apodictic syllogisms deduced from 'first 
principles,' but on enthymemes, “i.e. syllogisms that [...] moved from probable premises, [...] to 
emotionally and pragmatically influence the listener.”70
This instrumental conception of discourse (influencing the listener both emotionally 
and pragmatically) was irreconcilable with Plato’s idealism. For Plato, in fact, language 
“carves nature at its joints:” any other usage of the faculty of speech contravenes its 
fundamental ergon and as such it is to be condemned as false and misleading.
 Such distinction was not merely an 
operational one, but also, fundamentally, a definitional feature, an element on which rhetoric 
based its self-awareness.  
71
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 Moreover, in 
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against conventionalism and the idea that it amounts merely to a system of arbitrary signs.72 
In the Apology, more concretely, Socrates famously defends himself from the accusation of 
making “the weaker argument defeat the stronger,” pointing to the Sophists as the real 
perpetrators of the offense of rhetoric.73 Among the latter, Gorgias emerges as one of the 
clearest advocates of a view of language as an entity independent of nature, and endowed 
with performative force in its own right, for “[s]peech is a powerful lord that with the 
smallest and most invisible body accomplishes most godlike works.”74
Contra both Plato’s indictment of rhetoric, and the Sophists’ fascination with it, 
Aristotle specifies that “[rhetoric’s] function [ergon] is not to persuade but to see the available 
means of persuasion in each case;” it is then the rhetorician’s task to elaborate the 
appropriate communicative strategy to elicit the desired effects of sense.
  
75 Moreover, 
rhetoric is not concerned with what is certain, necessary, but it pertains to the realm of 
dynamis, the potentiality that needs an efficient cause to be actualized: “we debate about 
things that admit two possibilities […] Thus, it is necessary for an enthymeme and a 
paradigm to be concerned with things that are for the most part capable of being other than 
they are.”76
                                                 
 
 Rhetoric, in other words, is classically founded on the explicit recognition of the 
probable, not certain character of its premises, and consequently on the admission that its 
conclusions depended heavily on certain semantic choices operated within the confines of 
the semantic space opened by the non unambiguous premises.  
72 for a critique of Plato’s position in the Cratylus see: G. Genette, Mimologique: Voyage en Cratylie (Éditions du 
Seuil, Paris: 1976) 
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Ideology, on the contrary, omits to acknowledge its limits as a truth-oriented style of 
discourse, when it does not actively seek to conceal them. As Eco clearly puts it: 
 
I mean by ideological discourse a mode of argument that, while using probable 
premises and considering only a partial section of a given semantic field, pretends to 
develop a 'true' argument, thus covering up the contradictory nature of the Global 
Semantic System and presenting its own point of view as the only possible 
conclusion (whether this attitude is deliberately and cynically adopted by a sender in 
order to deceive a naïve addressee, or whether the sender is simply the victim of his 
own one-sidedness).77
 
 
Ideology, then, starts from “probable premises,” then activates only some of their semantic 
properties, and finally reach conclusions that it presents as “true.” In constructing and 
justifying this narrative edifice, ideological discourse relies on certain devices aimed at the 
production of effects of truth. Here I will briefly present some of these devices that I will 
then identify and critically assess in the following chapters. In particular, I will briefly 
illustrate how semiotics might refine the classical understanding of rhetoric through the use 
of categories like overcoding and abduction. Then I will introduce the actantial model as an 
alternative to both the subject-centric assumptions of mainstream grammar and the 
centrality of a certain idea of individualism in contemporary politics. Finally, I will discuss 
the semiotic square as a powerful instrument for mapping the field of interrelations among 
different terms in a system of signification.   
 
 
TAKING MEANING AND MAKING IT STICK: ABDUCTION AND OVERCODING 
The semiotic categories of abduction and overcoding are prime examples of how 
ideological discourse relies on certain narrative devices to produce its effects of truth. Eco, in 
fact, further defines ideology as “a message which starts with a factual description, and then 
                                                 
77 U. Eco, A Theory of Semiotics, p. 278 
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tries to justify it theoretically, gradually being accepted by society through a process of 
overcoding.”78 Overcoding, in turn, is defined as the operation by which “on the basis of a 
pre-established rule, a new rule [is] proposed which govern[s] a rarer application of the 
previous rule.”79
Alongside the familiar categories of deduction and induction, abduction too provides a 
pattern of logic operations aimed at the elaboration of inferences.
 This is a specification of a concept that Eco derives from Charles Sanders 
Peirce, that of 'abduction.'  
80
In the case of induction, on the other hand, given a case and a result, a probable rule is 
inferred. Consider the traditional conservative defense of prudence: the French Revolution 
was inspired by abstract reason (case); the French Revolution had undesirable effects (result); 
all political change inspired by abstract reason leads to undesirable effect (rule – never 
certain). The probability of the rule that is derived is directly correlated to the number of 
observed cases, a principle expressed by Edmund Burke in his vindication of prejudice 
against the attacks of the “enlightened age”: “we cherish [prejudices] to a very considerable 
degree […] and the longer they have lasted and the more generally they have prevailed, the 
more we cherish them.”
 In the case of deduction, 
given a rule and a case, a result is deduced, the classic formula being the syllogism: All men 
are mortal (rule); Socrates is a man (case); Socrates is mortal (result – always certain). 
Deductive reasoning, though, is not productive of new knowledge, as its operation is limited 
to the application of an already established general rule to a specific case. As such, 
deductions are rarely of use in the realm of political ideology that organizes discourse about 
essentially contested concepts, for which no rules hold self-evidently, and incontestably true.  
81
                                                 
 
 Unlike deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, is frequently used 
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in political argumentation; however, the “rules” that it produces, and that might then 
become the bases for further deductions, are never certain, and as such they can be easily 
contested.  
In the case of abduction, finally, given a rule and a result, a probable case is inferred. 
For instance: All Frenchwomen speak French (rule); these women speak French (result); 
these women are French (case – never certain). It is evident that abduction does not provide 
the kind of certain conclusions that deduction guarantees. Also, unlike induction, abduction 
cannot hope to increase the probability of its inferences through the accumulation of 
different cases. Far from solving the problems of either, abduction would seem to combine 
the shortcomings of both. However, abductive reasoning is the typical method by which 
human beings make sense of the world around them. Abduction is both contextual (the 
example above, for instance, would sound quite different in Paris or in Quebec City) and 
intuitive (out of many possible hypotheses, it chooses one without a necessary logical 
justification). Political discourse abounds with these kinds of (probable) inferences. The 
heuristic character of abductive inferences, though, has tended to disqualify them with 
ideologies preoccupied with providing absolute rational force to their argumentation. 
Scientific socialists, for instance, would characterize their project as a chain of necessary, not 
probable inferences; likewise, as I will show in chapter III, Victorian liberalism insists on the 
superiority of the inductive method as the only mode for the acquisition of knowledge truly 
compatible with reason and science. Nevertheless, leaving aside such normative concerns, 
recognizing and understanding the functioning of abduction is an important element in an 
analysis of how effects of truth are produced within ideological discourse. 
The discursive style of ideology makes use of abduction primarily by charging certain 
statements (which can be easily decoded at one level of signification) with extra meaning 
(which requires the activation of specific effects of truth). In the case of overcoding, the 
probable inference is that of a surplus of meaning that is circumstantially associated to a 
message that is already literally understood through a certain code. For instance, in the case 
of slang, overcoding enables us to understand a message beyond (and sometimes regardless 
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of) its literal meaning. When overcoding is successful and established over time and over a 
definite community of speakers, certain ready-made expressions, sequential linkings of 
concepts and ideas, or simply recurrent portions of discourse acquire the power of 
immediately evoking certain signifieds, which in turn are associated with certain emotional 
states, either euphoric or dysphoric. In the context of American Cold War propaganda, the 
phrase “the Free World” meant something more specific than that same phrase would have 
meant in the context of the 19th century, for instance: it carried with it the extra meaning of 
liberal-democratic, capitalistic, anti-Soviet, and ultimately morally good and desirable.  This 
linkage of cognitive and emotional elements is one of the most important finalities that 
ideologies possess. In order to achieve these effects of sense, ideologies resort to the devices 
already recognized in rhetoric.   
To the extent that rhetoric pertains to the organization and delivery of persuasive 
argumentation, unlike other narrative styles (i.e.: the ideal type of “science”) it is concerned 
with the aesthetic dimension of language. This is manifested primarily through the use of the 
various rhetorical figures, whose function is both hedonistic, stimulating in the addressee the 
pleasure of being addressed with a certain style of discourse; and at the same time 
instrumental for the very first requirement of any persuasive discourse: that the attention of 
the receiver be gained and maintained. 
A fundamental characteristic of rhetorical figures should consequently be their novelty 
and originality. However, due to the accumulation of such tropes over the centuries, a more 
or less codified canon has been established that correspond to the model of “good writing” 
or “good public speaking.” Such triteness and predictability are often associated with 
rhetoric today. Rhetoric can then be considered as “the result of a millenary overcoding that 
has in some cases produced catachreses, that is, figures of speech so strictly coded that the 
entity for which they stood has definitely lost its sign-vehicle, as in the case of the /table's 
legs/.”82
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powerful instrument of ideological discourse. The phrase “states’ rights,” for instance, 
became in the context of Jim Crow America a (thinly veiled) reference to the goal of 
maintaining racial segregation, and as such it enabled the advancement of a certain agenda 
more effectively than an explicit appeal to racist attitudes could have done. Likewise, the 
articulation of a “pro-choice” position enables its advocates to deflect accusations of 
regarding abortion as a goal in and of itself, while at the same time signaling, through a 
process of contextual overcoding, the objective of defending/promoting the right of women 
to choose (whether or not to carry on a pregnancy).  
Though the aesthetic dimension of discourse is the most immediately recognizable 
element of rhetoric (and of ideology), it is only the outer layer of a more complex narrative 
construct. Before being expressed, more or less pleasantly, more or less persuasively, political 
ideas need to be “determined,” in the sense that the virtually infinite chain of their semantic 
associations needs to be given boundaries. In other words, for each unit of meaning a 
privileged path is identified out of the semantic web that surrounds it. For instance, for a 
concept like /industrialization/ all the attributes and effects generally deemed to be positive 
would be selected by what ecologists refer to as the macro-ideology of industrialism, while 
the same discourse would gloss over negative attributes and effects that could be just as 
validly associated to that concept. 
This effect of truth, a rhetorical device that organizes the semantic field for the 
purposes of promoting a specific truth, is akin to the process of decontestation discussed by 
Freeden. Consider the meaning of /freedom/ within an ideology of liberalism. Out of the 
polysemous potentiality that it might evokes, liberal discourse privileges the associations with 
attributes that are generally considered positive, desirable in a certain political culture. 
Freedom, therefore, typically comes to imply a sense of opportunity, openness, even choice. The 
negative connotation of /freedom/ as lack, for instance, though it is an equally valid portion 
of the semantic space of the concept, is instead typically silenced in liberal discourse. So, that 
economic freedom might involve the lack of economic security is something that free 
market advocates in the tradition of classical liberalism generally do not acknowledge as an 
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implication of /freedom/, but as a function of some other factor external to the notion itself 
of /freedom/. At the same time, the opportunities that arise when states do not intervene on 
the economy, for instance, are emphatically advertised as a result of, or rather coterminous 
with /freedom/. Ideological discourse relies on processes of overcoding to charge certain 
concepts with extra meaning, so that only the desired effects of truth will be activated. 
Basic concepts of discourse analysis like abduction and overcoding can be fruitfully 
applied to the analysis of the specific style of discourse employed by political ideologies. So, 
for instance, a neoliberal discourse on the value of the free market might choose to organize 
its argument from the premise of the inefficiency of welfare state expenditures. From this 
starting point (descriptive) it would then conclude that the provision of welfare state services 
should be minimized (action-oriented), and that the free market would allocate scarce 
resources more efficiently (normative). In doing so, the complementary premise that welfare 
state expenditures are only inefficient under certain conditions, and the contradictory 
premise that free market expenditures might be just as inefficient are excluded from 
consideration. In general, by employing the discursive strategies of abduction and 
overcoding, a political ideology takes a portion of meaning from the semantic field, and 
makes it stick as true, often to the deliberate exclusion of alternative interpretations.  
 
 
RETHINKING AGENCY BEYOND INDIVIDUAL AGENTS: THE ACTANTIAL MODEL 
The notions of abduction and overcoding can illustrate how ideological discourse 
selects and activates specific portions of a given semantic field. In the case of a political 
ideology this is relevant because it defines the role that certain concepts with their 
implications (whether activated or deactivated) play in the overall economy of 
argumentation. Semiotic analysis helps to deconstruct the communicative strategies through 
which ideological discourse produces these effects of truth. At a more fundamental level, 
however, the most basic aspect of the development of a narrative pertains to the allocation 
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of agency within the system of a given semantic field. Who/what gets the story going, 
moving from premises to conclusions? Is an impersonal force (destiny, biology, divine 
justice) capable of determining action, or can only human beings do that? Is human agency 
necessarily located at the level of the individual, or can action be explained as the function of 
entities greater than, and irreducible to, aggregations of individuals? Can action be explained 
not by invoking a unified acting consciousness (the stylization of the individual), but by 
considering the various facets that coexist in it, not always harmoniously?   
Different ideologies answer those questions differently, more or less explicitly. 
Consider, for instance, how various forms of feminism tell stories that indict biology, social 
structures, or specific institutions as the culprit for the disadvantaged condition of women. 
In general, analyzing a narrative text typically requires identifying certain states of the world 
that are described, the actions that take place during the narration, and the agents that 
perform those actions. Moreover, the style of the narration may be more or less explicitly 
disseminated with axiological markers: from a harmonious past into a corrupted present-
future (in a narrative of decline), or from a brutish past into an enlightened present-future (in 
a narrative of progress), for instance. 
Liberal grammar, I argue, employs a model in which action is unequivocally understood 
as being performed by individual agents, whether singularly or in aggregation. Before even 
articulating their claims on the ontological and normative value of individualism, liberal 
thinkers employ a language that establishes the individual as the fundamental unit of action. 
This constitutes a meta-ideological dimension of liberal discourse, for it configures its 
hegemony beyond the confines of liberal ideology.  This is, however, one model for the 
allocation of agency among several possible alternatives. Understanding the meta-ideological 
success of liberalism, I argue, requires explaining it in relation to competing grammatical 
models. 
The conception of agency inherent to both the political project of liberalism, and to its 
meta-ideological articulations is critically engaged by Judith Butler. In discussing the 
performative dimension of language, Butler notes how neither identity nor the (gendered) 
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body preexist it, but they are both created in and through language. Nevertheless, since 
grammar is typically understood as a pre-political, a-political matter, the effects that the 
structures of language produce are also misrepresented as natural. In Butler’s analysis, then: 
 
It is […] clearly unfortunate grammar to claim that there is a ‘we’ or an ‘I’ that does 
its body, as if a disembodied agency preceded and directed an embodied exterior. 
More appropriate, I suggest, would be a vocabulary that resists the substance 
metaphysics of subject-verb formations and relies instead on an ontology of present 
participles.83
 
 
Contra the expressive assumptions of a liberal meta-ideology, Butler exposes the distorting, 
performative character of language. In the Genealogy of Morals Friedrich Nietzsche had also 
lamented the distortions to “Truth” that the superficial structures of language entail. In his 
famous example, saying that “the lightning flashes” suggests an entity (the lightning) that 
preexists and causes the flashing, whereas, in fact, subject and action are coterminous in this 
example. In Nietzsche’s famous words, “there is no doer behind the deed, the deed is 
everything.” Moreover, the very construction of the subject is largely a function of language, 
a process that Nietzsche calls “inpsychation.”84
 
 Exposing the inherently paradoxical nature 
of “the right to make promises” contra the power of forgetfulness, he observes that such an 
entitlement presupposes that: 
[A] human being must necessarily have first himself become something one could 
predict, something bound by regular rules, even in the way he imagined himself to 
himself, so that finally he is able to act like someone who makes promises—he can 
make himself into a pledge for the future!85
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Engaging in the peculiar illocutionary act that promising is requires making oneself into “a 
pledge for the future.” That pledge, in turn, is renewed not only each time that a promise is 
made, but also each time that normal linguistic activity is performed, for language in turn 
rests on the meta-linguistic promise that sense be bound by certain predictable “regular 
rules.” Bound by those rules, and largely defined by them, is not only the “I” that inhabits 
contingent speech acts, but also the “I” that is continuously constructed and reconstructed 
by the iterative activity of enunciation. Both Nietzsche and Butler are aware of the effects of 
truth that are produced by the rules of subject-centric grammar; Butler, in particular, also 
envisages alternative linguistic structures, as she calls for “an ontology of present 
participles.” What would those linguistic structures look like? To what, exactly, should they 
be alternative? In order to try and clarify what these questions entail, I will give two 
examples of how different grammatical formulations may affect the universes of meaning 
that are evoked.  
First, consider the statement: “I am a vegetarian.” A stable subject (I) declares 
something about herself, attaches to its self an enduring quality (being vegetarian) that comes 
with certain semantic implications, or at least presuppositions (e.g.: abstaining from eating 
meat for moral or religious reasons). Consider now the statement: “I am not eating meat.” 
Though the two formulations cover much of the same semantic ground, the latter assumes 
much less about the subject and her connection to the action of not eating meat. The 
emphasis in this second formulation switches toward the action, of which the subject is but a 
contingent agent, whereas in the first formulation it clearly remains with the subject and her 
attributes.  
At this point it is important to point out that there is a crucial difference between the 
superficial form of the present participle and the deeper “ontology of present participles” that 
Butler invokes. Consider a second example, taken from the TV show Curb Your Enthusiasm. 
In the second season episode “Trick or Treat,” Larry David is shown in front of a theater, 
humming a Wagner tune, when a man also waiting to see a film yells: “You know what you 
are? You are a self-loathing Jew!” To which Larry promptly responds: “Hey I may loathe 
 51 
 
myself, but it has nothing to do with the fact that I’m Jewish!” In the first formulation Larry 
is something that gets indicated by the ready-made semantic unit of the “self-loathing Jew,’ a 
trope to which he is accused of conforming. In his retort, on the other hand, Larry 
deconstructs that very trope, disentangling the “self-loathing” and “Jewish” elements of his 
being. The identity of the subject thus gets destabilized, Larry’s self dissolved in a series of 
traits that are only contingently associated in his person. In this second ontology the subject 
is not an entity endowed with necessary immanence, but rather a “bundle” of present 
participles. The actions that they narrativize constitute and continuously reconstitute the 
subject, rather than descending from it. 
If these intuitions about the role of grammar in shaping our universes of sense are taken 
seriously, investigating them systematically proves a fruitful enterprise for the scholar of 
political ideologies as well. If, before even expressing their distinctive political concepts, 
different forms of ideological discourse already establish their narrative styles, and if these 
carry hidden political implications, unveiling them can crucially contribute to the project of a 
comprehensive analysis of ideology. Here I will try and address these questions by first 
considering the dominant linguistic structures of a liberal meta-ideology, and then reflecting 
on how different claims about agency may inform different discursive configurations. In 
particular, I will introduce Algirdas Greimas’ opposition between the level of a superficial 
grammar and the deeper structures of language.86
On the surface of grammar it may be noticed that the central role of the subject in 
organizing sense corresponds to the liberal assumption of the individual as the protagonist 
of action. At a deeper level, however, Greimas identifies an “actantial model” in which 
action itself becomes the focal point of the narration, and the actant is defined in purely 
syntactic terms, as the entity that occupies a certain position with regards to the act, before 
any semantic investment is made.
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contingent construct of grammar, this might constitute a formidable platform for launching 
a critique of the meta-ideological hegemony of the “individual,” for it would seem that the 
latter is continuously reinforced and reaffirmed by the former. In other words, if at least part 
of the success of the narrative style of liberalism is explained as a function of the structural 
correspondence between the individual and the subject, deconstructing the latter might also 
help relativize the former, potentially opening up the space for alternative meta-ideological 
formations. 
Greimas starts by discussing the structure of narration as the concatenation of 
enunciates. An enunciate was classically understood as being composed, fundamentally, of 
two parts: theme and rheme. The theme is the thing being talked about, whereas the rheme 
is what is noted about it. Alternative formulations of the same structure oppose topic and 
comment or, in more quotidian parlance, subject and predicate. As Marsciani and Zinna 
point out, this basic opposition, already illustrated by Plato in the Sophist, survives in the 
contemporary linguistic theory of Noam Chomsky.88
The Danish linguist Ludwig Hjelmslev, though, contests that the predicative function 
can be attributed to just one element of the enunciate, an assumption that greatly reduces the 
applicability of the scheme. (For instance, in a painting, as opposed to an enunciate of a 
verbal language, it would not be possible to distinguish between a topic and a comment.) 
More poignantly yet, French linguist Lucien Tesnière calls into question the precedence 
 Moreover, this binary formula presides 
over the implicit syntactic structure of liberalism, the style of political discourse that more 
decidedly invests into the dichotomy between subjects and predicates, postulating a 
fundamental distinction between individual selves that pre-exist their actions, and such 
actions. For a self to be assumed to exist before it acts, and independently of its action, a 
grammar needs to be in place in which that subject is kept logically distinct from, and prior 
to its predicates.  
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accorded to the subject in the canonical scheme, as well as its very status. Plato had affirmed 
that the combination of a noun and a verb gives origin to the smallest possible form of 
discourse. Opposing the statements “Theaetetus sits” and “Theaetetus (…) is flying,” he had 
concluded that one was true and the other false, by virtue of the first predicating something 
that was already true of the subject, and the second something false. More generally, he had 
determined: “When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being, such 
a combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly false discourse.”89
To this subject-centric view, Tesnière opposes the centrality of the predicate. If 
attention is shifted from theme to rheme, the verb can be exploded into a more complex 
structure. This structure is understood in dramatic terms, as such involving actors, 
circumstances and a process. If Plato’s subjects were bundles of semantic and syntactic 
properties (traits that survive in Hobbes’ and Locke’s constructions of the self), Tesnière’s 
verbs emanate systems of relations among a certain number of “actants”, depending on the 
structure of the verb itself. So, for instance, the predicate “Mary walks” has one actant; 
“Mary eats a cake” has two; and “Mary gives a bag to John” has three.  
 The predicate was 
then understood as a mere appendage of the subject, a bundle of already existing properties 
of which the predicate could only take note.  
Building on Tesnière’s original intuition, and abstracting from Vladimir Propp’s 
morphology of the Russian folktale in search for structural universals, Greimas defines the 
actant in purely syntactic terms, as the entity that occupies a certain position with regards to 
the act, before any semantic investment is made.90 He goes on to propose a syntax of the 
enunciates, in an attempt to systematize his theory about the deep structures of language.91
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involve. In the first case (“Mary eats a cake”), Greimas distinguishes a Subject Actant (S1) 
and an Object Actant (O). Dismissing the opposition between “Mary eats a cake” and “a 
cake is eaten by Mary” as merely formal in nature, he identifies a common structure so that, 
unlike the superficial grammatical positions of subject and object, the Subject Actant and the 
Object Actant remain unvaried. In the second case, that of ternary enunciates (“Mary gives a 
bag to John”), Greimas calls the actants Sender (S2), Object (O) and Receiver (R) 
respectively, again regardless of their superficial grammatical position.   
Binary enunciates indicate utterances describing a status.92
Ternary enunciates indicate utterances of doing.
 The function that relates the 
Subject Actant and the Object Actant is one of junction, a category that is deployed in the 
modalities of conjunction and disjunction. Accordingly, the notation: S1 ∩ O designates a 
status in which the Subject Actant is united with its object of value. Conversely, the notation: 
S1 ∪ O describes a status in which the Subject Actant is separated from its object of value. If 
S1 = Locke’s individual, and O = Property, then S1 ∩ O describes the status of the state of 
nature in the Second Treatise of Government. If S1 = Hobbes’ individual, and O = security, then 
S1 ∪ O describes the status of the state of nature in Leviathan.  
93 The function that relates Sender, 
Object and Receiver is one of transformation, a category that gets articulated in the 
modalities of realization and virtualization. Realization indicates the narrative program of a 
Sender (the French term, destinateur, is better suited to avoid any semantic cluttering of this 
syntactic position) that purports to unite a Receiver (destinataire) with its Object of value: S2 
 (R ∩ O). On the contrary, virtualization indicates the narrative program of a Sender that 
purports to separate a Receiver from its Object of value: S2  (R ∪ O). If S2 = Leviathan, R 
= the parties to the covenant,94
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social contract can be described as: S2  (R ∩ O). If S2 = a corrupt government, R = the 
individuals in civil society, and O = Property, then Locke’s indictment of tyranny can be 
read as: S2  (R ∪ O). 
In general, social contract theory might be characterized as a narrative project in which 
processes of realization and virtualization result in the conjunction and disjunction, 
respectively, of Subject Actants and Object Actants. Gone is the vision of independent 
individuals deliberately seeking association with others in order to conserve their pre-political 
selves. And effaced is also, from this structural reading, the delusion of grammatical subjects 
owning the actions of their aggregative processes. Actions, and political actions at that, take 
analytical precedence in this view, displacing at the same time the most basic assumptions of 
liberalism, a position that denies the inherently political character of humans. What 
Aristotle’s claim had rendered with unfortunate grammar, i.e.: that political action defines 
(hu)man(s); a structural reading of social contract theory can now establish with greater 
clarity. Additionally, it can do so against the background of the position that is less amicable 
to such a view of the relationship between humans and politics.  
Greimas’ profound narrative grammar, moreover, can extend its analytical value beyond 
social contract theory, into political theory more generally. The infinite combinations of such 
enunciates of status and of doing provide the deep structure for any discursive formation, 
making it possible to construct models of any given text in which the structural relations 
among its elements appear pristine and uncluttered by semantic investments. Moreover, 
various typologies of discursive formations are classified by Greimas, and various modalities 
are employed to specify the relative positions of the enunciates in a discourse (for instance, 
the Subject Actant typically has to acquire the “will-to-do,” then the “knowledge-of-how-to-
do,” and then the “ability-to-do” before it can act). These can account for a nuanced variety 
                                                                                                                                                 
94 it is important to notice that no biunivocal relation is assumed by this model between actants, at the level of 
deep grammar, and actors, at the level of superficial grammar. So, for instance, one actant can be narrativized 
by many actors, as in this case; or an actor can syncretically take on various actantial roles in the same 
enunciate, as in the case of autonomous individuals imposing a law onto themselves, for instance. 
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of situations, and thus fruitfully make sense of many of the narratives that are employed in 
political theory.  
If Greimas is correct in identifying these deep structures of language, his system 
constitutes a powerful and parsimonious instrument for the analysis of how human beings 
share meaning and quarrel over it. If these elements of language could be uncovered in the 
specific genre of political discourse, more systematic comparisons could be attempted 
among various ideological formations. In turn, this would allow a systematic assessment of 
different political ideologies in their ability to make sense of the world of politics. In 
particular, the hypothesis that the current meta-ideological hegemony of liberalism is, among 
other things, also a function of some peculiar quality of liberal discourse that replicates the 
dominant structures of language, could be tested against an informed examination of its 
structural characteristics. Additionally, establishing what exactly is that makes liberalism 
semiotically successful, could provide crucial insights into some of the requirements for a 
potentially alternative meta-ideological formation.  
To be sure, the world of politics, and by derivation that of political ideologies, are 
certainly too complex to be reduced to a finite number of algorithms and functions, as 
structuralist theories would do. Focusing on the tension between “structure” and “agency,” 
however, there seems to be a particularly fertile area that stretches from these two poles and 
oscillates between them. In general, it seems that some of the more contested aspects of 
classic structuralism refer to the unsatisfactory explanation of the parts in relation to the 
whole. Not only is parole considered derivative from langue, but the role of the speaker 
appears that of a mere vehicle for the expression of signs. In Levi-Strauss’ eloquent words, 
“the subject is the spoilt brat of philosophy”.  
If some of the parsimony of Greimas’ categories is renounced, without rejecting their 
validity altogether, and if a set of analytical instruments peculiar to the argumentative style of 
political ideologies is devised, at the expense of naïve pretenses of universality, then the 
systematic mapping of political ideologies becomes an endeavor worth embarking on. If the 
premise is accepted that political ideologies can be considered as a genre, like other clusters 
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of literary works and more generally narrative objects, an area of commonality is postulated 
among them that allows for systematic comparisons and evaluations. Accordingly, a turn to 
post-structural semiotics might prove a fitting approach to the study of political theory and 
political ideologies, especially when considered in their meta-ideological functions. Resisting 
what Butler calls “the substance metaphysics of the subject-verb formations,” the actantial 
model might provide the blueprint for what she envisages as “an ontology of present 
participles.”  
Alongside Greimas' reflection on the deep structures of grammar, the feminist tradition 
of critical engagement with the traditional subject might also prove beneficial in providing 
content and depth to this otherwise discouragingly abstract project. Rosi Braidotti's work on 
“nomadic subjects,” in particular, promises to be a formidable contribution to the task of 
“making the individual uncomfortable.” The nomadic subject is for Braidotti “a figuration 
for the kind of subject who has relinquished all idea, desire, or nostalgia for fixity. This 
figuration expresses the desire for an identity made of transitions, successive shifts, and 
coordinated changes, without and against an essential unity.”95 Outside of “fixity” and 
“essential unity,” Braidotti's subjects are not thrown into a sterile world devoid of any 
meaning; on the contrary they “transition without a teleological purpose” through an 
environment pregnant with possibilities, one in which meaning is distributed in  
“nonphallogocentric” configurations.96
A grammar that reaffirms and perpetuates subject-centric linguistic structures also paves 
the way for a conception of the world in which individuals own their actions and choose 
 This “rhizomatic” universe of meaning (to borrow 
Deleuze's felicitous metaphor as Braidotti herself does) in turn complements the “ontology 
of present participles” that Butler intuits and for which Greimas' actantial model provides a 
fitting systematization.    
                                                 
95 Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory (Columbia 
University Press, New York: 1994), p. 22 
 
96 see R. Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects, p. 23 
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them. If the primacy of the subject in grammar is renounced, and if the primacy of the 
individual in politics is also called into question, a model may be constructed in which selves 
are constituted through acts and language, and through acts and language they are 
continuously undone and reconstituted. Breaking free of the cage of syntax can also deliver 
the self from the delusion of a stable identity, a semiotic and political device whose 
oppressive potential is relentlessly reinforced and reproduced in society. If absolute freedom 
is ultimately unattainable, resisting that power remains a crucial site of political struggle for 
the animal that Aristotle characterized as political by virtue of its linguistic faculties. If Butler 
is correct in identifying the “substance metaphysics of subject-verb formations” as the  
fundamental structure of language that both distorts and predetermines the world that it 
purports to express, then a careful deconstruction of the seemingly inert matter of grammar 
is the necessary precondition for effectively resisting the political order that it produces. The 
individual is but a catachresis of the subject. 
 
 
MAPPING NARRATIVE TENSIONS: THE SEMIOTIC SQUARE 
Ideological discourse aims at the production of effects of truth in the semantic field of 
politics. A political ideology typically tells a story in which an undesirable status quo can be 
overcome, and a desirable alternative to it can be reached. Accordingly, narrative devices like 
abduction and overcoding are employed in defining the status quo and its alternative, as well 
as their character of being more or less desirable. Likewise, narrativizing the action that 
solves the tension requires allocating agency in ways consistent with an ideology's semantic 
and political investments (e.g.: individual agents for liberalism; class for socialism). 
Moreover, semiotic analysis can account for how ideological discourse needs to delimit 
its semantic field in order to sustain its narrative structure. Political ideologies typically 
organize meaning in oppositional terms, by pitting different concepts against each other, in 
order to associate euphoric value with some principles, ideas, states of the world, while 
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charging the rival entities with dysphoric connotations. Consider the case of anarchism, or at 
least certain versions of it, in which an opposition is constructed between “freedom” and 
“the state,” for instance, in which the former is desirable and just in its own right, whereas 
the latter is portrayed as inimical to it, and inherently undesirable. The project of anarchism, 
then, could be said to coincide, in the crudest of its articulation, with the abolition of the 
state so that freedom might flourish. From state (description); to non-state (action-oriented); 
to freedom (normative).  
Semiotics offers powerful tools for systematizing the study of such oppositional 
schemata in ideological discourse. The “semiotic square,” in particular, accounts for the 
complex possibilities of sense that two antonyms can produce (see Figure 1). Greimas 
defines it as “the visual representation of the logical articulation of any semantic category.”97
                                                 
97 A. J. Greimas and J. Courtés, Sémiotique. Dictionnaire Raisonné, pp. 29 – 33  
 
Inherited from classical logic, the semiotic square starts from a pair of semantic units that 
can be constructed as entertaining a relation of reciprocal contrariness. In the sketch of 
anarchism presented above, these two terms would be “freedom” and “the state.” On each 
of the two units, then, the logical operation of negation is also performed, so that each 
generates its contradictory. Negating “freedom” produces “unfreedom;” negating “the state” 
produce “statelessness.” The two terms on the top horizontal axis (“freedom” and “the 
state”) are called contraries, and their opposition is a qualitative one. The terms of the two 
couplets on the diagonal axes (or schemes) are called contradictories, and their relation is 
one of negation. The two terms on the bottom horizontal axis are called subcontraries. 
Finally, on the vertical axes (deictics) there lie relations of presupposition (for instance, 
“statelessness” suggests, or may imply in an anarchist worldview, “freedom”). This 
illustration has the advantage of capturing both the oppositional schema of a possible 
anarchist argument (“freedom” v. “the state”), and a pattern for its narrative unfolding (from 
“the state,” to “statelessness,” and then finally to “freedom,” in a typical ‘butterfly’ 
movement).   
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Figure 1. The Semiotic Square: Freedom vs. The State 
In chapter V I will use the semiotic square to map some of the possible articulations of 
meaning that inhere to the opposition between individual and community. The semiotic 
square, I argue, can both systematize the terms of the debates that have historically opposed 
advocates of liberalism and of communitarianism, and, most crucially, it can point to 
alternative configurations of meaning that the simple opposition individual-community risks 
obliterating. Together with the clarity with which the concept of overcoding points to the 
ways in which ideology charges portions of discourse with additional meaning, and with the 
relativization of dominant structures of language and discourse that the actantial model 
allows, the semiotic square can offer an important contribution to a study aimed at unveiling 
the discursive practices that make liberalism so successful as a meta-ideology, and at the 
same time at imagining the conditions under which different meta-ideological formations 
might emerge.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have illustrated some of the ways in which semiotics can contribute to 
the study of ideology. If ideology is regarded as a distinctive narrative genre, in fact, the 
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discipline that systematizes the analysis of signification and of its textual manifestations can 
provide both rigor and insight into the matter of how political meaning is constructed, 
mobilized, and contested through ideological discourse. In particular, as I argued in chapter 
I, it is necessary for the critique of ideology to definitively abandon the traditional dichotomy 
of truth/falsehood in assessing the value and impact of ideology. Rather, I maintain that in 
considering the operations of ideological discourse in the field of politics it is expedient to 
reframe the analysis toward the unveiling of the effects of truth that are produced within the 
discursive practices of ideology. 
Ideology, I have noted, employs a style of discourse similar to that of rhetoric. As per 
Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric, it too deals “with things that are for the most part capable 
of being other than they are;” however, unlike rhetoric, ideological discourse presents its 
premises as necessary and objective, so that its conclusions also follow necessarily from 
them, thus appearing immanently true. Whereas apohpantic critiques typically concentrated 
on exposing the untruthfulness of the premises assumed by an ideology in order to discredit 
its conclusions, a semantic approach is interested in reconstructing the allocation and 
deployment of meaning that make ideologies such powerful instruments for advancing 
political arguments. In this chapter I have briefly introduced three semiotic concepts that can 
be useful in assessing how ideological discourse produces effects of truth. 
First I have presented the notion of abduction as a common scheme for the production 
of logical inferences. On the one hand, deductive reasoning applies preexisting rules to new 
cases, to infer necessarily true results; however, this process does not produce any new 
knowledge. On the other hand, inductive reasoning proceeds from cases and results to infer 
rules; however, the knowledge that is produced in this process is never certain, as new cases 
could determine the formulation of new rules. As I will explain in Chapter III, aggregating 
individual cases into general rules, and rejecting dogmatism, induction provides liberalism 
with the fundamental logical architecture to sustain its claims. Nevertheless, I argue, 
abduction is a much more common pattern for the generation of inferences, and as such a 
much more relevant element of the ideological function of producing effects of truth. The 
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process of abduction infers probable cases from rules and results; in other words, it 
formulates hypotheses that depend on the context and on extra-logical elements that affect 
the production of inferences. As such, abductive reasoning is creative of new knowledge, 
and while this new knowledge is neither necessarily true (like in the case of deduction), nor 
can it be scientifically tested by accumulating observations (like in the case of induction), it 
still produces effects of truth within discourse. For instance, in the case of overcoding, 
abductions might be performed on preexisting portions of discourse, thus charging them 
with a surplus of political meaning. A semiotic analysis of ideological texts can unveil these 
kinds of devices. 
Secondly, I have reflected on a more fundamental level of the production of truth that 
inheres to language, and that ideological discourse in particular mobilizes for political 
purposes. Whereas grammar typically goes unquestioned as a pre-political or even a-political 
element of language, I argue that in fact certain precepts for making meaning available in 
discourse carry with them ponderous political implications: by weaving their arguments into 
certain recurrent configurations of meaning, ideologies perpetuate certain basic assumptions 
about the world without explicitly declaring them as political (and therefore disputable) 
concepts. Echoing Judith Butler’s dissatisfaction with it, I regard the subject-centric 
character of mainstream grammar as “unfortunate.” Liberalism, for instance, typically 
presents its claims by assuming a structure in which subjects exist before their actions, and 
continue to exist as subject regardless of the actions that they are contingently attached to 
them. Because this basic grammar of agency also corresponds to the liberal credo of 
foundational individualism, the ideology of liberalism benefits from the congruity between 
the content that it promotes and the expressive modes that it employs in doing so. Yet, in 
treating the grammatical primacy of the subject as an extra-political fact, liberalism 
surreptitiously depoliticizes its commitment to individualism. Moreover, as I will show in 
Chapter IV, the subject-centric, individualistic mode of expression of liberalism can also 
articulate non-liberal content, thus incorporating certain values, concepts, and arguments 
from other ideologies into a hegemonic meta-ideological scheme. Instead I propose 
Greimas’ actantial model as an alternative way of understanding the relation between 
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subjects and actions. Focusing on action, and deriving actants from it, Greimas’ model 
subverts the expressive infrastructure of liberalism, and provides the grammatical basis for 
thinking a politics of performativity that would in turn radically question the principle of 
individualism. I will consider this possibility in Chapter V as I reflect on how certain 
concepts of community can sustain an alternative to the meta-ideological hegemony of 
liberalism.  
Finally, I have introduced the analytical device of the semiotic square. As ideological 
discourse typically employs an oppositional structure, between the status quo and a desirable 
future (and all the values, concepts and ideas that are associated to them), the semiotic 
square proves useful in mapping the semantic field that each piece of ideological discourse 
constructs. Moreover, these oppositions are not static, as they contain the elements for the 
development of the story that an ideology dramatizes; the movement between states of the 
world and the logical steps that are entailed in the various passages can be visually captured 
by the semiotic square, as I have briefly shown in a couple of examples. In Chapter V I will 
also map the oppositions between different concepts of individual and community onto the 
semiotic square.  
In conclusion, I maintain that by opening up to the style of inquiry of semiotics, the 
study of political ideology can benefit from its systematic treatment of the deployment of 
meaning in discourse. In particular, unveiling the effects of truth that ideological discourse 
produces can also contribute to an explanation of the success of certain ideologies. It is my 
claim that liberalism especially exploits certain effects of truth to the effect of asserting its 
own hegemony while at the same time obfuscating the genuinely political character of some 
of its foundational claims. In order to investigate this level of hegemony, I now turn to an 
investigation of some of the effects of truth that some key figures in the tradition of 
liberalism have employed in formulating some of the most influential arguments in the 
definition of the ideology. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE IDEOLOGY OF LIBERALISM 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter I I presented some preliminary considerations on the centrality of ideas in 
politics, and on how ideas come to fruition in concrete instances of political discourse. In 
particular, I noted that within a political culture, ideas are typically organized in more or less 
coherent formations; ideologies, then, rather than loose ideas, are the level of analysis at 
which an ideational approach to the study of politics needs to concentrate. The pertinent 
question to be asked about ideologies, I argued, is not whether or not they capture some pre-
discursive “Truth” in their expressive function, but how tightly and cogently they arrange 
political meaning. Toward a semantic-morphological study of ideology, then, in Chapter II, I 
proposed some basic instruments of semiotics as valuable tools for understanding more 
clearly how meaning is defined, contested, and mobilized in and through political discourse.  
In this chapter I intend to invest these general reflections onto the actual reality of a 
specific ideology: liberalism. In doing so I maintain that the concept itself of “ideology” 
contains certain important features of a narrative, argumentative style that are recurrent 
across a wide array of discursive formations. Different ideologies, in other words, exhibit a 
certain degree of structural similarity with each other (though, of course, the content that 
they articulate can vary greatly), and this similarity resides in their common relation to the 
general notion of ideology. Not all ideologies, however, conform as neatly to the ideal type 
that could be deduced from an abstract definition of ideology, and many examples of 
ideological discourse self-consciously style themselves as non-ideological, while reserving 
that characterization as an epithet to be waged against rival worldviews. The example of 
“scientific socialists” is only one of the most obvious, as an anti-ideological predisposition 
extends, in one form or another, to all the main ideologies. Traditional conservatives, for 
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instance, have tended to dismiss ideology for its abstract, rationalistic style of discourse; 
ecologists often efface the distinctions among other ideologies as insignificant when 
compared to their common obfuscation of environmental themes.  
Not all ideologies, however, are equally critical of ideology, and, most importantly, not 
all ideologies are symmetrically placed with regards to each other, and to the space for 
contestation that opens up among them. The very idea of a political “space” betrays the all 
too common tendency to visualize politics and the relations among more or less stable 
discursive formations. The most common spatial metaphor is that of a political “spectrum” 
oriented from Left to Right, with various clusters of ideological discourses along the 
continuum. The patent inadequacy of this linear representation is only marginally lessened by 
the disentanglement of economic and social matters onto a Cartesian plane, or by the 
addition of a vertical axis opposing “the people” to “the elite” (a crucial move for the 
articulation of populist positions). Neither can the indefinite multiplication of dimensions 
beyond the powers of the human brain to envision provide a satisfactory solution to the 
problem of mapping the positions and relations of different ideologies. Short of rethinking 
space along non-Euclidean parameters (an effort that relatively few political theorists are 
willing to make), some have instead proposed a horseshoe configuration in order to 
represent graphically the conceptual proximity of different forms of “extremism,” like 
fascism and (implicitly Marxist-Leninist) communism. 
However much the spatial metaphor can be refined, though, it still fails to account for a 
complex phenomenon that defies simple topological models. Perhaps an inevitable feature 
of our political thinking, spatialization is also an inevitably inadequate one. Moreover, the 
mental images that are produced are not neutral with regards to their effects on how 
ideologies are perceived. For instance, as Michael Freeden has observed, “The left/right 
continuum […] is itself ideological. It serves the purpose of bestowing a moderate or, 
respectively, radical, or even dangerous aura on an ideology.”98
                                                 
98 Michael Freeden, Ideology: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 2003), p. 79 
  In fact, both the linear and 
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the multidimensional, Cartesian or horseshoe-shaped illustrations that are produced within 
contemporary Western political cultures invariably place liberalism at, or around the center 
of the political space. This systematic recurrence cannot be a simple coincidence. Is there 
something peculiar about liberalism that qualifies it as the “central” ideology? Or is this 
perceived “centrality” a function of the perspective from which those maps are drawn? No 
unequivocal answer can be provided for either of these questions without presupposing the 
other. No simple etiology can be reconstructed by imagining (liberal) ideological eggs and 
(liberal) societal chickens. However, this should not frustrate the efforts aimed at 
understanding how liberalism comes to enjoy a privileged place within certain ideological 
coordinates.  
I will concentrate most of my analysis on the question of whether some intrinsic 
features of liberalism characterize it as peculiar among other ideologies; but first I would like 
to address the second question, pointing to the actual existence, and to the specific character 
of a liberal ideological hegemony in contemporary Western societies. In fact, from the 
triumphant tones of liberal apologists proclaiming an untimely End of History, to various 
shades of Critics and Discontents, a vast consensus has been registered over the last two 
decades on the formula that “liberalism is the dominant ideology of the West today.” Both 
endorsements and denunciations of this alleged hegemony have come from rather disparate 
corners of the academic and extra-academic debates. The fervent certitude with which 
Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the universal spread of liberal values in 1989 and then again in 
1992 contrasts starkly with the “political, not metaphysical” appeal to an “overlapping 
consensus” with which John Rawls defended his idea of “justice as fairness” since at least 
1985.99
                                                 
99 see, for instance: Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (The Free Press, New York: 1992); 
John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political, not Metaphysical,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol 14, No. 3 
(Summer, 1985), pp.223-251 
 Similarly, while Neil Jumonville and Kevin Mattons extol the transcendent qualities 
that place liberalism “in the mainstream of American history” as a “defensible and utterly 
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necessary creed,” Raymond Geuss emphasizes the “highly contingent historical process” that 
resulted in the seemingly “inevitable” prevalence of liberal values in Western societies.100
The assortment of bedfellows in the “anti-liberal” camp is possibly even odder. If 
Michael Sandel laments the liberal postulate of an “unencumbered” self that pre-exists its 
ends, and contests the principle that “the right is prior to the good,” Slavoj Žižek exposes 
the Denkverbot that defines the current “ideological hegemonic coordinates,” and objects that 
“actual freedom of thought must mean the freedom to question the predominant liberal-
democratic postideological consensus-or it means nothing.”
 
101 Likewise, whereas Patrick 
Neal’s discussion of the neutralist and perfectionist articulations of the current liberal 
paradigm is aimed at the vindication of Hobbesian, “vulgar” liberalism as a sounder political 
philosophy, Maureen Ramsay aims her critique at “the pervasiveness of liberal ideas,” as she 
observes that “implicitly, most people assume the validity of liberal answers to [the questions 
of political philosophy].”102
Whether they regard it as a good or a bad thing, several theorists converge on the thesis 
of liberal hegemony. Some of the most perceptive among them also attempt assessing the 
confines and modus operandi of this hegemony. Alan Wolfe, a staunch defender of the liberal 
cause, addresses attacks that style themselves as positioned outside the liberal consensus by 
pointing out that: “We are definitely not all liberals now. But we do all live in a liberal 
world.”
 
103
                                                 
100 Neil Jumonville and Kevin Mattons, ed. by, Liberalism for a New Century (University of California Press, 
Berkeley: 2007), p. 1; Raymond Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 
2001), p. 3 
 More explicitly, John Kekes, a distinguished figure in contemporary conservatism, 
notes that: “With the demise of Marxism, [liberalism] has become the dominant ideology of 
 
101 see, for instance: Michael Sandel, ed. by, Liberalism and its Critics (New York University Press, New York: 
1984); Slavoj Žižek, “A Plea for Leninist Intolerance,” in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Winter, 2002), p. 545 
 
102 Patrick Neal, Liberalism and its Discontents (New York University Press, New York: 1997); Maureen Ramsay, 
What’s Wrong With Liberalism? A Radical Critique of Liberal Political Philosophy (Leicester University Press, London: 
1997), p.1 
 
103 Alan Wolfe, The Future of Liberalism (Alfred A. Knopf, New York: 2009), p. 255 
 68 
 
our time, one sign of which is that even its opponents now couch the defenses of the 
regimes they favor in evaluative terms that liberals have imposed on political discourse.”104 
In a liberal world, even non-liberal arguments are framed in the language of liberalism. 
Paraphrasing the title of a famous 1942 essay by Benedetto Croce, the Italian liberal 
philosopher, today one could chime: “Why we can't say we are not liberals.”105
I construct a possible explanation of why that is the case in trying to answer the 
question of what allows liberalism to exercise this hegemonic role. In particular, here I argue 
that studying the discursive practices of liberalism is necessary for delineating the channels 
through which the dominance of liberal values is asserted. In other words, I want to 
contribute to the scholarship on liberal hegemony by concentrating on a relatively 
understudied aspect of this political phenomenon, by investigating its communicative, 
discursive, linguistic, and even grammatical dimension. My thesis is that before even 
presenting its descriptive, normative and action-oriented statements as, respectively, true, 
desirable, and feasible, liberalism is successful at making them easily intelligible. This 
communicative accomplishment, in turn, rests crucially on the ability of liberal discourse to 
replicate certain structural features of language that are coded in grammar. Liberal discourse 
sounds intuitively “right” because it sounds familiar, because the content that it articulates 
conforms to the expression that it employs. Consequently, it has comparatively less 
“convincing” to do than other ideologies and becomes a sort of default position of the 
linguistic status quo. In Chapter IV, moreover, I analyze some cases in which liberal modes 
of expression even succeed at articulating descriptive and normative claims that do not 
correspond to the defining values of a liberal ideology. Liberal hegemony, then, extend from 
the merely ideological to a more broadly meta-ideological dimension. 
  
                                                 
104 John Kekes, Against Liberalism (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY: 1997), p. 2 
 
105 in Why We Can't Say We Are Not Christians Croce, a firm believer in secularism, had argued that the 
emergence of Christianity had been the most important revolution in the history of humankind, and as such it 
had shaped the existence of humans beyond the religious sphere more deeply than any other political 
phenomenon. See Benedetto Croce, Perche' Non Possiamo Non Dirci Cristiani (Laterza, Bari: 1944) 
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I certainly do not claim that this is the only explanation for liberal hegemony. 
Economic, historical, philosophical, and genuinely political accounts are clearly indispensable 
in constructing any sensible account of such a complex phenomenon. However, in Chapter 
II I have argued that the linguistic component is also a necessary ingredient in the mix of a 
well-balanced multi-causal story. Moreover, and more crucially for the development of my 
project, I ultimately do not wish to suggest that there is an immutable, a-historical basis to 
the linguistic foundations of liberal hegemony. This may sound counter-intuitive, as 
grammatical rules may be taken to exist outside of history and politics. Yet, in Chapter V I 
will attempt to advance an argument on how language itself, far from being a pre-political a 
priori, can be more or less consciously mobilized toward certain political goals, often with 
unintended consequences down the road. In particular, I will point to the concomitance, at 
the onset of modernity, of the rise of national states and the codification of standardized 
national languages. Finally, in Chapter VI I will consider the case of a peripheral area in the 
system of modern liberal hegemony. In such marginal areas, I will argue, the colonization of 
liberal discourse can be resisted, and different meta-ideological constructs can emerge.  
Here I will first identify certain recurrent characters of liberal discourse, as they appear 
from some of the foundational texts of a liberal tradition. In particular, I will consider three 
authors whose contributions to the development of liberal thought I find especially 
significant. Though the genealogy of liberal ideas can probably be traced further back in 
history, John Locke indubitably makes the most coherent case for early liberalism in the 
Second Treatise of Government in the late 17th century. Accordingly, since his thought truly 
shapes the development of the ideology from its formation, I will reserve special attention to 
Locke’s philosophy in general, and to its political implications in particular. The second 
theorist that I will consider is John Stuart Mill, as the ideas put forth in the mid-19th century, 
in such works as On Liberty, crucially advance the definition of a comprehensive liberal 
agenda. Finally, I discuss the position taken by John Rawls, who emerges as the leading 
political philosopher of the second half of the 20th century, animating the debates that 
flourish around his Theory of Justice, and that lead him to revise his original statement 
throughout his career.  
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I am not, obviously, equating the history of liberal thought with these three specific 
authors, nor could such a complex historical phenomenon be reduced to a limited number 
of discrete points in time. Thomas Hobbes could be claimed as a forefather of liberalism, as 
his is in many ways the earliest and most radical break with previous paradigms of political 
thinking (though not necessarily with the practices of government that descended from 
them). Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism clearly moves from liberal premises (though it, 
arguably, reaches illiberal conclusions). Robert Nozick's defense of a minimal state 
reinvigorated the confidence in a traditional theme of liberalism (though it inserted it in a 
libertarian political project whose relations with liberalism are far from unproblematic). 
Moreover, outside of the Anglo-Saxon tradition, critical contributions to liberal theory come 
from thinkers as diverse as Charles de Montesquieu, Immanuel Kant, and Amartya Sen, 
among countless others.  
My choice to concentrate on Locke, and to discuss Mill and Rawls too responds to a 
three-fold set of considerations. First, their work spans over three centuries, thus addressing 
very different political scenarios, in which a wide array of questions arises from society, thus 
eliciting age-specific answers from political theory. Second, there is a certain degree of 
consistency in the political realities that these thinkers confront, and in the cultural horizons 
in which their work is located: from early modern to late modern Western society. Thirdly, 
Locke, Mill and Rawls can be interpreted as examples of what Christine Di Stefano has 
called “problem-solving” orientation of political theory (as opposed to a “problem-making” 
one).106 Locke's writings, while their influence certainly transcends their specific context, 
have also been read (albeit inaccurately, as Peter Laslett’s historical analysis has shown, thus 
challenging the standard account of the Second Treatise as a piece of problem-solving political 
theory) as a defense of the Glorious Revolution of 1688.107
                                                 
106 See Christine Di Stefano, book review of Iris Marion Young, Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political 
Philosophy, and Policy, in Political Theory, vol. 29 No. 3 (June 2001), pp. 477-8  
 Mill's overarching goal is that of 
 
107 See: Peter Laslett, “Two Treatises of Government and the Revolution of 1688,” in Peter Laslett, ed. by, John 
Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1988) 
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salvaging individuality from the tyranny of the majority. Rawls' project explicitly sets forth to 
contest the utilitarian paradigm, thus vindicating a Kantian version of liberalism. Together, 
their articulations of liberal discourse attest to the resilience and versatility of the ideology 
that their writings have contributed to inspire. In the next pages I hope to show what aspects 
of liberalism make it so successful at articulating political content. I start by considering 
Locke’s political argument in light of his general theory of knowledge. Contrary to the some 
of the most established interpretive theses on The Second Treatise as either advocating 
“possessive individualism,” or a deep form of communitarianism, I argue that, by 
characterizing individuals as members of linguistic communities, Locke in fact presents a 
much more nuanced account of both human nature and of the character of political 
interactions. To this argument I now turn.  
 
  
LOCKE'S POLITICS OF SEMIOTIC INDIVIDUALISM 
Though any given entry point into an analysis of liberal ideology would be questionable, 
not engaging the political writings of John Locke would seem like an unwarranted exclusion 
from the definition of any critique on liberalism. Though associating the label “liberal” to 
Locke's thought and times would be a sheer anachronism, as the political theory and 
ideology of liberalism did not acquire consciousness of themselves and widespread 
recognition in political discourse until about two centuries after the publication of his major 
works, the influence of Locke's ideas on the subsequent development of liberalism is clear 
and unmistakeable. While other thinkers, ranging from Hobbes to Montesquieu, from Adam 
Smith to the French philosophes certainly participated in shaping the early phases of the 
complex political project that was to be called liberal, it may legitimately be argued that 
Locke's system of thinking is the central knot in that web of contributions. Moreover, few 
other figures in the tradition of Western philosophy have exercised such a profound 
influence on both the unfolding of theoretical debates, and on the institution of political 
practices.  
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Accordingly, the scholarship on John Locke continues to be vast and lively, as his 
remain among the key ideas that later thinkers have discussed, critiqued, and revised, and 
that still inspire the core of liberal political culture today. During the twentieth century 
several interpretative traditions have emerged on such rich texts as the Two Treatises of 
Government (1689), the Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), and (with comparatively less 
attention from political theorists) the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Leo 
Strauss and his disciples have seen in Locke the continuation of the political undertaking 
initiated by Hobbes earlier in the seventeenth century. Though moving from the premises of 
a different, less chilling account of the state of nature, Locke too ends up reducing the role 
of the state to the protection of certain pre-political, natural rights.108 Quite differently, John 
Dunn has emphasized the religious aspects of Locke's thought, arguing for a deep 
substratum of Protestant morality to justify his commitment to values of both freedom and 
equality.109 Contrary to this historicist reading, the materialistic dimensions of Locke's theory 
have been the focus of attention of the Marxist interpretive school. Perhaps the most 
influential statement to come from that tradition, C.B. MacPherson's thesis revolves around 
the concept of “possessive individualism,” stressing the connections between the theory of 
property offered by Locke, and the needs of emerging capitalism to justify the new order.110
                                                 
108 see Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago University Press, Chicago: 1953)  
 
A radically alternative understanding has been more recently proposed by David Walsh. 
Questioning a facile identification of Locke's view of human nature with a simplistic 
ontology of individualism, Walsh maintains that the characterization of Lockean individuals 
as not embedded in their larger social contexts is a misleading fiction, as in both the state of 
nature and after the social contract the individual is naturally inclined toward community, 
 
109 see John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An Historical Account of the Argument of the “Two Treatises of 
Government” (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 1969) 
 
110 See C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 
1962) 
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and cannot be said to fully exist without the latter: community is logically prior to the 
individual.111
The latter claim is probably the most provocative one, as it radically redescribes the 
premises of the political project that lies at the heart of liberalism. In particular, Walsh’s 
notion of a “liberal-communitarian” Locke contrasts sharply with MacPherson’s notion of 
“possessive individualism.” Are these two different, but complementary (or at least 
reconcilable) aspects of Locke’s thought? Are they radically alternative interpretations? Is 
one correct and the other aberrant? Or, is there another way to frame the contribution of 
Locke to the development of liberalism in a language that overcomes the hermeneutical 
impasse between anthropological communitarianism and materialistic individualism? In the 
next few pages I will briefly consider the positions of MacPherson and Walsh, and I will then 
advance my own interpretation of Locke’s peculiar blend of individualism. Paying attention 
to linguistic community, I argue that Locke grounds the individual in a system of shared 
meanings through which social interactions are mediated. Neither possessive, nor 
communitarian, Locke’s politics can therefore be termed one of “semiotic individualism.” 
 
I will start by considering the argument that economic motives are at the core of the 
political vision delineated in the Second Treatise. This position has been argued by a variety of 
commentators, both sympathetic with and openly critical of liberalism. Both perspectives, in 
spite of their evaluative disagreements, have tended to converge on the interpretation that, 
for better or worse, the ideas advanced by Locke are indeed among the key propositions of a 
liberal ideology. Since the Marxist version of this thesis is especially clear, I will concentrate 
on one of its most influential proponents here, all the while referencing relevant passages of 
the Second Treatise. “The student of liberal theory,” MacPherson points out, “is thus well 
advised to pay particular attention to the place of Locke’s theory of property in his theory of 
                                                 
111 See David Walsh, “Locke,” in K. Deutsch and J. Fornieri, ed. by, An Invitation to Political Thought (Thomson 
Wadsworth, Belmont, CA: 2009), pp. 271-309 
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government.”112 That theory of property, in turn, rests on an ontology that posits the 
individual as “the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for 
them;” in this view the individual is seen “neither as a moral whole, nor a part of a larger 
social whole, but an owner of himself.”113 In fact, in Locke’s state of nature, free and equal 
individuals enjoy “freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and 
persons,” and “equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having 
more than another.”114 In this context, what is “proper” of human beings is to tend to their 
own self-preservation, and as much as possible, to preserve the rest of (hu)mankind too; in 
other words, free and equal individuals also possess the attribute of “reason,” which Locke 
takes to coincide with the law of nature, and which “teaches all mankind, who will but 
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, 
health, liberty, or possessions.”115 Though these “items” are kept conceptually separate at the 
beginning of the treatise, later the “lives, liberties, and estates” of those who join in civil 
society are conflated in a “general name, property.”116
The logic of Locke’s argument is both simple and ingenious. On the one hand, “God 
[…] hath given the world to men in common [and He] hath also given them reason to make 
 Between the description of the state of 
nature, in which the various components of “property” are simply listed, and the 
introduction of the social contract, in which the protection of “property” (in the broad 
sense) has become the paramount goal of the associated life of humans, Locke situates the 
section in which he fully details his theory of property.  
                                                 
112 C.B. MacPherson, “Editor’s Introduction,” to John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, ed. by C.B. 
MacPherson (Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis and Cambridge: 1980), p. viii 
 
113 C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford University Press, 
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114 John Locke¸ Second Treatise of Government, ed. by C.B. MacPherson (Hackett Publishing Company, 
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115 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 6, p. 9 
 
116 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 123, p. 66 
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use of it to the best advantage of life, and convenience.”117 On the other hand, “Though the 
earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his 
own person: this no body has any right to but himself.  The labour of his body, and the work 
of his hands, we may say, are properly his.”118 What follows in Locke’s equation is that 
mixing one’s labor with what is common turns the latter into property. The act of gathering 
acorns makes them the property of the individual who gathered them. Concomitantly, two 
clauses limit such appropriation: avoiding the spoilage of the resources that one accumulates, 
and leaving “enough and as good” for others. The justification of appropriation and its 
limitations would seem to be equipollent, as they both derive from the same authority: “The 
same law of nature, that does by this means give us property, does also bound that property 
too.”119
So far this theory of appropriation remains fully consistent with the conditions of 
freedom and equality that were predicated of the state of nature. Where Locke departs from 
equality, thus offering moral validation to social arrangements that enable individual 
accumulation even to the extent to which this is conducive to egregious inequalities in 
material possessions, is in his explanation of the invention of money. Since money does not 
spoil and cannot be directly consumed, its accumulation by one individual does not inhibit 
others from acquiring property, and in fact, under certain conditions, promotes the latter 
too. As MacPherson notes, the introduction of money enables Locke to “transform the 
natural right of every individual to such property as he needed for subsistence, and as he 
applied his labour to, into a natural right of individual appropriation, by which the more 
industrious could rightfully acquire all the land, leaving others with no way to live except by 
selling the disposal of their labour.”
  
120
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 The trajectory indicated here is clearly one from 
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equality to inequality: “Locke makes a unique and ingenious case for a natural right of 
unlimited private property, with which society and government are not entitled to interfere: 
no-one, before or after, has come near his skill in moving from a limited and equal to an 
unlimited and unequal property right by invoking rationality and consent.”121
MacPherson’s bitter irony notwithstanding, the Marxist commentator is truly and deeply 
worried about the political implications of the principle of unlimited accumulation of 
property. Moreover, he denounces the unwarranted naturalization of a profoundly historical 
and contingent concept of labor as a commodity to be exchanged on the market for a wage, 
as well as Locke’s troubling silence on the possibility that that transaction would result in the 
“alienation of life and liberty,” as subsistence wages would keep the working class at the level 
of survival, as opposed to life, all the while depriving of any real meaning the notion of 
“liberty.”
  
122 In fact, the Second Treatise continues to be revered as a fundamental text in the 
tradition of Western political theory precisely because it outlines “an acceptable theoretical 
fall-back for publicists who accept the modern liberal state and society uncritically.”123 The 
relationship between Locke’s thought and the development of a liberal ideology is clear and 
straightforward for MacPherson: “As a liberal ideology [Locke’s doctrine] has almost 
everything that could be desired.”124 Central to this understanding of liberalism is the notion 
of possessive individualism; in turn the “core of Locke’s individualism is that every man is 
naturally the sole proprietor of his own person and capacities—the absolute proprietor in 
the sense that he owes nothing to society for them—and especially the absolute proprietor 
of his capacity to labour.”125
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accumulate property; the association of individuals and the ensuing formation of political 
power are secondary and merely instrumental to the protection of those possessions.  
Several critiques of MacPherson’s interpretive thesis have appeared over the last few 
decades. J.S. Maloy, for instance, locates his interpretation within “the trend of studies 
seeking to complicate the association of Locke with an ideal-type liberalism of limited 
government, free markets, property rights, and secularism.”126 Drawing inspiration from the 
“Cambridge School” of intellectual history, Maloy denounces as a false dichotomy the 
opposition between the political philosophies of Locke and Aristotle that is prevalent in 
modern academy. This view, illustrated, among others, by Michael Sandel’s Democracy’s 
Discontents, assumes Locke as the intellectual forefather of the “procedural republic,” in 
which “government should not affirm in law any particular vision of the good life. Instead, it 
should provide a framework of rights that respect persons as free and independent selves, 
capable of choosing their own values and ends.”127 On the other hand, Aristotle is invoked 
as the ancient champion of “organic community,” in which “the purpose of politics was to 
cultivate the virtue, or moral excellence, of citizens.”128 Maloy, instead, claims that “Aristotle 
was the classic source for both the principal theoretic argument of Locke’s Second Treatise and 
the method employed to pursue it;” furthermore, he argues that these “Aristotelian gestures 
[…] would have been readily understood as such by Locke’s contemporaries, even without 
the explicit attribution of Aristotle by Locke himself.”129
In his textual and contextual analysis, Maloy observes the alignment between Locke and 
Aristotle on the definition of political power as separate from, and irreducible to other 
relations of power, such as those of the household. Both thinkers, then, derive “radically 
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constitutional” conclusions from the premises of the specificity of the political, in both cases 
vindicating “the distinctiveness of the political against the pretensions of absolute 
monarchy.”130 On these grounds Maloy forcefully claims that his analysis is meant to “def[y] 
conventional assumptions about modern liberalism and its rivalries with 
‘‘communitarianism,’’ ‘‘republicanism,’’ or what have you. The creature that has come to be 
called ‘‘liberalism’’ is nothing if not a mongrel.”131
An even more radical dissent with MacPherson’s equation of Locke’s theory of politics 
with his notion of “possessive individualism,” and of this with the core of a liberal position 
is voiced by David Walsh: “While it may be argued that we have subsequently created a 
society of possessive individualists, Locke himself had a far more profound vision.”
 To the extent that a liberal tradition stems 
from Locke’s ideas, it does not stand in opposition to Aristotelian notions of virtue and 
community, but rather incorporates them.  
132 In 
fact, he goes so far as to claim that “The guiding intuition that prompted Locke’s search for 
consensus was that the community of human beings came before and remained despite their 
disagreements.”133 The thesis of the primacy of community in Locke's thought is not novel: 
Virginia McDonald, among others, posited that: “[t]he crucial focus of the political society is, 
for Locke, the community, the original compact. This remains intact with the dissolution of 
government.”134
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 More generally, along the lines of the different fate of society after the 
dissolution of government in Hobbes' and Locke's theories lie the standard defense of the 
latter from the allegation of promoting social atomism. In McDonald's account, Locke's 
story begins with dissociated individuals who then form social and civil bonds which outlast 
the political effects of their compact; it is a one-way trajectory from individual to society. 
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Ruth Grant identifies the opposite trajectory. Taking Locke's anthropological position 
seriously, she argues that he “makes no claim that men ever lived in isolation from their 
fellows. Man's natural condition is to be embedded in a series of social relations throughout 
life.”135 Alongside this descriptive “communitarianism,” though, Locke clearly articulates a  
view of “political individualism at the level of normative theory.”136 In Grant's account, 
Locke detaches individuals from community, but does not end up with social atomism, as 
strong social bonds are inherent to human nature. “Political relations,” on the other hand, 
“can only be created by consent in accordance with the premise of natural freedom:” though 
the political is one step removed from the nature of humans, the social is always essential to 
it.137
While the case against Locke's social atomism can be made without questioning that 
strong individualistic themes characterize his political theory, Walsh's Copernican revolution 
in the exegesis of the Second Treatise of Government reformulates the very premises of Locke's 
thought, as it shifts the interpretive focus from rights to responsibilities. Similarly, John Scott 
has argued that an emphasis on “obligation” is needed in the economy of Locke's theory of 
the state:  
   
 
Locke constructs a sovereignless commonwealth with several coexisting claimants to 
supreme authority: the naturally free individual, the people or society, the legislative, 
and the executive. Locke rejects sovereignty as what unifies the state, and he wants 
to replace the discourse of sovereignty theory with a language of obligation that will 
help bind together the sovereignless state.138
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Because he has offset the equilibrium of the traditional political order centered on an 
absolute authority, Locke needs to devise a language of obligation as the “centripetal force 
that helps the political machine work without a single ultimate authority.”139 For Walsh, 
rather than breaking away from previous conceptions of morality, Locke’s thought is still 
very much imbued with a profoundly Medieval conception of natural law. In this political 
universe, then, rights are in no way prior to obligations. Rather, rights rely on “a common 
responsibility to defend them;” in other words, “it is not the individual that sustains the 
political community but rather the political community that sustains the individual.”140
This is no minor redescription, as it enables Walsh to claim that community is always 
already prior to the individual: before, during, and after the (possible) dissolution of the 
commonwealth: 
 
 
The community of humans who live together may not have a political representation 
in the form of a government, but it is not for that reason any less real. Bonds of 
mutual obligation remain even in the absence of an effective means of enforcing 
them. This prepolitical community that lacks any visible manifestation is carried 
within each individual member, and from the mutual trust and recognition the 
compact to form civil society eventually emerges. For Locke there really is no 
problem in accounting for the transition from an individual to a communal 
perspective because individuals carry the sense of common obligation toward one 
another from the beginning.141
 
  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, property does not receive much attention from this interpretive 
approach. Material possessions are understood as merely functional to the preservation of 
the rights to life and liberty; Locke’s attitude toward unlimited acquisition is not justificatory 
in this view, but it rather carries “unrelievedly negative overtones.”142
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Walsh’s interpretation, albeit original and stimulating, fails to provide enough textual 
evidence to sustain its provocative theses: why does Locke’s individual “becom[e] an 
individual through his assumption of civic responsibility”?143
 
 A more interesting set of claims 
concerns the complex relation between the individual, community, and the state:  
Government ultimately emerges in a mysterious process from individuals who are 
already inwardly united before they become visibly so […] We are individuals who 
determine our own existence and cannot be properly human if we are less than 
responsible for ourselves. Yet we cannot function alone. We find ourselves in a 
network of mutual obligations before we even become conscious of our self-
determining prerogative. Politically this ambivalence is of great moment because it 
means that the breakdown or the failure of government is never ultimate. As 
individuals we carry the capacity for improvising government within ourselves.144
 
  
In a passage that seems to evoke themes of foucauldian governmentality, though in a very 
different context (most evidently: for Foucault “governmentality” describes a specific 
historical phase in the development of the relationship between governments and their 
subjects, whereas Walsh’s argument appears to be ahistorical and rooted in human nature 
more than in the contingent actions of governments), this sentence is especially insightful: 
“We find ourselves in a network of mutual obligations before we even become conscious of 
our self-determining prerogative.” However, unfortunately, Walsh does not elaborate on 
what constitutes this “network of mutual obligations,” nor does he clearly specify what 
exactly these “mutual obligations” are, and how they impact the constitution, or at least the 
acquisition of conscience about our “self-determining prerogative.” There is room to expand 
on the characters of the ontological universe that this claim subtends, and in particular on its 
implications for the role of individuals and community in Locke’s system of thought. While I 
do not think that Walsh fully accounts for the critique that he presents of the thesis of 
possessive individualism, I believe that a move beyond the material is in order for advancing 
a more thorough interpretation of the political universe disclosed by the Second Treatise. At 
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the same time, abandoning the category of individualism altogether as the interpretive key of 
Locke’s contribution to liberalism appears rather implausible. Here I propose to locate 
Locke’s individualism in what I understand to be a “network of mutual obligations” that 
affect and shape our sense of a “self-determining prerogative.” 
Language, I argue, provides human beings with the means for apportioning and sharing 
meaning in a system of mutually recognized expectations that make communication possible; 
language also provides humans with the means for accessing, contesting, performing, and 
expressing the identity of their selves. Systems of signification, more generally, rely on 
“networks of mutual obligations” inasmuch as the meaning that they organize requires that 
certain rules be recognized by those who participate in the processes of signification. Which 
portions of meaning get attached to certain vehicles for its expression, and how basic units 
of meaning are to be combined in order to form more complex units of meanings are two 
sets of such rules. While these rules might not be fully binding, and in fact can be 
transgressed in certain instances of communication, this does not mean that they cease to 
apply to the system as a whole. This semiotic infrastructure (a field of meaning; rules for the 
identification of discrete portions of meaning; rules on how to combine them) is in turn the 
prerequisite for acquiring consciousness of oneself as an agent and a source of valid claims. 
The “network of mutual obligations” established by language is logically prior to the claims 
that individual agents will articulate.  
In this sense I argue that Walsh’s intuition about a “communitarian” substratum in 
Locke’s thought is worth exploring, though I ultimately argue that by virtue of that very 
intuition one can reach a rather different interpretive outcome than what Walsh himself 
envisions. For the “mutual obligations” that preside over a system of signification are not a 
fact of nature, as Walsh’s Locke would have it, but derive in fact from a convention, from a 
sort of semiotic contract that is logically prior to the social contract illustrated in the Second 
Treatise. The outcome of the semiotic contract is the formation of the subject as the unitary 
locus of consciousness and the owner of action. To the subject of grammar corresponds in 
liberalism the social construct of the individual. Before even characterizing Locke’s position 
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as “possessive individualism,” I argue that it needs to be recognized as “semiotic 
individualism.” In order to explain what I mean by that, and in order to sustain my claim, I 
now proceed to analyze certain aspects of Locke’s political writings in light of his general 
philosophy of knowledge, and of language in particular.  
A thread of continuity extends from Locke’s empiricist theory of mind to his views 
concerning the relations between individuals and community. An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding advances the thesis that the human mind is at birth a tabula rasa, a blank slate 
devoid of any innate ideas. Contrary to the philosophical doctrine of innatism, Locke posits 
the mind as in principle separate from the external world, which affects it through the 
medium of experience. Simple ideas are impressed onto the mind, which receives them 
passively: “Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the things themselves, so united 
and blended, that there is no separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas 
they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple and unmixed.”145
If the mind is originally a blank slate, and if all knowledge depends on contingent 
experience, the very ability to perform these operations is what exists independently of 
specific experiences. This entity continues to exist regardless of the different experiences that 
a person encounters; as such, this continuity is what defines the essence of personhood 
separate from the accidents of experience. Moreover, since knowledge derives both from 
sensations (as the external world becomes known to us through our senses) and reflections 
(as we are aware of our mental processes) the self that Locke envisions is also aware of itself:  
 Semantic “atoms,” in 
other words, indivisible units of meaning like “hot,” “cold,” “soft,” “hard” are produced in 
the mind through either sensation (the experience of the senses), or reflection (the 
experience of thinking). Once it is invested with these simple ideas, however, the human 
mind possesses the faculty of acting on them in several ways. Simple ideas may be combined 
into complex ideas; ideas, whether simple or complex, may be compared; general ideas may 
be abstracted from particular ones.  
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[T]o find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands 
for: which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and 
can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; 
which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as 
it seems to me essential to it […] For since consciousness always accompanies 
thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby 
distinguishes himself from all other thinking things; in this alone consists personal 
identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being: and as far as this consciousness can be 
extended backwards to any past action or thought, so far reaches the identity of that 
person; it is the same self now it was then.146
 
  
Locke’s account of the self, then, postulates a rational being that remains “the same thing in 
different times and places.” On these grounds one might be tempted to infer a view of 
atomistic, unencumbered individualism, in which, pace Walsh’s claim, individual selves are 
conscious about their “self-determining prerogatives” without being immersed in any 
“network of mutual obligations.” However, Locke’s position is more complex than that, and 
as the Essay unfolds, a theory of language is presented that reinscribes the possibility of 
sociality. As I note in Chapter II, Locke proposes a two-stage model of signification.147 First, 
ideas are derived from experience: in this sense ideas are “signs” of things, the idea of “hot” 
stands in for the actual experience of touching a hot object. Second, words are signs of ideas: 
“Words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the 
mind of him who uses them, how imperfectly soever or carelessly those ideas are collected 
from the things which they are supposed to represent.”148
                                                 
146 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, Chapter XXVII, Section 9 “Personal 
Identity,” pp. 210-211 
 If the first relation is imperfect, 
however, as the last passage acknowledges, if, in other words, the correspondence between 
“things” and the “ideas” of them that become impressed in the human mind is not a 
 
147 For a comprehensive treatment of Locke’s philosophy of language see: Walter Ott, Locke’s Philosophy of 
Language (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2004); Michael Losonky,  Linguistic Turns in Modern Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2006); Hannah Dawson, Locke, Language and Early-Modern Philosophy 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 2007) 
 
148 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chapter II, Section 2 “Words are the 
sensible signs of his ideas who uses them,” p. 267 
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necessary one, then the second relation must somehow fix the potential for indeterminacy 
that the first allows. The openness of the thing-idea relation must be closed in the idea-word 
relation. To this end, a system must be devised so that the same words will stand for the 
same ideas in the minds of different people. Thus Locke summarizes the problem:  
 
But though words, as they are used by men, can properly and immediately signify 
nothing but the ideas that are in the mind of the speaker; yet they in their thoughts 
give them a secret reference to two other things. 
- First, They suppose their words to be marks of the ideas in the minds also of other 
men, with whom they communicate: for else they should talk in vain, and could not 
be understood, if the sounds they applied to one idea were such as by the hearer 
were applied to another, which is to speak two languages. […] 
- Secondly, Because men would not be thought to talk barely of their own 
imagination, but of things as really they are; therefore they often suppose the words 
to stand also for the reality of things.149
 
 
This problem of communication is resolved by Locke by affirming the primacy of linguistic 
community. No individual speaker, not even “the great Augustus himself,” in the example, 
has the power of imposing a word-idea connection at will onto a community of speakers: 
“no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has, when 
they use the same words that he does.”150
 
 That power instead resides in “common use,” and 
this ultimately derives its force from what Locke calls “a tacit consent:” 
It is true, common use, by a tacit consent, appropriates certain sounds to certain 
ideas in all languages, which so far limits the signification of that sound, that unless a 
man applies it to the same idea, he does not speak properly: and let me add, that 
unless a man’s voice excite the same ideas in the hearer which he makes them stand 
for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly.151
                                                 
149 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chapter II, Section 4 “Words often secretly 
referred, first, to the ideas in other men’s minds,” and Section 5 “Secondly, to the reality of things,” p. 267 
 
 
150 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chapter II, Section 8 “Their signification 
perfectly arbitrary,” p. 268 
 
151 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book III, Chapter II, Section 8 “Their signification 
perfectly arbitrary,” p. 268 
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This tacit consent, then, apportions words to ideas, securing that connection for the 
community that abides by it. It is “consent” because it is conventional; it is “tacit” because 
prior to its existence there would not be any language to express it. This tacit consent is a 
sort of implicit semiotic contract which produces the conditions for communication; like the 
social contract, it rests on the agreement of individuals, and on the power of community to 
enforce it. In both contracts Locke invokes the language of “propriety:” the social contract is 
meant to protect the “proper” endowments of an individual (life, liberty and estates); the 
semiotic contract is required to protect the “proper” meaning of words. Semantic properties, 
as well as the property of the individual are elements in a system that a contract guarantees.  
Considering the theory put forth in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, then, 
Walsh’s claim that there exists “a network of mutual obligations” which is prior to the 
acquisition of consciousness of our “self-determining prerogative” can be taken to suggest 
that there exist certain linkages of signifiers to signifieds in language that constitute a system 
of mutual presuppositions by which individuals may assume the possibility of meaningful 
communication. This very system, I argue, and in particular the semiotic contract on which it 
relies, also produces individuals as beings conscious of their “self-determining prerogative.” 
In this sense the semiotic contract also entails the paradoxical feature of producing the 
entities that will agree to it, a paradox that Locke solves by qualifying this consent as “tacit.”  
In light of this account of Locke’s theory of knowledge and language, what are the 
implications for the interpretation of his more explicitly political writings, and in particular of 
their contribution to the ideology of liberalism? The notion of “semiotic individualism” 
seems to be a clearer lens through which otherwise puzzling aspects of the Second Treatise can 
be read. I argue that Locke is not (just) a possessive individualist, as MacPherson would have 
it; but he is not (quite) the communitarian thinker that Walsh wants to see. Nor, I believe, is 
Lockean interpretation to be located at any discrete point on an imaginary continuum 
between communitarianism and individualism; and neither is it to be constructed by 
juxtaposing discrete elements of both positions in a balance that is doomed to be 
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unsatisfactory and precarious. In characterizing his position as “semiotic individualism,” on 
the one hand, I argue that Locke is committed to an individualist ontology, and that his 
individualism extends well beyond the material sphere of possessive acquisitiveness. The 
immaterial basis of Locke's individualism, on the other hand, is not rooted in the solipsism 
of disassociated beings, but in the socially constructed network of meaning through which 
they come to understand themselves. Lockean individuals are such because they have tacitly 
consented to a semiotic contract which is in turn what produces the conditions for their 
conscious existence.  
Consider now the motivation for individuals to leave the state of nature and form civil 
societies. Locke identifies three major “inconveniences” in his otherwise agreeable state of 
nature: “want” of an “established, set, known law;” “want” of a “known and indifferent 
judge;” and “want” of a “power to back and support” the law “and give it due execution.”152
First and foremost, while in principle individuals in the state of nature have access to 
the law of nature, insofar as they are endowed with reason, the exact interpretation of that 
law remains indeterminate: “for though the law of nature be plain and intelligible to all 
rational creatures; yet men being biassed by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of 
study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the application of it to their 
particular cases.”
 
A desire to fix these problems is what prompts individuals into the social contract. In fact, 
this is but a specific case and application of the semiotic contract to which I refer above.  
153
                                                 
152 J. Locke, Second Treatise, parr. 123-127, pp. 65-67 
 While both appealing to their ideas about what the law of nature 
sanctions as “right” or “wrong,” two different individuals could in fact mean something 
entirely different, either because of their emotional investments (“men being biassed by their 
interests”), or because of cognitive deficiencies (“for want of study of [the law of nature]”). 
The function of a positive law, “received and allowed by common consent,” is precisely that 
of fixing ideas of “right” and “wrong” into words, so that those words can be taken to evoke 
 
153 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 124, p. 66 
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the same ideas in the minds of the members of a certain (linguistic) community.154
Secondly, once ideas about the law of nature have been fixed into the words of a 
positive law, this still needs to be applied to specific cases. If the first inconvenience of the 
state of nature can be solved by anchoring signifieds to signifiers, the second pertains to the 
actual usage of the signs of law that are produced to the instances in which they are 
appropriate. If the first step was the creation of a positive language of law, the second is the 
application of that language to the world. Crucially, the “known and indifferent judge” that 
Locke postulates is to be endowed with “authority to determine all differences according to 
the established law.”
 If access 
to the law of nature were unproblematic, and in general if the “impression” of ideas onto the 
blank slate of the individual mind were not dependent on contingent experiences, then there 
would be no need to fix the meaning of the law of nature into a positive law made of words. 
Because the mind is a blank slate, the law of nature cannot be already inscribed in it, and 
because reason can only operate on ideas that come from experience, there is no guarantee 
that two rational individuals will derive the same ideas about the law of nature. The social 
contract that produces a positive law is possible because of the semiotic contract that 
establishes the connection between words and ideas. 
155 This authority corresponds to the power of determining the 
extension of a sign. Semiotic analyses of meaning identify “intension” as the ensemble of the 
semantic properties of a certain sign, whereas “extension” describes the ensemble of 
referents in the world to which the sign can extend.156
                                                 
154 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 124, p. 66 
 In his seminal article on concept 
formation, Giovanni Sartori has also employed the couplet extension-intension, describing 
the two terms as respectively equivalent to the denotation and the connotation of a word: 
“the denotation of a word is the totality of objects indicated by that word; and the 
connotation is the totality of characteristics anything must possess to be in the denotation of 
 
155 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 125, p. 66 
 
156 See: Harry Deutsch, “Extension/Intension,” in Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa, ed. by A Companion to 
Metaphysics (Blackwell, Oxford: 1995), pp. 158-160 
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that word.”157
Finally, having defined a “language” for the law, in both its intension and extension, 
Locke still needs to account for the validity of that system of signification as a system of 
communication too: he needs to demonstrate that individuals will be able to share and 
contest meaning, that the language will indeed be of “common use.”  The third 
inconvenience of the state of nature is that “there often wants power to back and support 
the sentence when right, and to give it due execution.”
 For instance, the intension (or connotation) of the sign /cat/ includes 
semantic markers like: animal; feline; four-legged; has a tail; meows; etc. The extension (or 
denotation) of /cat/, on the other hand, comprehends all the entities in the world, past, 
present, and future, real and fictional, to which those properties apply: Felix; Tom; Hello 
Kitty; Maneki Neko; Socks; etc. Locke’s judge determines the extension of the articles of the 
law to actual cases, like a zoologist would determine the extension of the abstract idea of 
/cat/ to concrete animals. Both would be engaged in the same semiotic operation.  
158
These homologies between the social contract and the “tacit consent” that logically 
precedes it have not received the attention that they deserve from political theorists. Both 
are occasioned by certain inconveniences, and both devise solutions that hinge on a clever 
balance between the role of the individual and the role of community in the new formation, 
linguistic or political. There is one passage of the Second Treatise, in particular, in which 
 Though in this context Locke’s use 
of the word “sentence” clearly refers to the legal meaning of an authoritative decision, it is a 
felicitous (and perhaps not entirely fortuitous) coincidence that that word could also be read 
as the grammatical unit of semantic and syntactic elements. In both ambits, the judicial and 
the linguistic, a sentence has validity and legitimacy only if it is sustained by the power of 
community: to apply it, or to simply understand it. Without community the sentence uttered 
by an individual is just a flatus vocis, empty sounds deprived of any force to impact the world.  
                                                 
157 Giovanni Sartori, “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics,” in American Political Science Review, Vol. 
LXIV, No. 4, December 1970, p. 1041 
 
158 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 126, p. 66 
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Locke’s discussion of political and linguistic matters is explicitly intertwined. In Chapter XIX 
the circumstances are described under which a government may be declared as dissolved. 
Locke sets forth by noting that “He that will speak with any clearness of the dissolution of 
government, ought in the first place to distinguish between the dissolution of society and the 
dissolution of government.”159 The precondition for properly assessing a political matter like 
the dissolution of government is that of “speaking with clearness;” once the linguistic 
armamentarium is appropriate, then Locke is confident that the political analysis will be 
accurate too. Accordingly, the government may cease to exist without precipitating the 
people back in the state of nature, for in the absence of a government power reverts to the 
society, and not to loose individuals. Moreover, after having detailed a fairly extensive list of 
causes for the dissolution of government, Locke responds to the possible objection that 
“this hypothesis lays a ferment for frequent rebellion.”160 His line of defense revolves around 
three main points. First, “the same will happen” regardless of the system of power: 
rebellions are a fact of political life, and their likelihood increases when “the people are made 
miserable, and find themselves exposed to the ill usage of arbitrary power.”161 Secondly, 
revolutions are not the result of sporadic mistakes on the part of the government: they 
originate only after “a long train of abuses, prevarications and artifices.”162
                                                 
159 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 211, p.107 
 The etymology of 
“revolution” too here points to the concept of return: going back to a just(er) political order 
after a corrupt government has deviated from that course.  In a skillful rhetorical move, here 
Locke swiftly substitutes “revolutions” for the term that he had originally used in 
formulating the possible accusation against his theory, “rebellion.” In opposing rare 
“revolutions” to “frequent rebellion” he redefines the terms of the contention on a ground 
that is bound to be more favorable for the defendant.  
 
160 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 224, p. 113 
 
161 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 224, p. 113 
 
162 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 225, p. 113 
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In a rhetorical crescendo, then, Locke introduces the third and crucial argument by 
turning the accusation of fomenting sedition on its head. He returns to “rebellion,” and 
boldly claims that his “doctrine of power” is indeed “the best fence against [it].”163 In order 
to justify this claim, he provides a definition of the intension of /rebellion/ as: “an 
opposition, not to persons, but authority, which is founded only in the constitutions and 
laws of the government.”164
 
 From this he then derives a definition of the extension of 
/rebels/:  
those, whoever they be, who by force break through, and by force justify their 
violation of [the constitutions and laws of the government], are truly and properly 
rebels: for when men, by entering into society and civil-government, have excluded 
force, and introduced laws for the preservation of property, peace, and unity 
amongst themselves, those who set up force again in opposition to the laws, do 
rebellare, that is, bring back again the state of war, and are properly rebels.165
  
 
It is ultimately on the power of language to establish shared meaning, and to attach 
unequivocal expression to it, that this defense rests. The power of community to forge the 
sign /rebellare/ from the association of a certain signifier to a certain signified binds 
members of that community to concede that Locke’s theory does not “la[y] a ferment for 
frequent rebellion.” Much like the establishment of a social contract requires a semiotic 
contract to be in place, the dissolution of government does not dissolve the social contract 
so long as the provisions of the semiotic contract continue to apply. Society survives the 
dissolution of government if the language that binds it together by making the contract 
possible remains in place. Short of redefining what /rebellare/ means (which is no 
disposition of any given individual), the act of deposing a corrupt government does not 
unravel the social contract, but confirms it in existence.  
                                                 
163 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 226, p. 114 
 
164 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 226, p. 114 
 
165 J. Locke, Second Treatise, par. 226, p. 114 
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In conclusion, I argue that reading the Second Treatise of Government in light of the Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding allows for a more refined understanding of Locke’s political 
theory by unearthing the semiotic foundations on which it rests. The concept of semiotic 
individualism points, at the very least, to the fact that Locke’s individuals possess more than 
their property, however generally defined: they own their ideas inasmuch as the self preexists 
and outlasts the accidents of experience that cause the formation of ideas. In this ontological 
view of individualism, ideas are not constitutive of the self. On the other hand, the semiotic 
dimension of human beings, the association of words (signifiers) to ideas (signifieds) is 
inherently rooted in the dimension of a community: inasmuch as individuals use words to 
communicate with each other, they are always already acting as members of a community. In 
this double gesture there lies much of the versatility of Locke’s thought, a versatility that 
contributes to explain the success of liberal discourse more generally. To some of the other 
sources for the foundations of liberal thought I now turn.  
 
 
MILL'S POLITICS OF SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUALISM 
Locke’s construct of semiotic individualism constitutes the communicative 
infrastructure of the ideology of liberalism. On the one hand, the self is defined as “the same 
thing in different times and places,” thus accounting for the disposition toward individualism 
that will come to characterize the main line of development of liberal thought. On the other 
hand, in Locke’s story, these selves are not unencumbered, to the extent that they are 
immersed in the communities of shared meaning through which they come to understand 
themselves, each other, and the world. Of these two fundamental commitments the first 
tends to take precedence in the thought of later contributors to liberal theory. Consequently, 
the ideology of liberalism inherits an emphasis on the individual which is not balanced by an 
equal attention to the grounding of individuals in their communities. 
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The intervention of John Stuart Mill in the 19th century, in particular, signals a crucial 
phase in the definition of the central role of the individual in the system of thought of 
liberalism. Whereas Locke had characterized the individual in terms of the continuity of 
consciousness throughout the incessant flow of experiences, Mill prefers to refer to “the free 
development of individuality.”166
Mill subsumes the core of his argument in the fundamental thesis that: “Over himself, 
over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.”
 Accordingly, whereas Locke had conjured up the power of 
community to avoid the disruption of that continuity, hence protecting the conditions that 
allow it (“life, liberty, and estates”), Mill’s concern is less with ensuring stability and more 
with creating the conditions that foster the unfolding of the potential that the developmental 
ideal entails. The purpose of On Liberty, then, is to advance a theory of what social and 
political arrangements favor individuality, and what limitations to individual freedom, if any, 
are ever acceptable. This, I argue, configures Mill’s general project as one of “sovereign 
individualism.” Whereas Locke had grounded individuals in the linguistic community in 
which they acquire sense of themselves and the world, Mill appears to relieve the sovereign 
individual of most social attachments. Nevertheless, I argue that in underscoring the value of 
reason as both a descriptive attribute of humans and a normative aspiration, this version of 
the liberal narrative of sovereignty ends up committing the individual to the external power 
of certain social expectations of reason. Though the Victorian climate of the 19th century 
might explain this attitude, at least in part, I argue that Mill’s position also signals a more 
general tendency in liberal discourse toward the subordination of other modes of action to a 
certain codification of reason.  
167
                                                 
166 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, ed. by Elizabeth Rapaport (Hacket Publishing Company, Indianapolis and 
Cambridge: 1978), p. 54 
 Several considerations about 
this formulation are in order, and contrasting its elements with the views of Locke is 
especially illustrative of Mill’s departure from that system of thought. First, the political 
order designed by the Second Treatise had been primarily concerned with the bodily extent of 
 
167 J.S. Mill,  On Liberty, p. 9 
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individual liberty: the protection of “property” was ultimately aimed at promoting the 
continuation of bodily existence, in both one’s self-preservation and the preservation of the 
rest of (hu-)mankind. To the extent that the Letter Concerning Toleration had carved a realm of 
the “mind” as separate from the body, and also worthy of protection from governmental 
interference, the goal was not the advancement of freedom, but congruence with religious 
dictates about true belief:  
 
In the second place, the care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because 
his power consists only in outward force; but true and saving religion consists in the 
inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. 
[…] Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have 
any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgement that they have 
framed of things.168
 
 
The freedom of the mind was valuable for Locke not in its own right, but only because it 
served God’s highest purposes better than forcible conversion. Mill clearly expands on this 
reasoning, and identifies the unfettered freedom of the mind as intrinsically desirable, and 
not just as a precondition for living a genuine religious life. Freedom thus applies to both 
body and mind (a problematic dualism that Mill does not question here), and the relation of 
the individual to both realms is defined as “sovereign.” The principle of undivided, absolute 
sovereignty that Locke had expunged from the political, gets now reinstated by Mill at the 
level of the sovereign individual. Nor is this a conclusion that Locke could have made 
compatible with his thinking, for on his account the self is always compounded of a merely 
individual dimension, inasmuch as contingent experiences affect the mind, and an irreducibly 
social grounding, inasmuch as consciousness develop linguistically, and the ideas that are 
gathered individually become fungible only insofar as they are fixed in socially codified 
words. Mill postulates unity where Locke had seen separation, thus returning etymological 
accuracy to the notion of the “individual.”  
                                                 
168 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration [1689] (Bobbs-Merrill, New York: 1955), p. 18 
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Consequently, the only limitation that individual sovereignty can admit is the competing 
claim to sovereignty of another individual. There is no superior principle to which 
sovereignty can be subordinated; but the boundaries of its extent can be determined in a way 
that both defines and enables individual freedom. The “harm principle” states that: 
 
the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That 
the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.169
 
 
While Locke had also postulated self-protection as the paramount goal stipulated by the law 
of nature, he had also added the subordinate provision that “the rest of mankind” be 
preserved too (whenever the latter does not conflict with the former). Moreover, Locke had 
envisioned a proactive role of the state in protecting property in order to guarantee the 
conditions for self-protection (and the protection of mankind). Mill, on the other hand, is 
only willing to recognize defensive power to the “collectivity:” not the power to protect, but 
the power to stop transgressions of sovereignty that threaten to cause harm. In general, 
Mill’s version of liberalism appears to systematically resolve in favor of the individual the 
tensions that may arise in society.  
Michael Freeden identifies a “Millite core” to liberalism, subsumed in the phrase “the 
free development of individuality.” For Freeden, this phrase fuses together the three 
elements that form the nucleus of Mill’s argument: liberty, the individual, and the idea of 
progress. The latter, in particular, reflects the 19th century milieu of faith in reason and in its 
deployment over time at the societal level. According to Freeden the morphology of the 
ideology of Millite liberalism hinges on this conceptual construct:  
 
                                                 
 
169 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, p. 9 
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The relationship of liberty, individualism, and progress is one of mutual dependence 
and definition. It is impossible to disentangle them and to position one alone at the 
core of Mill’s argument; all three are most usefully regarded as core concepts. Each 
manifests an ineliminable component: for liberty, it is the notion of non-constraint; 
for individualism, the notion of the person as a separate entity possessing unique 
attributes and capable of choice; for progress, the notion of movement from less 
desirable states – ‘the idea of moving onward’, as Mill puts it.170
 
  
Freeden’s morphological analysis is both insightful and perceptive. In emphasizing the co-
determination of the foundational values of liberty, individualism and progress, it does point 
to a distinctive character of Mill’s thought. However, as usual, it only illuminates the plane of 
content, leaving the deeper grammatical aspects of Mill’s ideology substantially unexplored. 
By looking at Mill’s more explicitly political writings in light of his overarching philosophy of 
science, I argue, a more complete assessment of his blend of liberalism can be devised. In A 
System of Logic a general theory of knowledge is proposed, and concrete prescriptions are 
made for the acquisition and organization of knowledge. The research paradigm that Mill 
delineates identifies induction as the appropriate method for science, whereas deduction is a 
merely derivative function that does not add any new knowledge. Induction moves from the 
observation of particular cases to the formulation of general rules, and thus it logically 
precedes deduction, which simply applies general rules to particular cases. Mill’s preference 
for the process that starts with the particular is clear:  
 
we shall yet, conformably to usage, consider the name Induction as more peculiarly 
belonging to the process of establishing the general proposition; and the remaining 
operation, which is substantially that of interpreting the general proposition, we shall 
call by its usual name, Deduction. And we shall consider every process by which 
anything is inferred respecting an unobservable case, as consisting of an Induction 
followed by a Deduction; because, although the process needs not necessarily be 
carried out in this form, it is always susceptible of the form, and must be thrown into 
it when assurance of scientific accuracy is needed and desired.171
 
  
                                                 
170 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory, p. 145 
 
171 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive (Harper & Brothers, New York: 1858), p, 137 
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In this formulation, the logical priority of induction over deduction corresponds to the 
primacy of the particular over the general in the realm of science. Much like the grammar of 
scientific discourse proceeds from particular to general, so the grammar of social interactions 
aggregates individuals in social compounds. However, Mill’s concern for “scientific 
accuracy” notwithstanding, his faith in the virtue of induction rests on the positivistic milieu 
of his day. Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism, on the other hand, provided a more refined 
understanding of logical inference. As I note in Chapter II, Peirce’s model supplemented the 
traditional categories of induction and deduction with what he called “hypothesis,” 
“retroduction,” and finally “abduction.” In abductive reasoning, given a rule and a result, a 
probable case is inferred; in Peirce’s own example: 
 
Suppose I enter a room and there find a number of bags, containing different kinds 
of beans. On the table there is a handful of white beans; and, after some searching, I 
find one of the bags contains white beans only. I at once infer as a probability, or as 
a fair guess, that this handful was taken out of that bag. This sort of inference is 
called making an hypothesis. It is the inference of a case from a rule and a result.172
  
  
Drawing hypothetical inferences, in fact, is the kind of reasoning in which human beings are 
engaged most frequently: unable to observe an adequate number of cases to infer certain 
rules (induction), and unaware of pre-existing rules to be mechanically applied to cases 
(deduction), we often proceed by making “educated guesses” based on the available 
information, and accept the conclusions as tentatively, heuristically true (abduction). Nor is 
the abductive model only valuable for describing mundane inferential operations, for 
scientific research too has been described, at least since Thomas Khun, as a much less 
orderly endeavor than inductive accounts would suggest, moved more by paradigm shifts 
than by the unfolding of linear progress.173
                                                 
 
 Inductive reasoning, though, is a logical paradigm 
172 Charles Sanders Peirce, “Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis (1878),” in Nathan Houser and Christian 
Kloesel, ed. by, The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings. Volume 1 (1867-1893) (Indiana University Press, 
Indianapolis: 1992), pp. 188-189 
 
173 See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 1962) 
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especially well suited to provide Mill’s liberalism with its discursive infrastructure: it starts 
with particular cases, and aggregates them into rules; it starts with individuals, and logically 
compounds them into a derivative society. Rules, like societies, therefore, have no 
explanatory power of their own, but are simply the convenient repositories of the specificity 
that is ultimately grounded in individuals/cases.  
Moreover, “scientific accuracy,” in Mill’s view, is “needed and desired” not only within 
the limited extent of the natural sciences, but is the paramount value of the social sciences 
too. Having absorbed the utilitarian lesson from both his father James Mill and Jeremy 
Bentham, Mill is skeptical of metaphysical accounts of human nature, and of political 
phenomena too. Accordingly, the very idea of the social contract is untenable for him: 
“Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose is answered by 
inventing a contract in order to deduce social obligations from it, every one who receives the 
protection of society owes a return for the benefit.”174
Mill’s notion of utility de facto departs from Bentham’s formulation in that it involves a 
crucial distinction between “higher” and “lower” pleasures. “It is quite compatible with the 
principle of utility,” Mill claims “to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more 
desirable and more valuable than others;” higher pleasures are those “of the intellect, of the 
feeling and imagination, and of the moral sentiments,” whereas lower pleasures are those “of 
mere sensation.”
 Far from following from general rules, 
individual obligation toward others (the obligation not to harm them) is to be understood as 
a cost-benefit calculation aimed at maximizing individual utility.  
175
                                                 
 
 Whether or not this is indeed a development of utilitarianism that 
remains compatible with the principles of the theory, Mill’s classification of pleasures 
introduces a new layer of complexity to the articulation of a liberal ideology. From a 
174 J.S. Mill,  On Liberty, p. 73 
 
175 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Savill and Edwards, London: 1863), p. 11 
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sympathetic point of view, John Gray has argued that this is both compatible, and indeed a 
fundamental component of Mill’s doctrine of liberty:  
 
Mill’s conception of happiness is hierarchical and pluralistic in that it decomposes 
happiness into the projects, attachments and ideals expressed in an indefinitely large 
set of human lives. If we treat Mill’s distinction between the higher and lower 
pleasures as being between different kinds of activity or forms of life rather than 
between states of mind, we can see that, though he is far from supposing that the 
higher pleasures will be the same for all men, he does think they have the common 
feature of being available only to men who have developed their distinctively human 
capacity for autonomous thought and action.176
 
  
In Gray’s account, then, Mill’s insistence on the higher quality of certain pleasures does not 
result in the imposition of a particular view of the good life onto other individuals, which 
would contradict the fundamental idea of the individual as sovereign over his mind and 
body. Rather, liberty is enhanced by the cultivation of pleasures the enjoyment of which 
depends on one’s “capacity for autonomous thought and action.” Wendy Donner finds 
Gray's treatment of autonomy in relation to self-development problematic, as it “plac[es] on 
Mill's theory a restrictive elitist and libertarian emphasis that violates the spirit of his 
liberalism, shifting his political philosophy away from the collectivist, social democratic pole 
and toward the libertarian individualist pole of the continuum of liberalism.”177 Mill's 
liberalism, in Donner's analysis, would indeed be inclined to the “social democratic” pole. 
She observes: “According to Mill, the firm line his critics draw between individuality and 
sociality, between the private individual and the public individual, is misleading and 
inaccurate. Individuality and sociality are not contradictory, but complementary notions.”178
                                                 
 
 
Appropriate social circumstances foster the conditions for the free development of 
176 John Gray, Mill On Liberty: A Defence (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London: 1983), p. 72 
 
177 Wendy Donner, The Liberal Self. John Stuart Mill's Moral and Political Philosophy (Cornell University Press, 
Ithaca, NY: 1991), p. 166 
 
178 W. Donner, The Liberal Self, p. 147 
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individuality, without constraining it. Gray's position, however, remains compatible with this, 
as he notes:  
 
Though, like Aristotle [Mill] thinks that all human excellences will be informed or 
characterised by the exercise of generic human capacities, he differs from Aristotle in 
insisting on the uniqueness which will characterise any man’s happiness […] A happy 
man will not, then, be simply a very distinct instance of a general type; rather, one 
part of his happiness, a necessary part in Mill’s view, will be that he has fulfilled the 
peculiar demands of his own nature.179
 
 
Mill then, would be able to claim that it is “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool 
satisfied” without by the same token necessarily indicating Socrates as the model of virtue, of 
“higher pleasures,” for everybody.180 Mill would seem to have been able to turn Tolstoy’s 
famous adage over its head: happy families are not all alike; every happy individual can find 
his/her own way to be happy (so long as it is still within the confines of what count as 
“higher pleasures”). Gray’s generous defense is not convincing, but Donner's thesis of a 
socially-minded Millian liberalism is unpersuasive too. Mill seems rather to incorporate into 
liberal thinking the assumptions about science, progress, development that permeate his 19th 
century sensibility. The social, or even democratic dimension is not valuable in its own right, 
but only if, and insofar as, it contributes to the conditions under which self-developmental 
individuality can prosper. This remains the ultimate goal for Mill, and societies are evaluated 
based on how they perform on this measure. This attitude is confirmed by passages like: 
“Despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end 
be their improvement and the means justified by actually effecting that end.”181
                                                 
 
 The same 
teleology of human development that applies to individuals (from lower to higher pleasures) 
179 John Gray, Mill On Liberty: A Defence, p. 81 
 
180 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 14  
 
181 J.S. Mill, On Liberty, p. 10 
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also applies to societies (from barbarism to civilization: advanced, Enlightened, liberal, 
remarkably similar to his own England…).  
In general, Mill’s project of sovereign individualism proves to be a rather profound 
reformulation of the proto-liberal stance expressed by Locke. Having expunged the residual 
“communitarian” elements of Locke’s picture of the self as a semiotically defined entity, Mill 
both relieves the individual from any concrete attachments to a social dimension (minus the 
obligation not to harm others), and at the same time commits him (and, significantly, her 
too) to a plan for self-development whose path seems to be already marked. While the 
notion of individuality clearly remains consistent with the overall goal of individual freedom, 
shielding it from the threat of the “tyranny of the majority” too, its unfolding seems to be 
subject to a sort of “soft tyranny” of a different kind. Reason, which had been already 
described by Locke as a fundamental attribute of humans, becomes in the 19th century a 
normative goal, if not a totalizing aspiration. Arguably more insidious precisely because it is 
less explicitly recognized as such, the soft tyranny of reason becomes a constitutive element 
of liberal discourse: not only are individuals recognized as the “owners” of their articulations 
of meaning and actions, but they are also assumed to deploy their “properties” (of meaning 
and actions) according to certain more or less predictable patterns of operation. A fond 
penchant for reason thus becomes a key ingredient of liberal ideology, and of liberal 
discourse. To a contemporary contributor to the doctrines of liberalism I now turn.  
 
 
RAWLS’ POLITICS OF TEMPERED INDIVIDUALISM 
Virtually all references to Locke in contemporary political debates are qualified with a 
note about the different historically and cultural coordinates in which his political theory is 
to be situated in order to be genuinely understood. Consequently, while he is revered as a 
key figure in the development of early modern political thought, his contributions to the 
foundations of liberalism are assumed as a starting point from which the theories and 
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ideologies of liberalism indubitably draw inspiration, but just as indubitably depart in some 
significant ways. The tradition of Mill’s liberalism, on the other hand, can still be invoked by 
some liberal advocates as the articulation of a fully accomplished liberal paradigm. On 
September 20th, 2007, for instance, Mill was announced as the winner of “The Great Liberal 
Contest” organized by the Liberal Democrat History Group, a British organization devoted 
to “the study of Liberal Democrat, SDP and Liberal History,” and the editor of the Journal of 
Liberal History.182 “His masterpiece, On Liberty,” reads the motivation, “emphatically 
vindicated individual moral autonomy, and celebrated the importance of originality and 
dissent; it is the symbol of office of the President of the [British] Liberal Democrats.”183
Encomia and acclaim notwithstanding, several critiques of Mill’s doctrine of liberty can 
be levied from within a liberal camp. In particular, his connections to the theories of 
Utilitarianism expand beyond the mere biographical datum, and while his deviation from the 
Benthamite variant is remarkable, his substantial adherence to the epistemology of that 
position is also problematic. John Rawls, among others, has offered a reading of Mill aimed 
at highlighting his contributions to liberalism despite the unfortunate utilitarian elements: 
 
  
[M]y object has been to explain how, given his apparently Benthamite beginning, he 
managed to end up with principles of justice, liberty, and equality not all that far 
away from justice as fairness, so that his political and social doctrine – lifted from his 
overall moral view-could give us the principles of a modern and comprehensive 
liberalism.184
 
 
In general, Rawls’ overall philosophical undertaking responds to the goal of devising certain 
principles of justice, and defending them within a tradition of liberalism alternative to that of 
utilitarianism. Though he successfully refuses the key utilitarian theses on human nature and 
                                                 
182 see: Richard Reeves, “Mill and Politics Today,” in Journal of Liberal History, Vol. 57, Winter 2007 
 
183 Duncan Brack, “John Stuart Mill chosen as greatest British Liberal,” available at: 
http://www.liberalhistory.org.uk/item_single.php?item_id=110&item=history. Retrieved online on Monday, 
April 5th, 2010.  
 
184 John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, Mass.: 2007), p. 313 
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the social arrangements that befit it, I argue that Rawls’ argument for a form of “tempered 
individualism” ultimately retains the same exclusionary potential that also haunts other 
articulation of liberal discourse. To the extent that his arguments for “justice as fairness” and 
for a “well-ordered society” crucially depend on an account of human nature predicated on 
the value of reason, the status of those human beings whose reason is deemed defective 
remains quite precarious. This, in turn, constitutes a fundamental trait of liberal discourse, a 
narrative style in which to the expectation that action be performed rationally corresponds 
the precept that it be expressed according to rational rules for the combination of units of 
meaning as well. A rational grammar of human action also posits a rational grammar of 
discursive formations.  
Rawls responds to the utilitarian position by resorting to the style of thinking of 17th and 
18th century social contract theory, though, as Michael White has noticed, he defines the 
object of his investigation differently. Whereas Hobbes, Locke, and to some extent Rousseau 
privileged the question of “commutative justice,” concerned with determining “what parties 
would be willing to agree to, perhaps in idealized circumstances,” Rawls focuses primarily on 
“distributive justice,” purporting to devise principles for the fair allocation of “the benefits 
and burdens of social cooperation among the citizens.”185 In this sense he claims that justice 
“is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of system of thought.”186
                                                 
 
 The ambition of 
A Theory of Justice, of 1971, is therefore that of finding the “truth” about justice. In later 
writings Rawls will progressively abandon this metaphysical concern with “true justice,” and 
will instead ground his conception within certain historical, cultural, and political boundaries. 
Throughout the development of his intellectual career Rawls remains committed to a theory 
of liberalism in which the foundations of individual freedom are coupled with a formulation 
of social equity that marks a clear break with previous instances of liberal discourse, and yet 
continues to be consistent with liberalism. 
185 Michael White, Political Philosophy: An Historical Introduction (Oneworld Publications, Oxford: 2003), p. 201 
 
186 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass: 1971), p. 3  
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That Rawls’s theory of justice moves from liberal premises is evidenced by his definition 
of society as “a cooperative venture for mutual advantage:” 
 
Let us assume, to fix ideas, that society is a more or less self-sufficient association of 
persons who in their relations to one another recognize certain rules of conduct as 
binding and who for the most part act in accordance with them. Suppose further that 
these rules specify a system of cooperation designed to advance the good of those 
taking part in it.187
 
 
In this version of social contract, then, the question of justice pertains to the distribution of 
the “mutual advantage” produced in society among its individual members. In order to 
identify the social arrangements that would qualify society as “just” in this sense, Rawls 
resolves that the appropriate unit of analysis is that of the individual: for an allocation of 
costs and benefits within society to be just, it needs to be met with the consent of the 
concerned individuals. Establishing this consent is the crucial hinge of this theory, and the 
main problem that will lead to its subsequent reformulations. In A Theory of Justice an 
“original position” is hypothesized in which the individual is found as a disembodied, 
unencumbered entity, a kernel of pure rationality and pure potentiality.188
                                                 
187 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 4  
 As such, this view 
designs a much more radical picture of individualism than what either Locke’s state of nature 
or Mill’s notion of utility had envisioned. In my analysis, while Rawls normatively gestures 
toward a more “social” pole within the discourse of liberalism, the method that he chooses 
to employ for furthering his argument betrays a deeper commitment to an ontology of 
individualism. Accordingly, I refer to Rawls’ blend of individualism as “tempered.” On the 
one hand, the individualistic conclusions of other positions within liberalism are mitigated by 
the formulation that social cooperation ought to be more than an instrumental concern for 
pre-social individuals, as, conversely, it ought to be concerned with “mutual advantage.” On 
the other hand, however, in conjuring up a stripped-down, infinitely agile stylization of “the 
individual” as the subject of the original position, Rawls tempers individualism also in the 
 
188 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 118 and ff.   
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sense of rendering its claims more resistant to possible critiques on the account that human 
nature is more complex. By settling for such a minimalistic description of “the individual,” 
this fiction alleges to have accessed the ultimate core of the notion, without the dubious 
conceptual baggage that had weakened other accounts. Moreover, as Bonnie Honig has 
observed, Rawls’ account of the original position is not merely functional to the unfolding of 
his theory, but is endowed with normative value as well, as it “operates as a much needed 
heuristic device designed to isolate morally relevant considerations, to simplify, clarify, order 
(and also consolidate) what Rawls takes to be a stable body of moral and prudential 
beliefs.”189
 
 A moral order exists outside the contingences of life, and the fiction of the 
original position allows individuals to access it. Furthermore, Honig points out:  
When Rawlsian citizens experience dissonance (in themselves or in others), the 
default is to return to the original position and confirm that, from its perspective, the 
outlaw impulse, desire, or activity in question is indeed irrational or unjust.190
 
 
Individuals in the original position operate behind “a veil of ignorance,” so that their choice 
about what would constitute “justice” is not does not suffer from self-interested bias: “They 
do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are 
obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations.”191
 
 Based on 
these assumptions, Rawls obtains two principles of justice that he enunciates as:  
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of basic 
liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.  
Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all.192
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The first principle articulates a version of the canonical liberal theme of individual freedom; 
consequently, it takes precedence over the second whenever the two are in conflict. It is the 
second principle, however, that characterizes the specificity of Rawls’ politics of tempered 
individualism. Allowing inequalities only insofar as they are “to everyone’s advantage” 
certainly introduces a concern for the well-being of everybody in society that is at the very 
least eccentric from the perspective of classical liberalism. Moreover, Rawls specifies section 
(a) of the second principle by presenting what he calls the “difference principle,” the 
distributive scheme that he favors:  
 
the higher expectations of those better suited are just if and only if they work as part 
of a scheme which improves the expectations of the least advantaged members of 
society. The intuitive idea is that the social order is not to establish and secure the 
more attractive prospects of those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of 
the less fortunate.193
 
  
With remarkable argumentative elegance Rawls reaches rather egalitarian conclusions 
without departing from his liberal premises, and in fact reaffirming them in the form of the 
first principle. In a virtuoso exercise of intellectual acumen, he stretches the limits of liberal 
discourse almost beyond liberalism itself; the versatility of the language of liberalism, that he 
consistently invokes and employs, allows him to validate “justice as fairness” as the choice of 
a rational individual. That this is a necessary conclusion, however, fails to convince some of 
Rawls’ early critics. Presented as the outcome of rational decision-making under certain 
conditions of radical individualism, the two principles of justice are called into question with 
regards to their alleged universality and moral superiority to competing conceptions of the 
good and the just. Defending the very approach that Rawls sets forth to undermine, John 
Harsanyi remarks: “It is regrettable that Rawls has ever made the untenable claim that he is 
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proposing a moral theory superior to utilitarian theory.”194 From the libertarian camp, 
Robert Nozick proposes a theory of justice as “entitlement” that contradicts the 
redistributive outcomes that the difference principle indicates: “Rawls’ construction is 
incapable of yielding an entitlement or historical conception of distributive justice.”195
Responding to some of these critiques, but conspicuously avoiding to address the 
radical disagreement with Nozick, Rawls reworks the explanation for consent to the 
principles of justice as fairness. Redrawing it as a “political, not metaphysical” notion, he 
introduces the idea of an “overlapping consensus” as the logical justification of his concept 
of justice as fairness: “a consensus that includes all the opposing philosophical and religious 
doctrines likely to persist and to gain adherents in a more or less just constitutional 
democratic society.”
  
196 This move dramatically limits the universalistic appeal of the theory, 
as it contextualizes this vision in the contingencies of Western liberal democracy. Rawls does 
not think (any more) that political theory can discover the formula of “true justice.” Much 
more modestly, he presents his view as a “working agreement on the fundamental questions 
of political justice,” a set of norms and institutional arrangements intended “to narrow the 
range of public disagreement.”197
The significant revisions to the original statement of his theory of justice do not call into 
question Rawls’ commitment to liberalism. Rather, they, once again, attest to the flexibility of 
liberal language: both from behind the “veil of ignorance,” and from within an “overlapping 
 At the same time, postulating this consensus (albeit 
contingent and historical) to really exist at least in certain societies, betrays in Rawls a rather 
robust confidence in his ability to read political phenomena and social movements – a 
confidence that his theoretical writings are not always persuasive in defending. 
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consensus,” the two principles of justice as fairness are justified in the name of the liberal 
individual, and in both cases the liberty principle is superior to the difference principle. The 
two arguments, however, differ in some very important ways; primarily, I argue, they signal a 
shift in Rawls’ theory from a discourse of rationality to a discourse of reasonableness. The 
picture of a single, abstract, rational individual arriving at the principle of justice on the basis 
of silent calculations gives way to the view of multiple, real, reasonable individuals, 
comparing their beliefs through the medium of language, and identifying a core of shared 
meanings. Rawls himself discusses the roles of the Reasonable and the Rational in his theory 
in Political Liberalism: 
 
What is that distinguishes the reasonable from the rational? […]  
Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to 
propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them 
willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. Those norms they view 
as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as justifiable to them; and they are 
ready to discuss the fair terms that other propose. […] 
The rational is, however, a distinct idea from the reasonable and applies to a single, 
unified agent (either an individual or corporate person) with the powers of judgment 
and deliberation on seeking ends and interests peculiarly its own. The rational applies 
to how these ands and interests are adopted and affirmed, as well as to how they are 
given priority. It also applies to the choice of means, in which case it is guided by 
such familiar principles as: to adopt the most effective means to ends, or to select the 
more probable alternative, other things equal.198
 
 
The rhetorical move from the rational to the reasonable corresponds to a substantial turn 
outward in the search for legitimacy for Rawls’ conception of justice: from the individual as a 
rational chooser, to society at large as a system of fair cooperation among reasonable 
individuals. In this restatement Rawls’ defense of reasonableness comes to resonate quite 
closely with Jürgen Habermas’ conception of communicative action. Despite their enduring 
divergences, the critical engagement between the two thinkers points to the progressive 
rapprochement between rather diverse worldviews: liberal and grounded in analytic 
philosophy one; continental and rooted in critical theory, the other. Rawls’ very willingness 
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to enter a conversation with Habermas can be regarded as symbolic of his cautious openness 
to the idea that the boundaries of the reasonable might extend beyond the universe of sense 
of liberalism. 
In order to fully appreciate the evolution of Rawls’ thought, and in order to estimate 
whether or not he ultimately succeeds in overcoming the critiques and in proposing a 
theoretically robust model, a careful semantic analysis of the concepts of “rational” and 
“reasonable” is expedient (see Figure 2). As a preliminary note, it should be observed that in 
the framework implicit in Rawls’ theory “rational” and “reasonable” constitute the two poles 
of human reason. The attribute of “rationality,” in this sense, designates the conformity of 
an instance of human conduct to expectations formed on the basis of certain assumptions 
on ends, means and will, and grounded at the level of the individual. In other words, in this 
context “rational” is the course of action chosen by an individual who selects the best means 
to achieve her ends – or, more precisely, to achieve those ends that she gives priority to, in 
case they conflict with other ends of hers. The key elements of rationality appear to be: 1) 
being rooted in one’s individual consciousness; 2) being fundamentally instrumental in its 
character; 3) being concerned with ends only in a comparative way, and not in regards to an 
end’s intrinsic value; 4) being a judgment over the outcome of some process of selection 
among alternative courses of action.  
Conversely, “reasonable” literally indicates something “able to be reasoned upon,” 
where “to be reasoned” points toward acts of deliberation and discussion among different 
interlocutors. The key elements of reasonableness in this context therefore are: 1) requiring 
more than one individual consciousness; 2) willingness to engage in conversation (real or 
simulated, staged in an individual consciousness) about both ends and means; 3) willingness 
to accept the other interlocutors’ premises of validity; 4) being a judgment over the process 
(and not the outcome) of selection among alternative course of actions.  
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Figure 2. Rational vs. Reasonable 
 
Rational Reasonable 
Individual  Social 
Outcome Process 
Instrumental Communicative 
 
The antonymy between rational and reasonable, however, does not capture all the 
complexity of human nature, not even when one focuses only on the notion of society as a 
fair system of cooperation. This opposition can be logically developed by borrowing from 
semiotics the fundamental tool of the semiotic square, which I briefly introduce in Chapter 
II (see Figure 3). In this case, the semiotic square starts from a couplet of semantic units, 
“rational” and “reasonable” that entertain a relation of reciprocal contrariness. On each of 
the two units is performed the logic operation of negation, so that each generates its 
contradictory: “rational” produces “non rational” and “reasonable” produces “non 
reasonable.” It should be noticed here that terms like “irrational” and “unreasonable” are 
loaded with a surplus of meaning in their common usage, so that they would not be good 
candidates to signify the simple negation of the original terms. “Non rational,” for instance, 
covers a semantic area of which what we refer to as “irrational” is but one province. Rawls, 
however, does not seem to be concerned with this, as he opposes “unreasonable people” to 
reasonable ones, and “irrational people” to rational ones.199
 
 Visualizing semantic relations on 
the semiotic square allows for greater accuracy in assessing how meaning is constituted and 
contested in language.  
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Figure 3
 
. The Semiotic Square: Rational vs. Reasonable 
The two terms on the top horizontal axis (“rational” and “reasonable”) are called 
contraries, and their opposition is a qualitative one. The terms of the two couplets on the 
diagonal axes (or schemes) are called contradictories, and their relation is one of negation. 
The two terms on the bottom horizontal axis are called subcontraries, or converses, and 
their opposition is less clearly demarcated than that of the original contraries. Finally, on the 
vertical axes (deictics) there lie relations of presupposition (for instance, “non rational” 
suggests, or may imply, “reasonable”). The italicized lexemes, outside the braces, indicate 
complex terms (méta-terms) that combine the characteristics of two simpler units of meaning. 
Combining what is “Reasonable” with what is “Non Rational” suggests “Openness:” an 
open-ended process in which meaning can be contested and redefined. Combining the “Non 
Reasonable” with the “Rational,” on the other hand, points to a pole of “Closure:” both 
being “unreasonable” and being “rational” indicate that one is not available for contesting 
meaning, as meaning is necessarily predetermined, prefixed, closed.  
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Turning to the horizontal axes, “Rational” and “Reasonable” articulate a category that I 
term of the “Intelligible.” This verbalization, although certainly arbitrary, has the advantage 
of pointing toward a common area of “understandability” and “predictability,” that the 
notions of rational and reasonable participate of, in different modalities. Human reason, in 
this sense, is broadly understood as the style of thought of linearity. Metonymy is the 
modality by which this kind of thinking proceeds: the logic concatenation of meanings on 
the axis of sintagma characterizes both the solipsism of rationality and the socially 
deliberative enterprise of reasonableness.  
Conversely, metaphor is the principle that governs the bottom edge of the square, “Non 
Reasonable” and “Non Rational.” The metaterm I use for this polarity is “Unintelligible,” 
because what is common to the subcontraries, and opposes them to the contraries, is the 
fact that they cannot be predicted or even understood on the basis of some algorithm, as in 
the case of rationality, and neither are they the algorithm, as in the case of reasonableness. 
Because metaphor expresses the sense of what is “non reasonable” or “non rational,” it 
contains an element of ineffability as for how it works. By transferring meanings, it defies 
linguistic explanations and resists the linearization of its process. While metonymy advances 
knowledge in a predictable manner, metaphor by its very nature creates new knowledge 
(until it becomes a ready-made semantic unit codified in language).  
For all its versatility, I argue that liberal language is much better equipped to deal with 
metonyms than with metaphors. In general, though liberal discourse can articulate intelligible 
meaning by allocating it in neat sintagmatic relations, it remains virtually silent on what might 
be termed “unintelligible meaning.” Different rules govern the semantic field that works by 
intuitive, poetic, passionate associations of meaning; accordingly, metaphor is a potentially 
subversive tool for the liberal order grounded in the realm of human reason. Thus Rawls, in 
keeping with an inveterate tradition of glorification of “reason” and corresponding 
devaluation of its negation, completely overlooks the bottom couplet of the square when 
discussing the conditions for establishing society as a fair system of cooperation. I believe 
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that this is not only an instance of selectivity in the crafting of a theory, but that it betrays an 
attitude that ultimately discredits Rawls’ conception of politics.  
The political is dramatically misrepresented when it is only confined to the sphere of 
reason. When passions are not allowed to enter the public sphere, the latter becomes an 
aseptic place fit for academic, vacant exchanges. Purified from passion, disembodied from 
senses, meaning becomes senseless. Rawls believes that reasonableness alone can support 
meaningful exchange and fair cooperation; but he misunderstands the role of reasonableness 
in at least two ways. First, he does not realize that the dependence of reasonableness on 
(liberal) language subjects it to the same limits that (liberal) language encounters in 
expressing the full range of the human experience. Rawls believes that his subjects of 
reasonableness literally “speak;” yet he overlooks how much they “are spoken” through 
language in their acts of speech. Limiting the phenomenology of language to the expressive 
function, and equating that with the intentionality of the individual speaker, Rawls neglects 
the performative dimension that is constitutive of the subject.  
Second, to Rawls’ insistence on reasonableness and rationality does not correspond a 
mere benign neglect for the unreasonable and the irrational; rather, the exclusionary 
potential of liberalism surfaces through this element of his theory. Not only does this 
systematically mortify human traits as fundamental as passions, sentiments, bodily 
sensations, which are “not able to be reasoned upon.” More troublingly, Rawls’ liberalism 
deliberately excludes certain categories of human beings from the political, and arguably 
from full participation in society. He starts by defining who counts as a citizen, a full 
member of society:  
 
Since we start within the tradition of democratic thought, we also think of citizens as 
free and equal persons. The basic intuitive idea is that in virtue of what we may call 
their moral powers, and the powers of reason, thought, and judgment connected 
with those powers, we say that persons are free. And in virtue of their having these 
 114 
 
powers to the requisite degree to be fully cooperating members of society, we say 
that persons are equal.200
 
 
“In virtue of” is the locution that Rawls uses to connect moral powers and reason to 
freedom and equality. In other words, in order to be free and equal, one has to be endowed 
with (enough) moral powers and reason. It follows that, without (enough) moral powers and 
reason, one cannot be regarded as fully free and equal to others. In order to be free, then, 
citizens have to “regard themselves as self-originating sources of valid claims.”201
 
 Rawls is 
aware that under those conditions there are human beings who do not qualify for 
“citizenship,” and thus for freedom and equality. He acknowledges that by affirming:  
This does not imply that no one ever suffers from illness or accident; such 
misfortunes are to be expected in the ordinary course of human life; and provision 
for these contingencies must be made. But for our purposes here I leave aside 
permanent physical disabilities or mental disorders so severe as to prevent persons 
from being normal and fully cooperating members of society in the usual sense.202
 
 
Lack of (conventionally defined) reason thus would render unfree and unequal, unable to 
fully participate in society, and ultimately, somewhat less than fully human. This exclusionary 
theme is a recurrent (if not an unavoidable) feature of liberal discourse. In the 17th century 
Locke had explicitly excluded from the provisions of the social contract “lunatics,” “ideots,” 
“children,” “innocents,” “madmen.”203
                                                 
200 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” p. 233 
 In the 19th century Mill had deliberately excluded 
“barbarians” from his doctrine of liberty, as I note above. Rawls, in the discursive style of 
the late 20th century, displays his argument in more subtle and acceptable terms. 
Nevertheless, the potential for exclusion remains intact in a Rawlsian context, as the 
entitlement to liberties and rights is not a prerogative of human beings as such, but only of 
individuals who conform to certain socially defined prerequisites. Those who, “in virtue of” 
 
201 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” p. 242 
 
202 John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness,” p. 234; compare with: John Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 20  
 
203 John Locke, Second Treatise,  par. 60, p. 34 
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their lack of reason do not qualify as free, equal, liberal individuals are left without agency: 
the same mode of discourse that positively locates agency in the individual subject, also 
treats certain human beings as unworthy of being individual subjects. This leaves the 
excluded human beings in the position of objects: passive receivers of the actions 
undertaken by individual subjects. Unable to be “self-originating sources of valid claims,” 
unable to “speak back” in the language of liberalism, these human beings are dehumanized, 
marginalized, objectified in the name of liberalism. Rawls’ theory of justice certain represents 
a remarkable accomplishment for liberalism; but it does not overcome this distressing 
feature of liberal discourse.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have introduced the thesis that liberalism is the hegemonic ideology in 
contemporary Western societies, on which both advocates and critics of liberalism seem to 
converge. In particular, I have observed that to the success of liberalism contributes 
significantly a discursive style in which the mode of expression conforms to the articulation 
of liberal themes. In other words, I have argued that the content of liberalism replicates 
certain structures of grammar, and thus is easily intelligible, intuitive. In order to identify 
what features of liberal discourse might possess these characteristics, I have considered the 
contributions of three key figures in the development of liberalism.  
First I have discussed John Locke, whose work on knowledge, language, and the human 
mind in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding presents an ontology that is then invested 
with genuinely political meaning in the Second Treatise of Government. I have presented the 
notion of “semiotic individualism” to account for Locke’s refined view of the relation 
between individuals and the (linguistic) communities in which they come to acquire 
consciousness of themselves via the medium of language. A thoughtful focus on the 
semiotic element, I maintain, can advance the interpretive debates on Locke’s political 
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thought beyond the impasse of an “individualist” versus a “communitarian” pole. In my 
account, Lockean individuals are primarily the “owners” of their narratives, and of the 
actions that they undertake; at the same time, this individual “ownership” depends on the 
social process of linguistic signification that I have called the “semiotic contract.”  
Then I have briefly analyzed John Stuart Mill’s version of liberalism, as evidenced in 
both On Liberty, and also in Utilitarianism and A System of Logic. I have characterized Mill’s 
position as one of “sovereign individualism,” for it seems to weaken the social ties that 
Locke’s theory of language had recognized. On the contrary, I have commented on a pattern 
in Mill’s thought in that he systematically accords logical priority to the particular over the 
general, the inductive over the deductive, the individual over the social. Moreover, I have 
noted how his developmental liberalism emphasizes the themes of reason and progress, both 
at the individual and at the social levels. 
Finally, I have briefly presented the evolution of John Rawls’ concept of justice as 
fairness from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism as a political project of “tempered 
individualism.” In the mutated grounds for the justification of the theory I have identified a 
prime example of the versatility of liberal discourse. Shifting from the code of individual 
rationality to that of social reasonableness, Rawls stretched the argumentative limits of 
liberalism thus also showing the resilience of its core principles. In doing so, I have argued, 
he does not question the exclusionary potential entailed by liberal discourse, for which 
certain human beings are classified as deficient in reason, and therefore can be denied 
ownership of their own narratives and actions.  
Combining some of the insights that I have derived from each of these theorists, liberal 
discourse can be tentatively defined as including the following features:  
1) Individuals own their actions; 
2) The mode of action is rational;  
3) Objects are treated as inert matter (and human beings can be treated as objects too). 
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This is clearly a very rough sketch of what liberal discourse might be; yet I argue that it 
captures at least some fundamental characters of what makes the ideology so successful. My 
claim is that these basic rules can also accommodate the expression of non-liberal content. 
In other words, I maintain that liberal discourse can incorporate claims that originate from 
outside a liberal paradigm too, without making them fully liberal. To the illustration of some 
examples of what I call “liberal incorporations” I now turn in Chapter IV.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
LIBERALISM AND BEYOND 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter III I have argued that the ideology of liberalism operates as a system of 
signification that allows political actors to formulate various kinds of statements about the 
world (both descriptive and normative), and then to call for action on the basis of those 
predications. A system of signification (a language, a code), is based on two sets of elements: 
certain rules of expression, and a field of content. The language of liberalism, in particular, is 
based on both an investment of sense on certain key concepts, and also, crucially, on the 
expressive regularities that make that content fungible.  The analysis of actual examples of 
liberal texts, both in the content that they articulate, and in how they tend to express it, 
suggests the recurrence of certain deep structures of signification, a style of liberal discourse 
whose distinctive features can be reconstructed in a more or less coherent morphology. A 
fundamental contribution to this ambitious analytical project has been offered by the work 
of Michael Freeden. As I note in Chapter I, according to Freeden, political ideologies isolate 
certain portions of the semantic field and shield them from contestation: “‘This is what 
liberty means, and that is what justice means,’ [an ideology] asserts.”204
Rather than focusing on the plane of content, identifying certain “decontested meanings” 
that characterize the ideology of liberalism, here I follow more closely Vladimir Propp’s 
formalist example, as updated and systematized by Algirdas Julien Greimas’ structuralist re-
elaboration. Examining a corpus of one hundred Russian folktales, in 1928 Propp identified 
 
                                                 
204 Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory. A Conceptual Approach. (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1996), p. 76 
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31 basic “functions” (e.g.: departure, trickery, victory) and 7 “character types” (e.g.: the hero, 
the villain, the helper). The variation among specific tales was thus understood by Propp as 
the result of the various possible combinations of those invariant elements.205 Drawing on 
Propp's original intuition, in the 1960s Greimas expanded the scope of his analysis from 
Russian folktales to the immanent structure of narration itself. He posited a fundamental 
“actantial narrative schema” that would account for the variation within the broad genre of 
narration.206
Freeden praises liberalism for being, among the major ideologies, “the most adept at 
giving expression to the mutating practices and ideas that human beings produce and 
develop.”
 Expanding on Greimas' work, and calibrating it for the needs of analysis of a 
specific “genre” as ideological discourse, here I identify certain recurrent characteristics in 
the mode of expression of liberal discourse. Whereas Freeden focuses on the semantic aspects 
of an ideology, by looking at how certain key concepts are defined, and in turn define an 
ideology, I concentrate on how liberal discourse is characterized by the recurrence of certain 
syntactic structures. I then reflect on how a rigid dichotomy of expression and content is 
untenable, and so the form of expression is not neutral with regards to the substance of 
content, but it always prefigures it and, to some extent, molds it.  
207
 
 Commenting on his comparative analysis of European varieties of liberalism, he 
further explains:  
In other words, liberalism does what any ideology aspires to do – it naturalizes what 
it regards as crucial social and political phenomena and constructs itself around 
them. In addition to its foundational belief in liberty, liberalism has naturalized 
change and diversity, rather than either stifling them or embracing them precipitately 
and irresponsibly. Two inevitable, creative and potentially unsettling processes are 
colonized by liberalism in such a way that enables its supporters to come to terms 
                                                 
205 Vladimir Propp, Morphology of the Folktale (Research Center, Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind: 1958) 
 
206 Algirdas J. Greimas, On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiotic Theory (University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis: 1987) 
 
207 Michael Freeden, “European Liberalisms: An Essay in Comparative Political Thought,” in European Journal of 
Political Theory, Vol 7, No 1, January 2008, p. 15 
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with, indeed to thrive in, a world of flux and uncertainty. The assimilation of that 
uncertainty and its presentation as a virtue rather than a defect, decoded as the 
freeing of human individuality, is liberalism’s greatest asset and the central challenge 
to its comparative analysis.208
 
 
Here Freeden points to liberalism's peculiar ability to deal with “potentially unsettling 
processes” in a way that domesticates them and renders them compatible with its 
“foundational belief[s]” that he elsewhere indicates as “decontested.” His argument is 
cogent; but its emphasis on political content (e.g.: concepts like liberty, change, diversity) risks 
obscuring the importance of what might be termed the form of the ideology: the mode of 
expression of that content. Freeden's own characterization of his approach as 
“morphological” might be misleading here: for it can convincingly account for the “form of 
the content” of an ideology, but it remains problematically silent on the “form of its 
expression.” The latter, I argue, resides in the deep structures of language that preside over 
the formulation of statements about the world, and as such it is to be found in the 
grammatical rules that make the fruition of content possible. 
Moreover, Freeden identifies “adaptation” as one of the fundamental modalities 
through which liberalism negotiates its relations with rival ideologies. This is made possible 
by “a combination of conceptual indeterminacy and interpretative flexibility:” ideas that 
occupied a marginal position in the morphology of the ideology may be brought closer to 
the core (e.g.: equality in Dworkin's thought); and even “illiberal features” can, within certain 
limits, be accommodated in a liberal framework.209
                                                 
208 M. Freeden, “European Liberalisms,” p. 28 
 I believe that this is a sensible description 
of one of the crucial characteristics of the modus operandi of liberalism; though I contend that 
the term “adaptation” overemphasizes the extent to which liberalism actually opens up its 
own core beliefs for contestation. “Incorporation,” I argue, describes more accurately the 
process by which liberal discourse comes to absorb certain non-liberal themes from a 
position of dominance. And in order to study such incorporations, I argue, it is crucial to 
 
209 M. Freeden, “European Liberalisms,” p. 15 and ff. 
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supplement the analysis of the semantic dimension with a study of the syntax that underpins 
it.  
Before delving in the analysis of liberal discourse, therefore I put forth some 
preliminary, general observations on language. At its core, I argue, language operates on the 
sense-less complexity of the real as a mechanism for the segmentation of sense into discrete 
units. In the beginning, there is chaos; it is language that intervenes on that chaos to impose 
an order on it. This primary operation of sense-making relies on an originary investment of 
sense that can never be fully accounted for, and that constitutes the paradox of the 
arbitrariness and at the same time non-arbitrariness of langue that Saussure so clearly 
identified. Moreover, a natural language entails a set of combinatory rules for the 
arrangement of signs into various types of aggregates, as theorists from J.L. Austin and J. 
Searle to Wittgenstein have shown.  
In its expressive function, language fundamentally articulates two kinds of statements, as 
noted in Chapter II: descriptions of states of the world (Mary is hungry; Mary is watching a 
movie); and descriptions of transformations of states of the world (Elizabeth gives an ice 
cream to Mary; Elizabeth takes Mary out for a walk). Political ideologies can be described as 
styles of language that typically organize such statements in a progression from: 1) an initial 
state of the world (the working class is exploited); to 2) a transformation (the working class 
liberates itself and humanity); and finally to 3) a new state of the world (a classless society). 
Obviously, one should not underestimate the performative function that language assumes 
when political ideologies operate in the sense of motivating people to act in certain ways.210
                                                 
210 It should be noted here that this stylization of the structure of a political ideology is helpful, but highly 
problematic. Certain ideologies in particular explicitly defy the very dichotomy of expression and performance 
in their political operations.  Rejecting the validity of “a new state of the world” as separate and independent 
from the “transformation” that originates it, anarchism, for instance, distances itself from liberalism and 
socialism, typically embracing the theory and practices of prefigurative politics.  
 
Yet, to the extent that it is possible to disentangle expressivity and performativity in the 
actual phenomenon of language, I concentrate on the first, and in particular on the rules that 
subtend it. In the case of liberalism I argue that its discourse typically produces statements of 
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the first and second kind (descriptions of states of the world and descriptions of 
transformations of states of the world respectively) that conform to a limited number of 
fundamental rules. These include:  
1) Agency is granted to individuals as one of their attributes (individuals “own” their 
actions, rather than being constituted by them); 
2) The mode of action is rational; 
3) Objects are treated as inert matter, the passive receivers of action (and human 
beings can be treated as objects too).  
There is nothing simple and unequivocal about these rules, and presenting them in such 
stark terms might be misleading. They don't claim to be rigorous covering laws; yet, it seems 
to be a recurrent feature of liberal texts that they tend to organize meanings in similar 
formations. What I claim here is that those formations, while they certainly are not empty 
with regards to their own intrinsic meaning, can also accommodate a wide range of meanings 
that are not reducible to the decontested meanings that define various forms of liberalism.  
In order to test this hypothesis, I now proceed to examine some examples of texts in 
contemporary political theory that appear to conform to the canons of liberal discourse, 
without articulating canonical liberal themes. In other words, I want to illustrate how the 
language of liberalism can speak non-liberal worlds, and at the same time I want to gauge 
how much of the original investment of sense required by a liberal syntax affects the content 
of the statements that are produced. The mode of expression of liberalism carries with it 
more than residual incrustations of liberal meaning; once extra-liberal sense gets grafted onto 
the structure of liberal discourse, the output becomes a hybrid political form. Much is lost in 
the translation from non-liberal to liberal discourse, and politically this cost corresponds to 
the ablation of non-liberal universes into a seemingly inescapable and ever-expanding liberal 
one.  
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In order to assess the impact of these processes more pointedly, I consider the work of 
three contemporary political theorists who employ a liberal vocabulary to articulate claims 
that originated outside of the liberal field. First I present Will Kymlicka’s reflection on the 
“right to culture” as a patent illustration of liberalism’s ability to co-opt non-liberal themes 
(communitarian, in this case) into its own framework. This represents the most self-
conscious attempt of liberal discourse to incorporate non-liberal themes, rearranging their 
claims according to the rules of liberal discourse, and finally rearticulating them in such a 
way as to make them compatible with (although not fully reducible to) the canons of a liberal 
ideology. Then I consider Robert Putnam’s emphasis on “social capital” as the (failed) 
attempt to resist liberalism’s tendency towards atomization without renouncing its 
fundamental commitment to the value of individualism. Finally I analyze Philip Pettit’s 
theorization on “neo-republicanism,” and argue that his definition of liberty as non-
domination, while certainly distinct from liberal formulations, does not question liberal 
ontology, and ends up justifying liberalism’s conception of the political as merely 
instrumental to the preservation of individual liberty.  
 
 
KYMLICKA'S (ATTEMPTED) SQUARING OF THE MULTICULTURAL CIRCLE 
The ability of liberal discourse to articulate claims and visions of the world that stem 
from outside a liberal ideology finds one of its clearest illustrations in Will Kymlicka’s 
engagement with issues of multiculturalism and recognition. Writing in the in the wake of 
the liberalism-communitarianism debate, and in particular responding to theorists of 
“recognition” such as Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, and Michael Walzer, Kymlicka 
deliberately attempts to reconcile respect for cultural diversity with the fundamental 
principles of a liberal society. In Multicultural Citizenship, of 1995, he delineates a rather 
persuasive argument for the defense of minority rights, based on his consideration that they 
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are not only consistent with liberal principles, but also implicated by what he refers to as a 
long forgotten tradition within liberalism.211
A certain taxonomic zeal characterizes Kymlicka’s project, aimed at distinguishing 
acceptable cases of “minority rights” from illiberal perversions. Two “broad patterns of 
cultural diversity” are identified: multinational and polyethnic. The first refers to “the 
incorporation of previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a larger 
state;” the second relates to “individual and familial immigration.”
 Such persuasiveness, however, crucially relies on 
a major theoretical redescription, one that “translates” minority rights into the vocabulary of 
liberalism. The very specificity of the project of “recognition” is lost in this translation, and 
though some of the most illiberal implications of “communitarianism” are avoided by this 
position, the problems that they present are not really confronted, as much as they are 
conveniently redefined so as to neutralize their non-liberal pungency. 
212
                                                 
211 see Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Clarendon Press, Oxford: 1995), pp. 49 and ff. 
 This categorization is 
extremely problematic: both at the practical level, as the proponent recognizes; and at the 
conceptual one, as he does not concede quite as easily. The polyethnic case is especially 
interesting to consider: in a typical move of liberal discourse, the relocation of masses of 
people into different countries is described as the aggregation of the actions of single 
individuals, each pursuing their own rational plans. What another discourse might describe 
as the effect of structural economic inequalities on which the single individual has little or no 
agency, liberalism swiftly constructs as the deployment of voluntariness and freedom. The 
literature on the causes of emigration is vast and far from unified. A compendium of the 
leading approaches would include positions ranging from neoclassical economics and (labor, 
like any other resource, responds to the forces of supply and demand and moves across 
countries accordingly); to the “new economics of labor migration” (decisions about 
migration are not made by isolated individuals, but are the product of more complex 
calculations at the level of family, household, and broader community); to the “segmented 
 
212 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 10 
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labor market theory” (immigration is “pulled” by receiving countries for their structural 
economic need for cheap labor); to various versions of world systems theories (as 
“periphery” countries enter into a relation of dependency with “core” ones, vast strata of 
their populations are economically displaced and relocate across the globe); to social capital 
theories (the social ties inherent to kinship, friendship, and community origin explain are 
crucial in determining the likelihood and patterns of migration).213
Of these approaches only the first, neoclassical economics, postulates the individual as 
the key unit of analysis, homo oeconomicus as the model for the rational calculation to migrate. 
Even in this explanation, the rational choice of migrants takes place on the background of 
market forces like supply and demand to which individuals can only adjust with at best very 
limited freedom. Kymlicka, on the other hand, confidently resolve that, because they 
“chose” to move to a given country, immigrants “typically wish to integrate into the larger 
society, and to be accepted as full members of it [by modifying] the institutions and laws of 
the mainstream society to make them more accommodating of cultural difference.”
 
214
                                                 
213 Douglas S. Massey, “Why Does Immigration Occur? A Theoretical Synthesis,” in C. Hirschman, P. Kasinitz, 
and J. DeWind, ed. by, The Handbook of International Migration (Russell Sage Foundation, 1999), pp. 35-47 
 It 
should be noted that, regardless of the conditions of immigration (“chosen” or otherwise), 
integration could still be more or less deliberately sought by immigrants. Though the 
accuracy of an adverb like “typically” is highly dubious in this context, there is an even more 
problematic aspect in this proposition: however “accommodating of cultural difference” it 
might be, the kind of integration that Kymlicka envisions would still take place in a political-
institutional context already constituted as liberal. Unless “the institutions and laws of the 
mainstream society” become entirely open for contestation, the project of integration risks 
being able to only accommodate (relatively) shallow cultural differences, while further 
alienating deeper ones (e.g.: granting special exemptions to those who wish to abstain from 
work on Wednesdays, but resisting pushes to renounce a principle like equal treatment 
before the law). Indiscriminate accommodation of all cultural difference (if such a possibility 
 
214 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 10 – 11  
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is even logically conceivable) would deny the liberal character of that society – incidentally 
exposing the myth of a value-neutral liberalism. Kymlicka cannot resolve the conundrum of 
multiculturalism by liberal decree. Accommodating differences, it would seem, is only 
possible in a liberal context so long as those differences are already formulated (and thus, 
crucially, can be formulated) in the language of liberalism.  
In Kymlicka’s liberal narrative, on the other hand, the initial state of the world is one in 
which certain individuals are unhappy with their life conditions in their countries of origin, 
and make the rational calculation that emigrating would better serve their interests; then they 
transform the state of the world by acting on this rational calculation and relocate; and finally 
they inhabit a new state of the world in which they accept the institutions and laws of their 
country of election where they live satisfactory lives and only aspire to escape 
homogenization (the paramount nightmare for liberal individuality). Based on this first 
example, one would be inclined to conclude that the form of liberal discourse contains more 
than a distant echo of liberal content. Yet, it is also to be remembered that Kymlicka’s 
project is explicitly one centered on the incorporation of non-liberal themes into a solidly 
liberal framework.  
As the argument of Multicultural Citizenship unfolds, the author engages the concept of 
what he calls “collective rights.” The very notion of these alleged “collective rights” that 
Kymlicka sets forth to critically redefine is already imbued with strong liberal logic, modeled 
as it is on the mechanic adaptation of the idea of individual rights to aggregates of 
individuals. Yet, even these vestiges of “collectivism” threaten the very fabric of liberal 
discourse, and so Kymlicka has to dissolve collective rights back into their original 
components, individual rights. In doing so he distinguishes among the “group-differentiated 
rights” based on their consistency with the rights of the individual.215
                                                 
215 cfr. W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 45 
 Internal restrictions 
designate claims for “restric[ting] the liberty of [a group’s] members in the name of group 
solidarity;” external protections prescribe “protec[ting a group’s] distinct existence and identity 
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by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger society.”216 Unsurprisingly, Kymlicka 
glosses that “[l]iberal principles are more sympathetic to demands for ‘external 
protection’.”217
Once again, the structure of liberal discourse seems to be at work here. Let’s consider 
the case of internal restrictions first. The description of the initial state of the world is, 
implicitly, one in which individuals enjoy liberty; the transformation is then operated by the 
imposition of these bad “collective rights” that crucially restrict individual liberty. By 
comparison, the appreciation of external protections stems from an opposite scenario: in the 
initial state of the world individuals enjoy liberty; then a transformation occurs so that the 
individuals that compose a specific group are threatened in their very identity by the 
decisions and values of society at large; finally, another transformation is required to restore 
liberty to these individuals by protecting it. Narrativizing collective rights in this way 
presupposes the existence of individual rights in a pristine form in an original state of the 
world. These original individual rights can then be jeopardized by either one’s own group, or 
by society at large; in either case, defense or restoration of individual rights seems to be the 
true function and limit of collective rights. 
 
But, in the case of external protections, why would it be more desirable for an individual 
to experience the mediation of the group in the construction of his/her own identity, rather 
than an analogous interference from society? In other words, by this logic, why would an 
individual not be better off without any encumbrance at all, whether at the level of a group, 
of of society at large? Kymlicka answers this question by formulating the most distinctive 
element of his theory. Central to his argument is the notion that (societal) culture is valuable 
in that it provides individuals with options on “meaningful ways of life across the full range 
of human activities.”218
                                                 
216 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 36 – 36  
 Providing their individual members with “meaningful contexts of 
 
217 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 152 
 
218 W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 76 
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choice,”219
Once again, the syntax of liberal discourse sustains this adaptation of a non-liberal 
theme to the exigencies of liberalism. Patchen Markell correctly notes that “[Kymlicka's] 
philosophical justification of what he calls the 'right to culture' is grounded decisively in the 
liberal idea of choice.”
 cultures enhance freedom. Contrary to the overwhelming majority of the wisdom 
of disciplines like sociology or anthropology, then, culture becomes an attachment of the 
individual, inasmuch as it is considered a “right.” Also, rather than being the substance 
matter of which the identity of individuals is interpenetrated, culture for Kymlicka becomes 
little more than a tree diagram on which individuals display their rationality by moving more 
or less freely from one course of action to the next.  
220 Markell also lucidly observes that Kymlicka responds to theorists of 
recognition in the style of Charles Taylor by arguing that they engage but “a straw man” of 
liberalism: “[l]iberalism is perfectly capable of acknowledging the ways in which human 
agents are situated within historical and intersubjective horizons without abandoning its 
fundamental commitment to the value of individual freedom.”221 However, Markell seems at 
times to fall victim of the very reification of liberalism that Kymlicka rejects: “[t]his way of 
thinking about culture is an unstable amalgamation of the liberal language of property and 
possessive individualism and the communitarian language of encumbrance.”222 In this view 
what is questionable about Kymlicka's project is that it attempts to “steer a middle course 
between two equally problematic visions of the relationship between context and agency  - 
one that equates agency with the total transcendence of context, and another that reduces 
agency to the performance of authoritatively given roles,” and in doing so it produces “an 
uncertain equivocation between these  two extremes.”223
                                                 
219 see W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship , pp. 82 and ff.  
 Markell's own position seems here 
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 129 
 
to oscillate between the claim that liberalism can accommodate the situatedness of 
individuals in those contexts of choices that Kymlicka refers to as “culture,” and the claim 
that doing so will produce “an unstable amalgamation.”  
Liberalism is always already capable of reconciling “individual freedom” with the 
“intersubjective horizons” in which action takes place, Markell maintains; artificially 
dichotomizing these two elements by distilling an essence of unrelenting ultra-individualism, 
from an equally dull blend of communitarianism, only to then recombine them in the 
precarious theorization of a “right to culture,” is clearly a faulty intellectual operation. This is 
undoubtedly a very perspicacious analysis of the shortcomings in Kymlicka's project; 
however, I argue, it is missing a crucial link for explaining how liberal discourse can escape 
the flatness of a dull individualism. Precisely because of its unrelenting commitment to a 
grammar of subjects who own their actions and accordingly choose to undertake them, 
liberalism can process meaning that is intersubjectively constituted. Content might be 
produced in intersubjective settings; but subjects are ultimately in charge of action, according 
to the master-narrative of liberalism. Of course Markell is correct in pointing out that (most) 
liberals do not mindlessly discount the role of culture and context in providing individuals 
with meaning; but he stops short of detailing the process through which that meaning gets 
disassembled, reorganized, and ultimately made ready for discursive investment through a 
syntax of individual action. This omission risks reifying liberalism as an object of pure 
content independent of its form of expression.  
Another form of reification is lamented by Seyla Benhabib. Critically engaging 
Kymlicka's notion of a “societal culture,” she objects that “[t]here is never a single culture, 
one coherent system of beliefs, significations, symbolizations and practices [but] at any point 
in time there are competing collective narratives and significations that range across 
institutions and form the dialogue of cultures.”224
                                                 
224 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton: 2002), p. 60  
 Kymlicka is therefore guilty of “cultural 
essentialism,” as “cultures are not homogenous wholes; they are constituted through the 
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narratives and symbolizations of their members, who articulate these in the course of 
partaking of complex social and significative practices.”225
Thinking of other ways in which “culture” might be discussed is also illustrative of the 
reconceptualization at work here. On the one hand, a crude cultural determinism might 
consider “culture” as the independent variable capable of explaining human action; on the 
other hand, an equally crude form of materialism might relegate culture to the derivative 
category of super-structural irrelevance. A postcolonial sensibility might want to concentrate 
on those aspects of local culture that can foster independence from the foreigner’s ideas and 
 This critique is undoubtedly valid, 
and it crucially redefines the very terms of a proposal for a “right to culture.” Yet, something 
appears to be missing Benhabib's reflection. Our understanding of “culture” should certainly 
be problematized, as cultures are by their very nature plural, and the pretense of unity that 
they carry with them should be exposed by a careful work of analysis, literally the subdivision 
of culture in its components, often inconsistent, and sometimes at odds with each other. 
However, by calling our attention to this important shortcoming in Kymlicka's argument, 
Benhabib seems to imply that the other term in the equation of the “right to culture,” the 
individual, is less susceptible to that kind of analysis. As opposed to the unity of culture, 
which is always fictitious and deconstructable, that of the individual is assumed to be real, or 
at the very least it is left unquestioned. To be sure, in Benhabib's view the subject is not a 
metaphysical a priori, but it is critically constituted through processes of communicative, 
dialogic, intersubjective exchanges, and even continuously undone and reconstituted. 
However, at any given point in time there seems to persist an unscathed delusion of unity in 
the postulation of agency as the attribute of a self whose identity – albeit complex and 
mutable – is rationally accountable and transparent to itself, as opposed to being inescapably 
decentered and plural. This in turn reinforces the foundation of liberal discourse, which rests 
on the assumption that the subject of action is (and must be, in its normal status) an 
indivisible entity, as the very etymology of “individual” testifies. That a culture be not unified 
is physiological; that an individual might be so is pathological.    
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impositions; whereas moral universalists might resent culture as the irrational force that 
hinders the spread of common values; and moral relativists might resent it for the opposite 
reason, imposing common values onto people who have not independently formulated 
them. All of these exemplary positions would understand the relation between cultures and 
the individual members of those cultures as one in which agency is at the very least, not fully 
confined to the latter.  
Liberal discourse of the kind employed by Kymlicka, on the other hand, positively 
assigns agency to individuals, and makes of culture the inert matter of the scenario upon 
which they act. Constraining this scenario might be; but at the same time that it is 
constraining, it is also enabling of free choices in action, and as such it is to be valued in that 
it resists the specter of a world of absolute un-freedom, in which action follows rigid and 
immutable patterns dictated with disheartening automatism by tyrannical forces like some 
hypostatization of “culture.” However, Kymlicka's emphasis on the individual as the ultimate 
repository of the right to freedom appears to have been originally extraneous to the 
formulation of a politics of recognition, and for sure contradictory of the communitarian 
critique of the liberal notion of an unencumbered self. This conspicuous re-signification of 
the concept of “culture” is a powerful testimony of liberalism’s exceptional ability to co-opt 
ideas and values from other positions into its own vocabulary, without compromising the 
essence of its own system of values and beliefs.  
 
 
PUTNAM'S (PALLIATIVE) CURE FOR ATOMIZATION 
Kymlicka’s project in Multicultural Citizenship was characterized as the deliberate attempt 
of a liberal thinker to confront the emergence of multiculturalism and the “politics of 
recognition” from within a liberal paradigm. In this scheme, the formulation of a “right to 
culture” appears as the crafty solution to a problem contingent and largely external to the 
internal dynamics of liberal societies. When (and if) “collective rights” are demanded in a 
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multicultural context, liberalism can respond by dissolving them into individual rights, thus 
adapting to a new situation without compromising its core beliefs, but rather underpinning 
them. Other problems, however, seem to stem endogenously from the fabric itself of liberal 
societies; as such they are likely to require a more fundamental engagement with the precepts 
of liberalism. A tendency toward atomization, in particular, has been often diagnosed as the 
endemic syndrome of contemporary liberal societies.  
Nowhere is the Zeitgeist of the 1980s more conceitedly palpable than in Margaret 
Thatcher’s famous statement: “And, you know, there is no such thing as society. There are 
individual men and women, and there are families.”226
 
 This epitaph to British society was 
promptly echoed and amplified on the other side of the ocean, where the Reagan Doctrine 
saluted in the advent of a new era of market fundamentalism the demise of politics and 
society. Obviously, the social and political milieu that made possible the declaration of such 
principles is not solely imputable to Thatcher and Reagan. Their figures and political 
philosophies, and in particular their appeal to a vision of society as a collection (aggregate, in 
economic terminology) of individuals, both reflect and exacerbate the effects of complex 
historical processes, culminating in the late twentieth century. Moreover, this blend of ultra-
individualism was conjugated with profoundly anti-individualistic values, from hyper-
nationalism to the reliance on a traditional moral order that would then fuel the rise of neo-
conservatism. Wendy Brown has raised very provocative questions on this fascinating, and 
seemingly inconsistent, ideological alignment:  
How does a rationality that is expressly amoral at the level of both ends and means 
(neoliberalism) intersect with one that is expressly moral and regulatory 
(neoconservatism)? How does a project that empties the world of meaning, that 
cheapens and deracinates life and openly exploits desire, intersect one centered on 
fixing and enforcing meanings, conserving certain ways of life, and repressing and 
regulating desire?227
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Brown's own answer to these questions is not aimed at unearthing “a single or coherent 
logic,” but at “understanding [...] the effects of two disparate streams of rationality in 
producing the contemporary landscape of political intelligibility and possibility.”228 In this 
sense she concludes that the projects of neoliberalism and neoconservatism, culminated with 
the two terms of George W. Bush's administration, converge on the effect that they produce: 
de-democratization. This is further specified as: “(1) the devaluation of political autonomy, 
(2) the transformation of political problems into individual problems with market solutions, 
(3) the production of the consumer-citizen as available to a heavy degree of governance and 
authority, and (4) the legitimation of statism.”229 Brown sums up the consequences of these 
processes as the production of “the undemocratic citizen.”230
A similar concern about the undemocratic transformation that American citizenship was 
undergoing animated much of the academic debate in the 1980s and 1990s. At that time, it 
was the neoliberal element of the emerging paradigm that attracted most criticism. An 
influential line of argument conjectured that the dramatic weakening of the civic fiber of the 
nation, epitomized by the triumph of Thatcherite and Reaganite values, had already been 
contained, in nuce, in liberalism's commitment to foundational individualism. This critique 
animated the coagulation of very diverse positions around the label of “communitarianism.” 
This in turn sparked the defense of various liberal devotees, eager to conserve both the 
principles and the practices of their doctrine. Following the lead of Robert Nozick a platoon 
of theorists continued to extol the virtues of an uncompromising brand of liberalism.  
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Another strand of liberal thinkers, however, adopted a different strategy against the 
critics, one aimed not at resistance, but at mithridatism: assuming small doses of the 
communitarian poison, liberalism would grow immune from its most devastating effects. In 
this vein, for instance, Ronald Dworkin theorized of a “liberal community:” the liberal 
principle of tolerance, coupled with a strong emphasis on equality of opportunity, “is not 
only consistent with the most attractive conception of community but indispensable to it.”231 
Charles Larmore has exposed the pretense of a value-neutral form of liberalism, noting that 
“the Romantic enthusiasm for custom and belonging” and “the contrary Ideals of autonomy 
and individuality to which Kant and Mill appealed” are co-constitutive of contemporary 
Western political culture, and concluding that “the Kantian and Millian conceptions of 
liberalism are not adequate solutions to the political problem of reasonable disagreement 
about the good life.”232 Most notably, John Rawls progressively revised his vision of justice 
as a “political, not metaphysical” project, sustained by the belief that in a democratic society 
an “overlapping consensus” can be reached not as a function of some universal principle, 
but as the more or less contingent historical product of that political community, so that 
“the most that can be done is to narrow the range of public disagreement.”233 Michael 
Walzer went so far as to portray the communitarian critique not as the archenemy of 
liberalism, but as a recurrent, “consistently intermittent feature of liberal politics and social 
organization,” functional to the reinforcement of “[liberalism's] internal associative 
capacities.”234
Salvaging society from Thatcherite pulverization became in particular Robert Putnam’s 
goal; the chief instrument for this crusade would be the restoration of “social capital.” Since 
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the literature on social capital responds just as much to the disease of atomization 
(explicitly), as it does to the cure of communitarianism (more implicitly), a brief 
recapitulation of the latter is in order here. Michael Sandel’s argument against liberal 
individualism is an especially useful term of comparison to consider when assessing the role 
of social capital in the discursive economy of liberalism. In this sense Sandel does not serve 
as the model for a perfect, or even desirable political philosophy, but as one that is clearly 
alternative to the foundations of liberalism.  
Both Sandel’s Democracy’s Discontent and Putnam’s Bowling Alone, in fact, share a profound 
sense of criticism and dissatisfaction with the actual circumstances of American civic life. 
Both Sandel and Putnam observe a decline in civic culture, and indicate an “excess” of 
individualism as the disease affecting the United States’ public sphere. However, the two 
authors differ greatly on the specifics of the diagnosis, as well as on the nature of their 
contentions and the evidence that they illustrate. What is common is the basic structure of 
their accounts: a narrative of decline, from a stage in which American citizens revered and 
maintained a set of values and virtues rooted in the civic sphere; to the current conditions of 
deviance, in which individuals just worship their privacy and tend to neglect the social 
dimension.  
Democracy’s Discontent is articulated around two major concerns: “One is the fear that, 
individually and collectively, we are losing control of the forces that govern our lives. The 
other is the sense that, from family to neighborhood to nation, the moral fabric of 
community is unraveling around us.”235
 
 Politically, these two worries correspond to the 
themes of self-government and morality. At root Sandel’s argument rests on the indictment 
of the liberal conception of the self as an “unencumbered” entity: 
Now the unencumbered self describes first of all the way we stand toward the things 
we have, or want, or seek. It means there is always a distinction between the values I 
have and the person I am. To identify any characteristics as my aims, ambitions, 
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desires, and so on, is always to imply some subject “me” standing behind them, at a 
certain distance, and the shape of this “me” must be given prior to any of the aims or 
attributes I bear. One consequence of this distance is to put the self itself beyond the 
reach of its experience, to secure its identity once and for all. Or to put the point 
another way, it rules out the possibility of what we might call constitutive ends.236
 
 
As such Sandel’s critique of unencumbered selves, and the implications that can be drawn 
from it, clearly contradict what was introduced above as the “first rule” of liberal discourse: 
Agency is granted to individuals as one of their attributes (individuals “own” their actions, rather than being 
constituted by them). The liberal self is fundamentally prior to its ends, and it experiences 
freedom inasmuch as it is able to choose among different actions, values, beliefs. The loss of 
community is therefore to be imputed not to the contingent actions chosen by individuals, 
but to the very conception of their selves as unencumbered that they have internalized.  
The diagnosis in Bowling Alone is very different, and so is the prescription that Puntam 
recommends. Though remarkably different from the historical and philosophical 
considerations that animate Democracy’s Discontent, the main themes of Putnam’s work reflect 
similar worries for the unraveling of the social fabric of the nation; these in turn correspond 
to a broader interest in the quality of civic virtue in different political contexts. If Sandel’s 
cardinal preoccupation was the evolution of the public philosophy in the bicentennial history 
of the United States, Putnam’s analysis revolves around the decline of social capital in the 
much more limited time-span of the last decades of the twentieth century. 
The concept of social capital is defined by Putnam as a form of civic virtue that is 
especially powerful because it is “embedded in a dense network of reciprocal social 
relations.”237
                                                 
 
 More precisely, social capital “refers to features of social organization, such as 
trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
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coordinated actions.”238
 
 Therefore, to have high social capital in a community, it is not 
sufficient that its members be virtuous: they must be interconnected too, lest their (civic) 
virtue remain idle and unexpendable. Contra Sandel's dismissal of the foundational premises 
of liberal individualism, Putnam's concern is here with “efficiency,” and his language betrays 
a vision of the world as inhabited by individuals whose actions need coordination. Putnam 
observes how in contemporary United States social capital is menaced and all too often 
inhibited by an excess of individualism that induces people to withdraw from the public 
sphere and retreat in their private lives. It is not individualism itself that Putnam calls into 
question, but the “inefficient” social consequences that its contingent operations produce.  
For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century a powerful tide bore Americans into 
ever deeper engagement in the life of their communities, but a few decades ago – 
silently, without warning – that tide reversed and we were overtaken by a treacherous 
rip current.239
 
  
Putnam employs a set of instruments to measure the decline of social capital, but his main 
strategy consists in studying the trends of participation in formal associations. As the title 
itself, Bowling Alone, suggests, the claim is that the deterioration of social capital can be 
inferred by the figures describing the membership of organizations. Even though this is 
certainly a rough characterization of Putnam’s work, it captures the essence of its limits. 
Formal groups are, by definition, joined by members who pursue association for the most 
various reasons, and take the appropriate steps to be accepted and belong into their group of 
choice. Typically this involves some ritualized process that marks the passage from the 
outside world into the closed universe of the group. No one, in this view, is born already 
“belonging,” and “association” describes the deliberate action of associating oneself with 
others, not a pre-existing condition of being, like “community.” More than a distant echo of 
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social contract theory, the master narrative of liberalism's account of the relationship 
between the individual and society, is audible in this account.   
Putnam’s position, moreover, also appears highly problematic in its uncritical recourse 
to the standard research repertoire of methodological individualism. An inherently 
unobservable and non measurable phenomenon, social capital is put in relation to other 
variables, that are clearly visible, easily measurable, and unequivocally attached to individual 
agents. Among these variables, the level of associationism enjoys a pre-eminent status. The 
methodological question then is: how good of a “proxy” associationism really is to estimate 
social capital? Is it efficient? Biased? This issue is addressed by sociologist McCarthy's 
argument that “professional social movement organizations arise precisely as a response to a 
'social infrastructural deficit'.”240
More generally, the causal argument that sustains Bowling Alone exhibits some critical 
weaknesses. The use of statistical instruments conjures up so many variables that it is not 
always clear which ones have a significant effect on social capital, and in which direction. 
Additionally, and more relevantly for this analysis, the emphasis on the voluntary ways in 
which individuals do or do not expose themselves to the creation of social capital overlooks 
the systemic aspects of the problem of “the collapse of American community.” As far as 
“the revival of American community” is concerned, Putnam cannot but see it as a project 
carried over by individuals who instrumentally choose a course of action alternative to that 
 The choice to join a formal association can be constructed 
as a remedy to the loss of social capital; according to this view, associations “come too late”, 
when social capital is already endangered by an “excess” of individualism. Of course, it can 
be counter-argued that the choice to join an association is made possible by a pre-existing 
level of social capital, themselves guaranteed by the possibility to re-enact dramatization of 
the liberal social-contractarian narrative. 
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of atomization because of the direct effect of social capital on the efficiency of a society. 
Hence the appeal that famously concludes Bowling Alone to “multiply picnics”…241
Questions of freedom (and of which kind of freedom) arise as well. In choosing an 
association (and whether to join one, altogether) one is acting in the sense of determining, 
limiting the possible outcomes of his/her sociality: an individual, for instance, chooses to 
meet people who belong to the same kind of associations and have similar interests. In so 
doing that individual effectively confirms its own individuality, rather than continually 
questioning it in the encounter with other others, others who have not been pre-approved as 
likely matches. 
 
In sociologist Mark Granovetter’s language, a study of formal, stable associations allows 
one to measure strong ties, but leaves weak ties thoroughly unaccounted.242 Moreover, it might 
be argued that joining a formal organization (i.e.: a group characterized by membership and 
therefore clear boundaries between “inside” and “outside”) does increase one’s bonding social 
capital, but it does not necessarily expand the resources for bridging networks. “Bonding” 
social capital is described as exclusive, inward looking, such that it “reinforce[s] exclusive 
identities and homogenous groups;” “bridging” social capital is inclusive, outward looking, 
and it “encompass[es] people across diverse social cleavages.”243
Putnam addresses this issue in Better Together, of 2003. “Bonding social capital is a kind 
of sociological Super Glue, whereas bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40,” 
he writes, repeating verbatim a phrase that appears in Bowling Alone too; but then he also 
  The latter can only be 
obtained in favorable general conditions and, pace a liberal view, do not depend solely, or 
even primarily, on an individual’s choices.  
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significantly notes that the latter is “harder to create” than the former, because “after all, 
birds of a feather flock together.”244 The author must place a lot of confidence in the 
descriptive power of this saying, as he resorts to it again as a commentary to the statement 
that “bridging social capital is intrinsically less likely to develop automatically than bonding 
social capital.”245
 
 Implicit in the discourse of social capital – and especially evident in the case 
of bridging social capital – is an underlying anthropology of liberal individualism. The 
picture that Putnam uncritically paints is one in which human beings experience their 
existence fundamentally as individuals, who may associate with others if they are recognized 
as “similar” (how this process of recognition works remains unaccounted in  this study), but 
are unlikely to develop ties with other others. And so, social capital is something to “create,” 
community is something to “restore;” neither is there in principle, in the beginning there are 
just individuals. Social capital – of the bridging kind in particular – is the product of the 
actions deliberately undertaken by individuals to bring it into being; it is an object (albeit of a 
rather abstract kind) and as such it is treated as inert matter, consistently with what was 
proposed above as the third rule of liberal discourse. In fact, social capital is presented as 
something that individuals possess and use: 
By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital – tools and training 
that enhance individual productivity – the core idea of social capital theory is that 
social networks have value. Just as a screwdriver (physical capital) or a college 
education (human capital) can increase productivity (both individual and collective), 
so too social contacts can affect the productivity of individuals and groups.246
  
 
Useful like a screwdriver, albeit intangible like a college education, social capital is not 
regarded as productive in its own right, but just as an instrument on which and through 
which individuals act.  That this “object” might indeed be what constitutes the “subjects” 
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that are claimed to pre-exist it does not seem to bother Putnam's beliefs in the construction 
and usage of social capital. Yet, there exists an alternative tradition in the literature on social 
capital according to which subjects  themselves are shaped by the interplay of social, as well 
as physical and cultural/human capital, rather than instrumentally utilizing them. Pierre 
Bourdieu, for instance, has offered an account of agency in which our ‘choices’ of music, art, 
food, entertainment etc., at the same time distinguish, and are distinctive of our different 
endowments with (physical, cultural, and crucially social) capital: 
 
Taste, the propensity and capacity to appropriate (materially or symbolically) a given 
class of classified, classifying objects or practices, is the generative formula of life-
style, a unitary set of distinctive preferences which express the same expressive 
intention in the specific logic of each of the symbolic sub-spaces, furniture, clothing, 
language or body hexis.247
 
 
Whereas Putnam's liberal world is inhabited by (pre-constituted) individuals with their (more 
or less metaphorical) “screwdrivers,” Bourdieu's articulation of social space transcends the 
rules of liberal discourse, without lapsing in a form of rigid determinism in which the subject 
is simply the resultant of “objective” social forces. Whereas for Putnam social capital is only 
valuable inasmuch as it “enhances productivity,” for Bourdieu it is a productive factor itself, 
as it contributes to the definition of “taste,” and therefore it ultimately molds individuals 
through the preferences that they exercise. 
Also consistent with Putnam's liberal worldview that individuals are always already pre-
constituted as owners of their actions, and that “community” is something to create/restore, 
is the idea that “communication” is the mode of action that this endeavor needs to take. The 
same thaumaturgical function that “multiplying picnics” had in Bowling Alone is performed in 
Better Together by “telling stories:” the goal is that of crafting new identities, for “bridging may 
depend on finding, emphasizing, or creating a new dimension of similarity within which 
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bonding can occur.”248
Far from Sandel’s historical and philosophical clarity, also Putnam’s explanation of the 
causes of the decline of social capital is not completely convincing. Among the main factors 
he indicates the replacement of a civic generation by a less involved one. However, the 
reasons why the present generation does not replicate the level of civic engagement of the 
preceding one are not fully articulated, leaving this explanation as a mere label behind which 
the true reasons are hidden. Television, suburbanization and the change of work conditions 
are suggested as the other causes of the decline of social capital, but Putnam does not seem 
to possess a clear vision of the phenomenon in its entirety. Single variables, and even their 
interplay do not seem capable to describe the complexity that the shift of public 
philosophies depicted by Sandel accounts for. 
 In other words, in the wake of diversity it is expedient to create 
similarity: this is very close to the definition of assimilation, and assimilation is one of the 
fundamental strategies within liberalism for dealing with others, by reducing/obliterating 
their otherness. Bridging must be reframed as a form of bonding, for in bonding I recognize 
(aspects of) myself in the other, and as such I am able to accept her. If the other remains 
entirely other, there is no underlying commonality that can connect our unencumbered 
individualities.  
Both Sandel’s and Putnam’s works have made lasting contributions to the debates on 
communitarianism and liberalism that have animated much of the intellectual life in the 
1990s and early 2000s in American academia. Much of this conversation has been framed in 
the language of an assumed republicanism/liberalism dichotomy, with continuous 
reformulation and oscillation between the two concepts, but with a clear tendency to 
recuperate a positive role to the values of republicanism in American civic life. On the other 
hand, this renewed consciousness of the centrality of community in the democratic 
experience of the United States has reinvigorated a strenuous defense of liberalism. Among 
the most celebrated advocates of minimalist liberalism, Richard Rorty has disputed the 
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validity of Sandel’s categorization itself of republicanism and liberalism. In particular, both 
the cogency and the pertinence of such duality in the contemporary American polity are 
questioned: “Most people nowadays believe both that a free society is one in which citizens 
participate in government, and that it is one in which people are, within the limits Mill 
defined, left alone to choose their own values and ends.”249 In this sense, however, the 
premises of a liberal individualistic ontology are left unscathed. Moreover, Rorty calls 
attention also to the relations between the changes in the economic performance of the 
nation and the loss of security and social trust of its citizens.250 The concept of economic 
anxiety is echoed by William Galston’s analysis, that invests the economic as well as the 
social and political spheres, focusing on phenomena like social disintegration and political 
dysfunction.251 Once again diverting attention away from Sandel's critique of liberalism as a 
“public philosophy.” More broadly, the very notion of “unencumbered selves” is contested 
by Rorty, who sees it as a philosophical abstraction whose relevance in real world is confined 
to few occurrences of extreme individualism. Finally he objects that liberalism, especially in 
its more recent Rawlsian formulation, does not necessarily imply the disenchantment derived 
by the absence of morality and its departure from politics, but that, instead, it can produce 
“new moralities and new religions.”252
Quite differently, Isaac Kramnick complicates the articulation of republicanism and 
liberalism, arguing that in the founding era of the American polity significant was also the 
voice of Protestantism, and that the values it bore are discernible also in the analysis of the 
current situation.
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for the “irrational” and exhaustive attachment of America for Lockean liberalism.254 Finally, 
historical institutionalism has challenged the appropriateness of studies primarily centered on 
the civil society, and incapable to visualize the broader picture in which the role of 
institutions in their interplay with communities becomes manifest.255
The rise of atomization as a problematic political phenomenon has stimulated a wide 
array of studies on both its causes and on the possible remedies. A vast consensus is 
registered on the argument that an “excess” or misdirection of individualism can produce 
grave social malaises; however a crucial distinction needs to be made between those 
observers who are willing to radically question the very foundations of liberal individualism, 
and those who are, de facto, confirming them by proposing a return to their true, genuine 
essence. The language of liberalism proves, once again, versatile and malleable in dealing 
with radical critiques, able as it is to rearticulate them in a way that does not threaten its 
principles. Putnam’s engagement with social capital, much like Kymlicka’s 
reconceptualization of multiculturalism, represents a remarkable accomplishment of liberal 
discourse. Putnam’s case, in fact, is even more significant in this sense, as the author is less 
upfront about his liberal premises, and yet they unequivocally permeate the substance of the 
argument and determine its conclusions. Philip Pettit’s formulation of “neo-republicanism” 
constitutes a much more ambitious attempt at devising an alternative public philosophy; 
nevertheless, the discursive hegemony of liberalism extends to this project much more 
deeply than the author would be willing to recognize. 
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PETTIT'S (DEAD-END) WAY OUT OF LIBERAL POLITICS 
Whereas Kymlicka explicitly purports to locate the project of multiculturalism within a 
liberal horizon, and Putnam never questions the liberal coordinates within which the 
construct of social capital takes place, Pettit's work marks a clear theoretical break with the 
paradigm of liberalism, one aimed at the recovery and reevaluation of the alternative 
tradition of republicanism. Pettit rose to prominence in the world of political theory for his 
advancement of a theory of freedom irreducible to the categories employed by liberal 
thinkers, and at the same time distinct from the interpretation that theorists of republicanism 
in the tradition of Quentin Skinner had offered. In particular, Pettit reads Skinner as 
equating republican freedom with “noncoercion or noninterference.”256
 
 Though this is a 
problematic rendition of Skinner’s thought, Pettit employs it as a foil for his own 
characterization of republican freedom as “non-domination:”  
The republican conception of freedom was certainly negative […] but it did not 
represent liberty as noninterference in the manner that Hobbes had inaugurated and 
that came to prominence among nineteenth-century liberal writers. It was, rather, a 
conception of liberty in which the antonym is not interference as such but rather 
dominatio, or domination. Domination is subjection to an arbitrary power of 
interference on the part of another – a dominus or master – even another who 
chooses not to actually exercise that power. Republican freedom […] should be 
understood as nondomination, not noninterference.257
 
 
To be free, in other words, is not to be dominated, and not to be dominated is not to be 
subjected to the arbitrary power of another.  The actual exercise of interference constitutes a 
specific case of unfreedom, but the very possibility of interference, which in turns descends 
from an arbitrary power relation indicated as domination, is in itself sufficient to negate 
freedom. In this sense, broadening the definition of unfreedom from the actual 
(interference) to the potential (domination), Pettit proposes to offer an account of freedom 
                                                 
256 Philip Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On A Difference With Quentin Skinner,” in Political 
Theory Vol 30, No 3, June 2002, p. 339 
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that is more thorough than those offered by liberals, and thus constitutes a more solid 
foundation for a public philosophy. Switching the emphasis from the actual to the potential, 
this formulation comes to hinge critically on what counts as “arbitrary interference.” 
However, as Patchen Markell has noticed, Pettit tends to employ an ambiguous notion of 
“arbitrariness,” one that significantly weakens the internal cogency of his proposition, and 
thus betrays a fundamental commitment to an ontological premise that in turn entraps the 
author in a universe of sense from which he purportedly attempts to escape.  
In its ordinary sense, the notion of arbitrariness refers to the capricious, whimsical 
character of an agent's choice of her actions; when these actions affect a different subject, 
the interference that ensues is to be deemed “arbitrary.” However, in Pettit's usage of the 
term, arbitrariness comes to refer also to cases in which an act of interference is “not forced 
to track the avowable interests of the interferee.”258 In other words, if the first, 
commonsensical understanding of arbitrariness anchors it to the will of the agent of a 
potential interference, the second calls into question the interests of the interferee. An act of 
interference is arbitrary, in this second sense, when it is undertaken without considering its 
effects on the interests of the subject who suffers its consequences. This second definition, 
as Markell observes, is narrower than the first, as it opens up the possibility of acts that 
disregard the interests of the interferee, but are still governed by a logic of their own, and 
therefore are not fully arbitrary in the first sense.259
                                                 
258 see Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford: 2001), pp. 138-139, cited in Patchen Markell, “The Insufficiency of Non-Domination,” in Political 
Theory, Vol 36, No 1, February 2008, p. 13.  
 Such cases would include, for instance, 
the example of a benevolent master who chooses not to interfere with his or her slaves for 
reasons other than a genuine concern for their interests (e.g.: desire to save one's soul, 
constraints imposed by a third party, etc.). These situations, while not entirely whimsical and 
capricious, would still be arbitrary in the second sense. Qualifying them as such enables 
Pettit to establish “the idea of non-domination - freedom from arbitrary power [as 
 
259 see P. Markell, “The Insufficiency of Non-Domination,” pp. 13-16.  
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applicable] against a sufficiently broad range of injustices, including both rule-bound and 
non-rule-bound forms of subordination […] as a single, overarching political principle.”260
Moreover, as Markell observes, the second definition of arbitrariness rests on the idea 
that the interests of the interferee must be “avowable,” capable of being rationally expressed, 
motivated, and sustained. This view “still expresses a concern with caprice, only here it is not 
the whim or caprice of the powerholder that matters, but the whim or caprice of the 
interferee: power is nonarbitrary when its exercise is forced to track the interferee’s interests 
and when those interests have themselves been validated, deprived of their arbitrary 
character by having been subjected to the standards of commonness and avowability.”
  
261
In Pettit's painting of its characteristics, then, the subject of republican freedom starts to 
look quite similar to the individual theorized by liberalism. To be sure, they draw the line 
between their freedom and unfreedom at different points, and the former is a lot more 
exigent than the latter; yet there seems to be a common concern for the formation of the 
subject as an entity capable of choosing its interests and the actions that promote them in a 
non-arbitrary, predictable way. This scheme for non-arbitrariness would seem to be, in both 
cases, an attribute of rationality as a quality located within the mind of the individual subject. 
Being free in Pettit's republican sense, involves, at a minimum: 1) being able to act according 
to one's beliefs and interests; 2) reflecting on those very beliefs and interests, thus choosing 
them in a deliberate manner as opposed to being enslaved by them; and 3) engaging in social 
relations mediated by discourse and such that the validation that one produces for her own 
 
Before her interests are taken into consideration, Pettit's subject must learn to identify and 
communicate them, thus expunging the capriciousness that might otherwise taint them. It is 
to this reflective, disciplined subject that belongs the freedom from domination: of others 
and of her own capricious will.  
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beliefs and interests cannot be reduced to relations of discursive domination that would 
negate her freedom. Pettit elaborates this ambitious account of agency in his Theory of 
Freedom; he also explicitly rejects the notion of a thin self that he would seem to impute to a 
liberal view:  
 
[I]f I am to maintain discursive interactions with others, then the self in question 
cannot recede to the point of being a purely formal ‘I,’ with a thin, commitment-free 
identity. In order to maintain discursive interactions with others, I must continue to 
stand by certain claims and intentions; I cannot change minute by minute, interaction 
by interaction. And that means that I must give my self a substantive specification; I 
must assume a substantive character.262
 
 
The subject of republican freedom would then appear to be a self endowed with a more or 
less stable (though revisable) identity, and capable of rational interactions with others, 
interactions that take that identity as a starting point, and not as the necessarily transitory 
stage in a process of transformation. While this is clearly not reducible to the stylization of 
the unencumbered self, it would seem as if Pettit's main preoccupation here is not to provide 
a description of the world in which identity is continuously negotiated, undone, and 
reconstituted by actions, but rather to justify a narrative in which individual selves pre-exist 
their actions and perform them with a rational concern for their beliefs and interests in their 
exchanges with others. This, in turn, remains fully consistent with the rules of liberal 
discourse. Not even the political is for Pettit an arena for the contestation of individual 
identities, as in his blend of neo-Roman republicanism “democratic politics is wholly 
instrumental to the supreme goal of non-domination.”263
                                                 
262 P. Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, p. 85 
 Citizens engage in political action 
for the purpose of defending their freedom from domination; to the extent that this limited, 
protective goal is accomplished, they continue to live their lives as substantially stable selves. 
Republican freedom remains distinct from liberal freedom (and, arguably, a sounder political 
project); but the political context in which they operate, as well as the ontological 
 
263 P. Markell, “The Insufficiency of Non-Domination,” p. 28 
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commitments that they share on the sense of human nature, seem to indicate more 
similarities than differences. 
Pettit refines his account of the self, and in particular of the role that language plays in 
constituting it, in his recent Made With Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics.264 Here 
Pettit starts from the premise that human beings are such by virtue of the faculty of thought 
that they possess, and that this in turn is made possible by the invention of speech. Hobbes' 
original intuition consists in the idea that language is “not a natural inheritance,” but “an 
invented technology:” Hobbes is “the inventor of the invention of language.”265 To the claim 
that “man is by nature a political animal,” and that he is so by virtue of his faculty of speech 
(in many ways the foundational adage of the civic republican tradition) Pettit responds via 
Hobbes by arguing that politics is two steps removed from the “nature” of man: first 
through the invention of language, and then through its contingent and instrumental 
application to political matters. Language endows human beings with the ability to establish 
comparisons and think relationally, to understand their place in the world  with regards to 
the place of others. Here, and only here, Pettit's analysis parts from Hobbes' proto-liberal 
formulation. Hobbes sees in “Vain-glory” the ultimate evil, and an ineradicable cause of 
conflict, because unlike competition and diffidence, it cannot be transformed into a peaceful 
impulse (desire for commodious living and fear of death respectively).266
                                                 
 
 Competition and 
diffidence, in fact, derive from the natural instinct of (individual) self-preservation, when this 
is exercised toward others; when the same instinct is turned inward, its energy can be 
harnessed for non-conflictual goals. Glory, on the other hand, pertains to the irreducibly 
social dimension of language: it lacks the self-referential quality that would redeem it. Glory 
264 Philip Pettit, Made With Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton: 
2008)  
 
265 P. Pettit, Made With Words, p. 2 
 
266 see: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Penguin Books, London: 1951), [chp XIII] pp. 185-188 
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is always glory relative to the standing of somebody else; glory entails the desire to be 
superior to others. 
Pettit, however, contends that an even more fundamental impulse is the desire not to be 
inferior to others. And whereas the fulfillment of one's desire of being superior is not 
compatible with an equal desire by others, the desire of not being inferior can lead to such 
social arrangements that make its fulfillment possible, at least in principle, for everybody.267 
Non-domination, in other words, is the principle that should inspire the public philosophy 
of a society. Republican institutions can ensure the peaceful coexistence among citizens 
interested in preserving their own individual freedom. This is a brilliant solution to Hobbes' 
problem of glory; but it is hardly a position that reconceptualizes the fundamental essence of 
humans, or even their relation to the political. Theorizing politics as the arena in which pre-
constituted individuals defend their pre-political freedom seems to mortify a tradition of 
republicanism that from Aristotle to Arendt extols vita activa as the culmination of human life 
itself. Though a cadet branch of republican thinkers (Machiavelli above all) has also praised 
politics as an instrument for the orderly coexistence among citizens, Pettit's project here 
lacks the elements of institutional inventiveness that would set it clearly apart from a liberal 
position.268
Moreover, presenting language as an appendage to the nature of humans (albeit one of 
the utmost importance) precludes the possibility that language is constitutive of the identity 
of the self, and not just the vehicle for its expression. Words are “used” according to Pettit 
for various purposes. Words are used first and foremost “to ratiocinate,” to perform those 
logical operations that Hobbes famously assimilated to the arithmetical functions of addition 
and subtraction.
 
269
                                                 
 
 Reason is therefore presented as a mechanical and discernible process, 
267 see: P. Pettit, Made With Words, pp. 3-4 
 
268 On “protective republicanism” see: David Held, Models of Democracy (Polity Press, Cambridge: 2006), pp. 35-
37 
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not a mystical one; accordingly, it is a learned ability, and not an innate one. Words are 
carriers of meaning that humans use in computing. Humans relate to the inert matter of the 
world through the medium of language and reason: the meaning that is associated to discrete 
portions of the world (each unequivocally associated with a sign in this view) must remain 
stable if ratiocinating is to be preserved from becoming a vacuous exercise in sophistry. This 
liberal theory of language necessarily prefigures a universe of sense in which individual 
speakers objectify and deprive of intrinsic value everything in the world that cannot “speak 
back:” animals, plants, peoples and individuals that they recognize as other and inferior, 
either because they speak a language that remains unintelligible to them, or because they 
ostensibly lack the faculty of reason as expressed through language. This also corresponds to 
Hobbes' fascination with the Newtonian paradigm of seventeenth-century science as the 
model for reason.270
An even more explicit theme of liberal discurisvity is developed in the chapter in which 
Pettit explains Hobbes' theory of how words are used “to personate.”
 The narrative that this position subtends about humans in the world, 
and that Pettit seems to accept uncritically, is one that neatly conforms to the principles of 
liberal discourse.  
271 If ratiocinating 
pertained (primarily) to the relation of humans to the (allegedly) inert matter of their 
nonspeaking environment, personating indicates their ability to recognize each other through 
language as “persons […] who […] can speak or act in their own name or the name of a 
principal.”272 In other words, persons are “agents who relate in a certain way toward others 
[…] authorizing their own words and actions as signs of their minds, and inevitably, taking 
others to authorize their words and actions in the same way.”273
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 Pettit concedes that this 
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might entail the exclusion from (full) personhood of those who are (deemed to be) unable 
(or, arguably, unwilling) to “authorize their words and actions, to “speak or act in their own 
name.” These are subjects that Hobbes indicates as “children, fools, and madmen,” and that 
different incarnations of the liberal practice of exclusion have variously defined at different 
points in time, from Locke (“lunatics and ideots […] children […] madmen”) to Rawls 
(persons affected by “permanent physical disabilities or mental disorders so severe as to 
prevent [them] from being normal and fully cooperating members of society in the usual 
sense”), typically coagulating around a semantic cluster of “lack of commonly defined 
rationality.”274 However, Hobbes is satisfied with leaving the decision of where to draw the 
boundaries of sufficient “personhood” to local conventions and legislation, and Pettit 
remains disturbingly silent on this issue.275 In general, the value of personation consists in 
making individuals readable to each other (and to themselves): “[b]y virtue of being able to 
personate, human beings achieve a way of predicting one another's behavior and knowing 
when they can rely on one another.”276
Finally, the liberal underpinnings of Pettit's endorsement of Hobbes's theory of 
language are evident in the account of how words are used “to incorporate.”
 This is, of course, propaedeutic to the paramount 
functions that Hobbes wants individuals to be able to perform: entering contracts, and 
ultimately the covenant that originates civil society. Here too Pettit seems to accept a 
narrative that sees in the social contract the artificial creation of pre-political individuals. 
Again, the goals that he wants them to be able to protect through the institutions of civil 
society are not simply reducible to those of liberalism; yet the political universe that they 
inhabit is not radically different.  
277
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“the ability of people […] to come together as a single corporate person.”278 Whereas 
through personation different individuals presented themselves to each other, by speaking 
and acting each on their own name, through incorporation an individual now comes to 
speak or act for other individuals, to re-present them. The most salient case is that of a 
multitude of separate individuals that get incorporated into a people and personated by the 
sovereign. Not only is there an assumption that the initial position of existence for humans is 
that of single individuals, but the very plurality of the multitude appears to be a fastidious 
transitory stage towards the final realization of a sort of “corporate individuality” of which 
the representer (the sovereign) is the embodiment more than the symbol: “[o]ut of the larval 
multitude there emerges a corporate butterfly […] the multitude ceases to be a heap of 
separate individuals and becomes” a people.279
Though Pettit may legitimately emphasize the neo-Republican elements in his thought, 
in light of this sympathetic reading of Hobbes' theory of language it appears as his departure 
from certain fundamental aspects of a liberal ontology is limited at best. Edwige 
Kacenelenbogen has further observed that Pettit's theory bears a quaint resemblance to 
Friedrich Von Hayek's neoliberalism. In fact, both views share a commitment to 
“epistemological modesty:” they both see political order as being neither natural, nor 
planned, but emerging spontaneously from the aggregation of the actions of self-interested 
 Even if the personation of a multitude is 
enacted by a group or committee, in their exercise of political power the members of that 
group or committee are bound to act like one person, for the multitude itself has become its 
own person. It is perhaps even more clear in this potentially democratic scenario that the 
model of unity based on the construct of the individual is so strong in Hobbes that it 
becomes impossible for him to accept plurality: in the meaning that words carry; in the 
pledges that individual persons make to each other; and now in the corporate entity that is 
molded from the multitude.  
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individuals.280 Kacenelenbogen points out: “The way in which, in Pettit’s view, individuals 
interiorize social norms and acquire civility through ‘habits’ and customs is in many regards 
similar to the way in which, in Hayek’s perspective, actors acquire their norms of good 
behaviour on a market.”281 I remain unpersuaded that the political implications of this 
parallel are so deep as to sustain the bold claim that “the opposition between liberal and 
republican thought is not as vivid as [Pettit] suggests.”282
However, I think that Kacenelenbogen's analysis is illustrative of how the adoption of 
the mode of liberal discourse leads Pettit astray from republican content too. More 
specifically, the narratives that Pettit can construct about the relations between individuals, 
their freedom, and the political system that best protects it prescribe to the rules of liberal 
discourse. This does not qualify the outcomes of Pettit's political theory as fully liberal, but it 
rather attests to the versatility of the language of liberalism, and its ability to speak a wide 
range of positions. 
 At the very least, I am skeptical that 
Pettit's work should be regarded as representative of all “republican thought,” as the 
statement above would seem to indicate.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have presented a brief account of how liberalism concretely functions 
as a meta-ideology. My argument is that, on top of advancing its own political agenda based 
on certain core values, and on the set of policies that descend from them, liberalism also 
exercises a subtler hegemonic role in the contemporary political culture of much of “the 
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West” by providing many (but not all) competing ideological positions with the expressive 
“infrastructure” that allows them to engage each other critically, without either annihilating 
each other, or renouncing their specificity altogether.283
There is a “fee” for participating in this conversation. In this chapter I have argued that 
the toll corresponds to the more or less deliberate acceptance of certain basic rules of 
expression. Typically, non-liberal ideologies are not asked to fully conform to liberal precepts 
in order to be admitted to the conversation hosted by liberalism; but they do have to present 
their own positions in a language intelligible to the other participants. That language is the 
meta-ideology of liberal discourse. I have characterized this as a mode of expression that 
coagulates around a few basic rules. I have proposed a tentative formulation of three such 
rules: 1) individual agency; 2) rational action; 3) objects as inert matter. Of these, the first 
point (that individuals pre-exist and “own” their actions, rather than being constituted by 
them) takes priority over the other two. The list is in no way meant to be an exhaustive one, 
and the formulation of each of those “rules” does not claim to be anything more than a 
rudimentary attempt at highlighting the recurrence of certain characteristic traits of liberal 
expression. 
 Liberalism, in other words, sets the 
table at which other ideologies sit and argue with each other. 
I should emphasize that these rules are not presented here as the “minimum common 
denominator” of liberalism: not all themes that define the ideology of liberalism are 
accounted for, of course (e.g.: the concept of “equality of opportunity” cannot be 
automatically derived from them); and certainly some self-identified liberals could take issue 
with them (e.g.: it is conceivable that passions, as opposed to rationality, might be accepted 
in a comprehensive theory of action). Nevertheless, I still find this agile list of expressive 
rules useful for testing my hypothesis that liberal discourse can (within certain limits) 
accommodate extra-liberal content, and that it can do so in a remarkably successful manner. 
Whereas Michael Freeden refers to this process as “adaptation,” suggesting that liberalism 
                                                 
283 It should be noticed here that not all ideologies are equally amenable to this kind of expressive 
domestication; some certainly do resist it, often times facing marginalization and irrelevance because of that. 
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significantly opens itself up for contestation in its engagement of other positions, I prefer to 
characterize it as “liberal incorporation:” the acquisition of extra-liberal content into, and 
through the structures of liberal discourse.  
I have analyzed three cases of what I describe as liberal incorporations. First I have 
discussed Will Kymlicka’s engagement with multiculturalism. In his formulation of a “right 
to culture” I envisage a limpid exemplification of the versatility of liberal discourse in seizing 
portions of non-liberal content, and reorganizing this content in a manner compatible with a 
liberal order. The communitarian defense of minority rights becomes in Kymlicka's hands a 
liberal project for the advancement of individual rights. The narrative of migration, in 
particular, is presented as one in which the action of relocating is undertaken by individual 
agents who are, therefore, “typically” willing to integrate into the society of the new country. 
Dissolving a complex social phenomenon into simple components like individual actions 
(the rational choice to migrate) and attitudes (the alleged desire to integrate) is an emblematic 
move of liberal discourse. This peculiar reconceptualization of one of the fundamental 
problems of multiculturalism, in turn, is likely to predetermine the kind of solutions that may 
be proposed. Liberal discourse can express non-liberal content; but in doing so it shapes the 
horizon of the thinkable and constitutes the world of politics as the unfolding of a liberal 
narrative. 
Secondly, I have focused on Robert Putnam’s work on “social capital.” Confronted with 
the undesirable effects of the atomization of American society, and the equally undesirable 
implications of certain communitarian projects, Putnam attempts to regain the Paradise Lost 
of an avowedly harmonious liberal polity. Accordingly, his formula is based on the 
translation of the theme of community into the vocabulary of liberalism. That translation 
roughly corresponds to what he indicates as social capital. Contrary to the communitarian 
critique of the unencumbered self as an ontological fiction, though, Putnam ends up 
glorifying the self that starts unencumbered, and then chooses to join in with others in the 
pursuit of a more or less explicit agenda of “efficiency.” Social capital is not constitutive of 
the identity of individuals, but an object at their disposal, analogous to other kinds of capital. 
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This discursive rearticulation of “community” studiedly harnesses its potential for rescuing 
liberalism from its own atomistc degeneration. By virtue of the very expressive forms that it 
employs, though, this position frustrates the possibility of thinking outside of the ontological 
and political precincts of a liberal order.  
Finally I have considered Philip Pettit’s ongoing advancement of a “neo-republican” 
public philosophy. Though his characterization of republican liberty as “non-domination” 
cannot be fully reduced to analogous liberal formulations, the discourse that Pettit employs 
remains consistent with certain key themes of liberalism. In order to resist “arbitrary 
interference” (which follows from relations of domination), a subject needs to expose that 
arbitrariness, by declaring its own interest so as to present them as non-arbitrary in the first 
place. In order to do so, the subject needs to be already constituted as a rational self with a 
relatively stable identity; this is made possible by the faculty of language. Pettit's theory of 
language, modeled on Hobbes', seems entirely consistent with the canons of liberal 
discourse, as it too postulates a world of inert matter, in which individual speakers use words 
crucially to “ratiocinate” (perform logical operation), “personate” (relate with, and 
distinguish one another), and “incorporate” (coordinate and act in unison like one single 
body). Moreover, Pettit's proposal remains fully compatible with a liberal order inasmuch as 
it construes politics as an instrument available to individuals for the preservation of their 
pre-political freedom.  
These are all cases of “liberal incorporation,” I argue, and as such they are illustrative of 
broader processes through which liberal discourse absorbs, reconfigures, and operationalizes 
alien political meaning. Three general questions, however, can be raised about this 
conclusion. 1) Does the “incorporation” really happen at the level of language, or is it simply 
the inclusion of new content in highly adaptive liberal paradigms? 2) Is there really a liberal 
“meta-ideology” at work here, or are these cases just a testimony of the descriptive power of 
methodological individualism? 3) Is there really a conceivable, and crucially, also desirable 
systemic alternative to the discourse of liberal individualism? 
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My simple answer to the first question is that liberalism operates on two levels. At the 
level of content, it certainly exhibits a remarkable propensity for revising its own beliefs, and 
hedging in new ones. Rawls' toleration is not Locke's toleration, and T.H. Green's advocacy 
of an “enabling state” is a considerable departure from classical arguments for a minimal 
state. Yet, I argue, there is also a peculiar way in which the discourse of liberalism can make 
extra-liberal content more palatable by reorganizing it according to certain rules of 
expression. Otherwise, Kymlicka might have not insisted on his narrative of immigrants as 
individual actors; Putnam might have avoided dissolving community into a collection of 
individuals variously endowed with social capital; and Pettit might have not presented 
republican freedom as attached to individuals that only defend it in the political, without 
constituting their identity in the process.  
As for the second question, I maintain that methodological individualism is a crucial 
dimension of the liberal project, in both its ideological, and meta-ideological incarnations. In 
particular, I suspect that, whereas in the ideology of liberalism individualism (both 
descriptive and normative) occupies a privileged position among other equally important 
principles (e.g.: freedom, reason, a certain notion of justice, toleration, etc.), in the meta-
ideology it clearly enjoys a more dominant position. The discourse of liberalism owes more 
to the correspondence between the subject of grammar and the individual presented as the 
undisputed owner of action, than it does to the other principles of liberalism. Yet, a 
translation of holistic accounts into the language of methodological individualism might still 
lack the liberal political projections that are apparent in the cases analyzed above as examples 
of liberal discourse. Adam Przeworski, for instance, has endeavored to harness the 
explanatory potential of rational choice theory (a set of propositions and models of social 
action based on the assumption of the individual as the fundamental unit of analysis) toward 
a defense of the conclusions of Marxism (a system of thought in which structural relations 
among the classes explain social outcomes).284
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structuralist language of Marxism into that of methodological individualism, he does not 
reach liberal conclusions. It is possible, in principle, to keep the methodology of 
individualism separate from the politics of liberalism.  
Finally, the third question is undoubtedly the most dauntingly fascinating one. My 
inclination is to respond that, whether or not a viable and desirable systemic alternative to 
the meta-ideology of liberal individualism can be found, it is worth looking for one. And to 
this quest I shall now turn, introducing my reflection on Jean-Luc Nancy's philosophy as a 
way out of the rigid substantialism of both liberal and communitarian worldviews.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
IMAGINING THE INOPERATIVE COMMUNITY 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter I argue that the formulation of an alternative to the ideological 
hegemony of liberalism and to the meta-ideological pervasiveness of a liberal grammar is 
both a possible and a desirable political project. Toward the definition of a non-liberal style 
of discourse I discuss critically various articulations of the political concept of community, 
and in particular I present Jean-Luc Nancy’s reflection on “the inoperative community” as a 
promising foundation for a non-liberal meta-ideological configuration. Since this is a crucial 
passage in the development of my project, before delineating the contours of the alternative 
that I envision, I will briefly recapitulate the main points that I have raised thus far.  
The study of political ideologies exposes with particular vividness the arbitrariness of 
any artificial opposition between political theory and the practices of politics, or between the 
empirical reality of politics and its abstraction, depending on what is assumed as the entry 
point in the definition of this problematic relation. By their very nature, and by the function 
that they perform in the world of politics, ideologies straddle the line that is supposed to 
separate the world of ideas from the world of action. In organizing political content, 
ideologies also produce effects on how that content gets mobilized for various political 
purposes. My goal in this project is to advance a reflection on how a study of ideologies can 
be conducted to account for the complex relations between ideas and politics. In particular, I 
concentrate on the specific grammatical-ideological formation of liberalism, and I then 
reflect on how its current hegemony can be contested. 
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In Chapter I I defined my approach to this study by emphasizing the narrative 
dimension of political ideologies: fundamentally, an ideology tells a story about the world of 
politics. Both content and grammar are constitutive elements of this narration: whereas 
political theorists have systematically investigated the semantic fields delineated by various 
ideologies, I argue that that the syntactic infrastructure which makes the articulation of 
meaning possible has been often regarded as inert, extra-political matter, and as such it has 
been severely understudied. Along with their commitment to different political values and 
views of the world, in fact, different ideologies also exhibit a general pattern of regularities as 
to how they allocate meaning in their narrations. Typically an ideology moves from the 
premise of a description of the status quo, in which a set of problems, shortcomings, faults is 
identified. Cleary, this is a stylization of political reality, a vignette drawn for the purpose of 
sustaining the advancement of a normative view: an alternative, more desirable allocation of 
values, resources, political meaning. Crucially, then, an ideology adds that a better future is 
not only thinkable in the abstract, but that it can also be concretely realized. Though the 
status quo is flawed, it is not irredeemably so; though the future is attractive, it is not out of 
reach. A call for action, often times appealing at an emotional level (“Working men of all 
countries, unite!”), and a blueprint detailing what steps are to be taken (more or less literally 
“What is to be done”) conclude the message of an ideology. This style of narrative, then is 
not primarily concerned with a notion of “Truth” as it may exist outside of the narration, but 
with the production of “effects of truth” within the narration aimed at showing that an 
alternative to the status quo is truly desirable, and that it is truly achievable.  
In Chapter II I furthered the reflection on how ideological discourse produces such 
effects of truth. If political ideologies can be regarded as narrative constructs, I argued, they 
can also be studied by borrowing some basic instruments of analysis from semiotics. In 
particular, I introduced the logical category of abduction, with the specific case of 
overcoding: ideological discourses produce effects of truth by making inferences about 
certain portions of a field of meaning, and then decontesting these inferences into natural 
and necessary claims about the world of politics. Then I concentrated on the issue of how 
certain deep structures of language shape the field of meaning by apportioning agency in 
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ways that prefigure certain ideological worldviews at the expenses of others. In other words, 
I reflected on how a commitment to an ontology of individualism may be fostered by a 
grammar of subject-verb formations in which action is an attribute of the subject rather than 
constitutive of it. Concomitantly I also considered what the implication of an alternative 
grammar of agency might be for the world of politics, shifting the emphasis from subject to 
verb, from the individual as a datum to the performativity of action. Finally, I presented the 
semiotic square as a useful instrument for mapping the semantic field on which the narrative 
of an ideology unfolds.  
In Chapter III I then invested my general reflections on ideology on the specific 
narrative of liberalism. I employed basic instruments of semiotics for the analysis of the 
contributions of three canonical liberal thinkers. First I looked at John Locke’s arguments in 
both the Second Treatise of Government and in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Contra 
the prevalent readings of Locke’s theory as either the prototype of “possessive 
individualism,” or as an endorsement of the value of community over that of the individual, 
I argued that he advances a rather more complex politics of “semiotic individualism” in 
which individuals acquire consciousness of themselves and take ownership of the narratives 
that they originate by virtue of their belonging to a linguistic community. The latter is in turn 
constituted by a “semiotic contract” which makes both signification and communication 
possible. Then I looked at John Stuart Mill’s politics of “sovereign individualism,” in which 
the action of individuals is explained as a function of their individual rationality. Finally I 
considered John Rawls’ view of justice as fairness as a politics of “tempered individualism,” 
in which some of the social ties that Mill had deemphasized are instead underscored, but in 
which the exclusionary possibilities of liberalism remain largely unquestioned. In conclusion, 
I have identified three elements of a profound grammar of liberal discourse: 1) individuals 
own their actions; 2) the mode of action is rational; 3) objects are treated as inert matter (and 
human beings can be treated as objects too). 
In Chapter IV I have argued that the same basic liberal grammar can also express extra-
liberal political content. Liberalism, in other words, also exercises its hegemony over other 
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ideologies by incorporating at least some of their claims into its own expressive 
infrastructure. I have considered cases of “liberal incorporations” in three contemporary 
authors. First I have looked at Will Kymlicka’s domestication of the communitarian 
dimension of multiculturalism into an individual “right to culture” to be granted in the 
context of a soundly liberal institutional setting. Then I have presented Robert Putnam’s 
formulation of “social capital” as a gesture toward some themes of communitarianism, but at 
the same time a clear reaffirmation of the foundations of a liberal political project. Finally I 
have considered Philip Pettit’s ambitious theorization of “neo-republicanism,” and I have 
found it consistent with both a liberal institutional structure, and with a liberal account of the 
self. A liberal grammar, I have argued, allows the articulation of political visions irreducible 
to the core of a liberal ideology. 
Is the grammar of liberalism uniquely endowed with such meta-ideological versatility? 
Can other grammatical configurations also convey meaning across a wide range of political 
positions? I argue that it is indeed possible to construct political narratives irreducible to the 
grammatical structures of liberalism. Moreover, contra the objection that outside of a liberal 
paradigm there can only be closed political universes rigidly organized around a set of core 
beliefs, I argue that Nancy’s view of the “inoperative community,” unlike other forms of 
communitarianism, can sustain a multiplicity of political claims, much like what I have 
defined as a “liberal grammar,” but without some the problematic commitment of liberalism 
to the fiction of the individual, at the level of political content, and to the primacy of the 
subject, at the level of grammar.  
My argument is loosely organized around the same narrative pattern that I have 
identified as characteristic of political ideology. At the “descriptive” level I have observed in 
previous chapters that the current status quo exhibits the hegemony (both ideological and 
meta-ideological) of liberalism. I regard this as undesirable, in particular because the 
individualistic ontology on which both the discourse and grammar of liberalism are founded 
does not constitute an adequate account of the complexity of human nature, and it 
constrains the development of the notion of the “political” in a distortive manner. At the 
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“normative” level, in this chapter I articulate (what I regard as) a more desirable foundation 
for political discourses, based on Nancy’s peculiar understanding of community, and capable 
of accommodating political meaning across a variety of positions. Finally, insofar as the 
“action-oriented” aspect of ideology is concerned, in Chapter VI I will illustrate some of the 
concrete implications that an understanding of community inspired by Nancy might have for 
political phenomena like migration, and the encounter with the other more generally. In 
order to illustrate the specificity and originality of Nancy’s formulation I will start by first 
reconstructing a possible trajectory of development of the concept of “community” in the 
reflection of some recent authors, ranging from Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael 
Walzer and Charles Taylor, to Benedict Anderson, James Scott and Pascale Casanova. 
 
 
IMAGES OF COMMUNITY: FROM ESSENCE TO IMAGINATION   
If the hegemony of liberalism does indeed extend from the ideological level to the meta-
ideological one, allowing liberal discourse to incorporate claims from other ideologies and to 
express them in such a way as to render them compatible with core liberal values, then I 
argue that this is due to certain features of a peculiar liberal grammar. In particular, I argue 
that the structural homology between the liberal commitment to an individualistic ontology 
and the grammatical structure of the subject can explain much of the success of liberalism in 
presenting its views as commonsensical, intuitive, or even natural. Both the liberal individual 
and the grammatical subject are described as owners of their actions: they pre-exist their 
actions, which are attached to them as contingent attributes to an immanent core. 
Etymologically the notion of the “individual” clearly refers to “that which cannot be 
further divided.” At the historical juncture of modernity, when thinkers like Hobbes, Locke 
and Descartes codified the rationalistic principles of the new era, the ongoing processes of 
dissolution of the feudal order across the societies of Europe had already fostered a radical 
critique of the traditional concept of “ascribed status.” As Alan Macfarlane has shown for 
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England, for centuries before the events of the Civil War and the publication of Locke’s 
Second Treatise, society had started morphing into the system of socio-economic as well as 
cultural values in which the principle of individualism would eventually take root.285
Questioning the validity of this outcome, then, would seem to imply at least two 
alternative possibilities. One position might argue that the very process of “breaking down” 
the unity of society into ever smaller components, all the way to the individual, is inherently 
misguided. Another position might respond that that process in fact stops short of 
questioning the unity of the individual itself, its actual character of indivisibility. I will return 
to the latter point at the end of this chapter, in the context of a postmodern critique of the 
self; but it is the former line of reasoning that has historically produced the foremost 
challenges to a conception of politics organized around the liberal view of individualism.  
 As the 
rigid social hierarchies of the past had become increasingly unstable over the centuries under 
the impact of new economic, scientific, technological, cultural, and genuinely political 
transformations, the division of society into self-contained groups virtually impermeable to 
each other like the nobility, the clergy, and the ensemble of the commoners also became 
untenable. The latter set, in particular, increasingly started to appear like an ill-assorted 
rassemblement of people with very little in common: “commoners,” for instance, were both the 
newly urbanized and enfranchised former serfs and the peasants who remained attached to 
the fields; both the nascent bourgeoisie and the laborers who were to become the first 
nucleus of a proletarian class. As ever more structured social differences became impossible 
to ignore, the status itself of “commoners” required analysis, literally “breaking down” into 
its constitutive elements; the endpoint of this breaking down was assumed to have been 
reached at the level of the individual, that which could not be further divided.  
The liberal argument for descriptive and normative individualism, in fact, has attracted 
criticism from different sides of the ideological debate. Conservative thinkers, variously 
inspired by Edmund Burke’s seminal Reflections on the Revolution in France, have argued that the 
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unity of an “organic society” takes logical and moral priority over the notion of the 
individual human being. Roger Scruton, for instance, has remarked that “[t]here is no 
autonomy that does not presuppose the sense of a social order, and if the order may be ideal, 
this is only because it was once experienced as real. The autonomous individual is the 
product of practices which designate him as social.”286 Contra the social-contractarian 
narrative of society as the association of originally autonomous individuals, Scruton 
redescribes the individual as derivative and dependent on the political, cultural, and moral 
premises of society. From a rather different position, socialists have typically rejected both 
the liberal view of human nature and its implications for society. To the extent that the very 
notion of human “nature” is tenable in the discourse of socialism, the nature of human 
beings is to be social creatures, and as such intimately and unavoidably shaped by social 
circumstances. Robert Owen, for instance, denounced as a mistake to suppose that “each 
individual man forms his own character,” and countered that “the character of man is, 
without a single exception, always formed for him.”287
The critique of liberal individualism was fueled toward the end of the 20th century by the 
emergence of a distinctive “communitarian” position. As I note in Chapter IV, Michael 
Sandel confronts the liberal postulate of an “unencumbered self.” Prior to its ends and 
detached from them, in Sandel’s analysis the liberal self is an artificial construct devoid of 
any constitutive attachments to its context and obligations to its community.
 This strong argument for social 
determinism clearly rejected the individualistic premises of liberalism, as well as its 
conclusions on the organization of society. 
288
                                                 
286 Roger Scruton, The Meaning of Conservatism (St. Augustine Press, South Bend, Ind.: 2002), p. 66 
 Similarly, 
Alasdair MacIntyre indicts the modern notion of the individual as an “emotivist self.” In a 
passionate vindication of an Aristotelian ethics against the moral relativism of the post-
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Enlightenment world, MacIntyre notes: “this democratized self which has no necessary 
social content and no necessary social identity can then be anything, can assume any role or 
take any point of view, because it is in and for itself nothing.”289
To the fragmentation of society into a contingent association of loosely connected 
individuals, thinkers in the tradition of Sandel and especially MacIntyre juxtapose the 
necessary unity of community. Community thus exists always already before the individuals 
that inhabit it. A community provides its members with the sources for the definition of 
both their collective and individual identities. The essence of a community is manifested by 
certain immanent characteristics such as a common language, a shared system of values and 
traditions, a coherent historical narrative.  
 For both Sandel and 
MacIntyre only grounding the individual in the community to which it belongs can solve the 
social and moral problems epitomized by the atomistic tendencies of contemporary 
liberalism.  
Moreover, the abrasion of liberal and communitarian claims in the debates of the 1980s 
and 1990s produced various redefinitions of the liberal and communitarian arguments. In 
Chapter IV I discussed Robert Putnam’s emphasis on “social capital” as a form of “liberal 
incorporation” (and ultimate enervation) of certain communitarian themes.290 With an 
altogether different theoretical depth, Michael Walzer has elaborated a theory of justice as 
“complex equality.” Contra the dominant paradigm of “simple equality,” Walzer’s theory of 
communal pluralism identifies different spheres in society, and upholds as just a social 
arrangement in which “no citizen’s standing in one sphere or with regard to one social good 
can be undercut by his standing in some other sphere, with regard to some other good.”291
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Governs?, Walzer’s particular version of the argument for non-cumulative inequalities crucially 
depends on membership in an interpretive community which is internally articulated in 
different spheres of value and distribution. In order for a society to be just, it has to be 
grounded in the community of citizenship and democratic participation. Furthermore, 
Walzer expands on his moral theory by exposing liberal morality as a “thin” one: universal 
and neutral, but by its very nature inadequate to regulate the balance of rights and 
obligations within a community. By contrast, a “thick” morality is rooted in local practices 
and traditions: as such it is the appropriate horizon for thinking about what binds together a 
community of shared understandings, but it would be ill-advised to follow its precepts in the 
international arena.292
Walzer thus ends up recommending a “thin” moral order at the international level, 
whereas a “thick” discourse of rights and obligation is required at the level of the domestic 
community. That the domestic sphere should indeed be understood as an undivided 
“community of shared understandings” is a postulation that other thinkers engage critically. 
In Patchen Markell’s convincing analysis, the articulation of “recognition” as a political 
project also emerged as the refinement of the early statements of communitarianism, and in 
particular of their assumption of an undivided community:  
 
 
The politics of recognition, you might say, emerged as pluralist variation on this 
original, “communitarian” critique of liberalism, with the “identity” taking the place 
of “community” as the preferred vocabulary for thinking about the contexts in 
which human agents are inevitably embedded.293
  
 
As Markell perceptively observes, Charles Taylor’s intervention in the debates on 
multiculturalism marks a critical juncture in rejecting the essentialist attitude of certain 
versions of communitarianism. On the one hand Taylor rejects the premises of “naturalism,” 
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and in particular the idea that the agent can act independently of the context of their action. 
Individual human agents do not operate as atoms disengaged from society. On the other 
hand, though, Taylor observes that the complexity of contemporary society cannot be 
reduced to the idealized unity of community, as a plurality of social contexts typically coexist 
without being reducible to a common whole. Moreover, contra the view that identity 
descends in an unproblematic manner from either the unitary essence of community, or the 
specific essences of different groups in society, Taylor objects that the formation of identity 
is a more complex dialogical phenomenon. As such it entails the recognition of one’s claim 
to identity from others: it starts from the formulation of a sense of one’s being; but it is 
never complete until that claim is also validated by others. In Taylor’s analysis:  
 
our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, 
real distortion if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining 
or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone 
in a false, distorted and reduced form of being.294
 
 
For Taylor too, like for Sandel and MacIntyre, the identity of the self is not independent of 
the social context in which it is immersed; but emphasizing the importance of recognition 
also qualifies that identity as the product of dynamic social interactions that effect either 
truthful or distorted identities. For the Quebecoise to have their distinctness recognized by 
the Canadian state and society, with the “consequent demand for certain forms of autonomy 
in their self-government,” is fundamental for their very survival.295
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Rejecting the essentialist thesis altogether, Benedict Anderson insists instead on the 
socially constructed character of the national community. At the beginning of Imagined 
Communities he defines nations and nationalism as “cultural artifacts of a particular kind.”296 
Anderson's programmatic statement further specifies: “In an anthropological spirit, then, I 
propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community – and 
imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”297
 
 Three attributes qualify the 
understanding of the nation as a community:  
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most 
of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each 
lives the image of their communion […] The nation is imagined as limited because 
even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living human beings, has 
finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations […] It is imagined as 
sovereign because the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and 
Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical 
dynastic realm […] Finally, it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the 
actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.298
 
 
In order to conceive of this kind of community, three pre-modern assumptions have to be 
displaced.299
                                                 
 
 First, language has to be made into an instrument for the expression of extra-
discursive truths: languages like Latin or Arabic, classically regarded as intrinsically imbued 
with Truth, have to give way to the much humbler national vernaculars. Second, a political 
shift away from the doctrine of the divine right of kings has to constitute the people as the 
ultimate repository of sovereignty. Third, time has to be re-apprehended as linear and empty, 
and not the cyclical repetition of a timeless continuity.  
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Language, in particular, is crucial for Andersen in fostering national sentiment, and thus 
awareness of itself in the community, and hence its imagining: “Nothing served to ‘assemble’ 
related vernaculars more than capitalism, which, within the limits imposed by grammars and 
syntaxes, created mechanically reproduced print-languages capable of dissemination through 
the market.”300 Economic forces required the creation of national markets that would 
maximize internal homogeneity while also configuring a clear outside: contrary to the 
universalistic pretenses of Latin, French, English, Swedish had to emerge as national 
languages. Or rather, the national community itself would emerge from the language, 
without preceding it in any essentialist, primordial way: “from the start the nation was 
conceived in language, not in blood, and […] one could be 'invited into' the imagined 
community. Thus today, even the most insular nations accept the principle of naturalization 
(wonderful word!), no matter how difficult in practice they may make it.”301
How language and nation stand in relation to each other, and how both instantiate 
community is an issue that has been debated by various authors. Anderson seems to accord 
much explanatory power to print capitalism, as the catalyst of the process of “imagination.” 
James Scott, on the other hand, has seen in the imposition of an official language one of the 
most distinctive tasks of the state. States for Scott are engaged in transformative processes 
aimed at making society “legible:” in order to exercise political control and extract revenues, 
states need to render their citizens predictable and transparent, they need to be able to 
“read” society, ideally rendering all meaning immediately intelligible and easy to acquire in an 
“administrative more convenient format.”
 By ways of 
communication (speaking the national language) foreigners can begin to imagine themselves 
into the community, and potentially be accepted as members.     
302
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Of all state simplifications, then, the imposition of a single, official language may be 
the most powerful, and it is the precondition of many other simplifications […] In 
the first efforts made to insist on the use of French, it is clear that the state’s 
objective was the legibility of local practice. Officials insisted that every legal 
document – whether a will, document of sale, loan instrument, contract, annuity, or 
property deed – be drawn up in French. […] The campaign of linguistic 
centralization was assured of some success since it went hand in hand with an 
expansion of state power. […] It was a gigantic shift in power. Those at the 
periphery who lacked competence in French were rendered mute and marginal.303
  
  
National languages are therefore deliberately manufactured to maximize legibility. As such 
they are also standardized by a state that controls and enforces their correct usage: via 
institutions of mandatory public education, via the activities of the administration, and often 
via the creation of state-run organisms for the regulation of orthography, vocabulary, 
grammar (e.g.: the Académie française). Similarly, Antonio Gramsci commented on the 
enforcement of linguistic conformism as a political act, aimed at “for[ming] hundreds of 
thousands of recruits, of the most disparate origin and mental preparation, into a 
homogenous army capable of moving and acting in a disciplined and united manner.”304 To 
be sure, Gramsci listed several sources responsible for forging linguistic conformity, 
including the education system (which can largely be traced back to the state), but also 
newspapers, writers, theatre and cinema, radio, etc.305
Gramsci advances a complex and multicausal explanation for the connection between 
language and hegemony. Out of the rich texture of Gramsci’s analysis, different thinkers 
choose to pick different threads. On the one hand, Anderson’s explanation of the rise of 
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imagined communities exhibits heavy materialistic undertones; on the other hand, Scott 
proposes a state-centric approach. On the latter’s (much simplified) account, ultimately states 
create languages, and then languages create communities. The terms of this equation are 
inverted by Pascale Casanova's study of world literatures. Focusing on the case of Italy, and 
inspired by the tradition of postcolonial studies, Casanova observes how the emergence of a 
national language precedes the formation of a unitary state. She notes:  
 
The example of Petrarch, now established both as a stylistic model and a 
grammatical norm, helped slow the pace of innovation in Italian letters. For a very 
long time the poets were confined to imitation of Dante, Petrarque [sic], and 
Bocaccio [sic]: in the absence of any centralized state structure that might have 
helped to stabilize and “grammatize” common languages [...] Broadly speaking, it is 
true to say that poetical, rhetorical, and aesthetic problems were subordinated in Italy 
to the debate over linguistic norms until the achievement of political unity in the 
nineteenth century.306
 
 
Absent a political embodiment of the community, the Italian nation was imagined first as a 
product of literature. As Gramsci too noted: “the entire historical formation of the Italian 
nation moved at too slow a pace. Every time the question of language surfaces, in one way 
or another, it means that a series of other problems are coming to the fore.”307
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provided the peoples of Italy with an avenue for imagining themselves as a people. Though 
this was probably a sentiment of some of the elites, and though the Sicilian, Venetian, and 
Neapolitan masses remained often indifferent (if not quite hostile) to the process of political 
unification, the very idea of a modern Italian nation as distinct from the memory of the glory 
of Rome owes as much to literature as to any other political factor. Similarly, the political, 
diplomatic and military process of German unification during the 19th century was crucially 
indebted to the philosophical reflection on language and nation advanced by Johann 
Gottfried Herder in the 18th century.  
As this brief discussion of Anderson, Scott, and Casanova points out, the intellectual 
trajectory toward the de-essentialization of community does not reach a single endpoint, but 
trickles down into a variety of narratives of social construction. Whether by placing the 
emphasis on markets, states, or literature, it is possible to problematize the relation between 
(national) language and (national) community without reverting to a naïve form of linguistic 
determinism in which the essence of community comes to coincide with its language. This is 
certainly a reassuring outcome for an argument that aims to reject the essentializing 
descriptions of community that perspire from the pages of MacIntyre, or even Sandel. 
Nevertheless, invoking one version or another of “social construction” as the master 
explanation of all that pertains to community runs the risk of trading an untenable 
foundationalism (the essential nature of community) for an equally dogmatic anti-
foundationalism (community is always constructed, and as such there is no “real” 
community). I argue that grounding the study of community in a different paradigm is 
necessary to get out of the intellectual cul-de-sac of essentialism, while at the same time not 
regressing ad infinitum into a sterile version of social constructivism. I maintain that Jean-
Luc Nancy’s engagement with community firmly rejects essentialism, but at the same time it 
does not end up in anti-foundationalism: rather than being a mere social construct, Nancy’s 
community is the foundation itself of being. In order to appreciate the vast political potential 
of this intuition, I first go back to discussing the couplet individual-community, as one of the 
crucial components for an understanding of political relations. 
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INDIVIDUAL VS. COMMUNITY: EXPLODING THE DICHOTOMY 
The ideological constellation of liberalism can be characterized as the archetypal 
political manifestation of a deep individualistic ontology. At the level of content, various 
liberal thinkers agree on a fundamental understanding of the nature of human beings as that 
of individual selves, thus deriving political relations from the association of pre-existing 
individuals. Other key themes certainly contribute to defining a complex ideological 
formation like liberalism; but a commitment to the value of individualism (both descriptive 
and normative) is the necessary premise for making sense of values like toleration, equality 
of opportunity, meritocracy, etc. At the level of expression, liberal narratives typically rely on 
grammatical structures in which the primacy of the subject over the verb corresponds to the 
primacy of the individual self over the actions that get contingently attached to it. Moreover, 
as I have argued in Chapter IV, a liberal grammar can also express content that does not 
originate from within the core of a liberal ideology; in this “incorporative” function, 
liberalism exercises a meta-ideological hegemony over competing ideologies. Consequently, I 
maintain that in order to question the current hegemony of liberalism, it is not enough to 
articulate extra-liberal content, but it is also necessary to question the very grammatical 
premises of a liberal narrative.  
Certain versions of communitarianism do pose a challenge to liberalism on both the 
levels of content and expression. Inverting the terms of the liberal equation, communitarian 
thinkers in the vein of MacIntryre and Sandel, and, to some extent, Taylor and Walzer, 
postulate that the political community is ontologically, historically, and morally prior to the 
individuals who come to inhabit it under contingent conditions.308
                                                 
308 Taylor, in particular, distinguishes between “ontology” and “advocacy” in his assessment of the liberal-
communitarian debate. He laments that much of the contention happened at the level of advocacy, thus leaving 
the crux of the dispute (theories of the atomistic individual vs. theories of the situated self) in the background. 
 To the thesis that the 
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community is endowed with some kind of transcendental truth respond authors like 
Andersen, Scott, and Casanova: variously emphasizing the role of markets, states and 
literature in constituting community, they expose the latter as a social construct, and not a 
pre-political reality.  
Ultimately, however, the description of a communitarian camp opposed to a liberal one 
distorts a much more nuanced interplay of claims, debates, and mutual definitions. In fact, 
the very notion of “liberalism” and “communitarianism,” in the singular, is ultimately 
untenable as it obscures the fault lines on either side. Nevertheless, it is not incongruous to 
point out that a broad commitment to the values of the individual and of community 
characterizes the discourses of liberalism and of communitarianism, respectively. As such, 
the opposition between individual and community has dominated much of the liberal-
communitarian controversy. In the production of their ideological appeals, thinkers from 
either perspective have often identified one or the other of these two concepts alternatively 
as the disease or cure of contemporary society. For instance, a communitarian ideologue 
might structure her narrative around three sets of claims:  
A) The status quo displays a fragmented, atomistic society, and this is the result (either 
necessary or contingent) of an excess of individualism (or, possibly, of individualism 
itself). This is undesirable.  
B) There is a way to fix the social problems caused by (excessive) individualism. A 
desirable social arrangement for the future will be founded on the primary value of 
community.  
C) In order to accomplish the transition from A) to B), the state (for instance) has to 
uphold the value of community by promoting solidarity, cultivating a national 
sentiment, imposing religious conformity, protecting certain languages (for instance 
                                                                                                                                                 
See: Charles Taylor: “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal Communitarian Debate,” in Nancy Rosenblum, ed. by, 
Liberalism and the Moral Life (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 1989) 
 177 
 
– this example is not meant to imply that any given communitarian thinker would 
actually endorse any or all of these goals).  
A liberal rejoinder might object that the real problem with today’s society is not too 
much individualism, but too little, and that reducing the role of community in imposing 
moral conformism (for instance) should be the goal of a free society. Either way, in this 
overly schematic illustration, both the logics of communitarianism and liberalism assume the 
entire matter of contention to be exhausted by the dichotomous alternative between 
individual and community. An echo of this attitude even carries over in the real debates. 
However, as I argue in Chapter II, the production of effects of truth within ideological 
discourse can be more accurately understood by exploding simple oppositions on the 
semiotic square (see Figure 4). While “individual” and “community” entertain a relation of 
mutual contrariness, the logical operation of negation can be performed on both terms, thus 
producing their contradictories. The contradictory of “individual,” which may be simply 
referred to as “non-individual” does not quite configure “community” yet, thought it might 
suggest community (as I note above, a critique of the notion of the “individual” might 
deconstruct it without necessarily advocating “community” as a desirable alternative). 
Likewise, the semantic area of “non-community” is broader and less clearly defined than that 
of “individual.” 
 
Figure 4. The Semiotic Square: Individual vs. Community 
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One of the advantages of visualizing conceptual relations on the semiotic squares is that 
doing so allows the observer to capture more of the complexity of how ideological discourse 
actually frames arguments. Movement on the semiotic square typically follows a “butterfly” 
pattern. A communitarian might start from the top-left corner in her description of the 
status quo (individual); then move diagonally to the negation of that (non-individual); and 
finally reach the contrary of the first term (community). Conversely, a liberal perspective 
might move from the premise of community, then take distance from it (non-community), 
and finally reach the endpoint of an affirmation of the value of the individual. A position 
that actualizes the potential of “non-individual” into the reality of “community” might be 
identified as Gemeinschaft. Similarly, borrowing from Ferdinand Tönnies’ pair, Gesellschaft 
could describe the political goal of framing social relations not as the result of a primordial 
community, but as an association of individuals instead.  
The opposition between the left side of the square and the right side, between 
Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft, however, does not exhaust the possibility of sense (and of 
political sense, in particular) activated by the explosion of the opposition between individual 
and community. As I point out in Chapter IV, Wendy Brown has convincingly studied the 
emergence of the New Right in the United States as the intersection of “two disparate 
streams of rationality:” one, neoliberalism, aimed at emptying the world of meaning; the 
other, neoconservatism, aimed at fixing and enforcing meaning in the world.309
It is worth to pause briefly and reflect on the (much debated) issue of the degree of 
coherence of the alignment of communitarian and individualistic themes. Roberto Esposito 
focuses on the dominant paradigm of communitarianism and claims that it is, in fact, 
intimately coherent with the paradigm of individualism, as both are fundamentally immanent 
 On the 
semiotic square, I argue, the American New Right would occupy the top side, conglobating 
both individualistic and communitarian themes in a political project seemingly endowed 
more with political traction than with internal consistency.  
                                                 
309 See Wendy Brown, “American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-democratization,” in 
Political Theory, Vol. 34 No 6, December 2006, p. 692 
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in their commitments. Both individualism and communitarianism, in this analysis, postulate 
discrete objects (the individual and community, respectively) endowed with the characters of 
unity, continuity, and self-identity. Esposito maintains that communitarian discourse is based 
on a misconception, in that: 
 
[it] forces community into a conceptual language that radically alters it, while at the 
same time attempts to name it: that of the individual and totality; of identity and the 
particular; of the origin and the end; or more simply of the subject with its most 
unassailable metaphysical connotations of unity, absoluteness, and interiority. It isn’t 
by chance that beginning from similar assumptions, political philosophy tends to 
think community as a “wider subjectivity”; as, and this in spite of the presupposed 
opposition to the individualist paradigm, such a large part of neo-communitarian 
philosophy ends up doing, when it swells the self in the hypertrophic figure of “the 
unity of unities.”310
 
  
A deeper analogy connects the two items on the top side of the semiotic square, according 
to Esposito. At least in the kind of communitarian discourse that he indicts, “community” is 
still understood through the lenses of the “individual:” a coherent, self-identical and self-
contained whole. To the excess of immanence that, on Esposito’s analysis, characterizes the 
top side of the semiotic square corresponds the negation of immanence on the lower side: an 
area of political content loosely structured around the poles of “non-community” and “non-
individual.” Contrary to the discourse of Gesellschaft, this nebula of meaning denies that the 
individual is the pre-political and pre-grammatical original position of human nature. 
Contrary to the vision of Gemeinschaft, the lower side of the square is not committed to an 
essentialist notion of community. Neither individualistic, nor communitarian, and certainly 
not both, the lower side opens up a vast, and largely unexplored horizon for contemporary 
politics. For a compass to navigate this semantic field I now turn to Jean-Luc Nancy and his 
musings on the inoperative community. 
 
                                                 
 
310 Roberto Esposito, Communitas: The Origins and Destiny of Community (Stanford University Press, Stanford: 
2010), pp. 1-2 
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NEITHER INDIVIDUALISTIC, NOR COMMUNITARIAN: NANCY ON BEING-IN-COMMON 
In the quest for an alternative to the current hegemony of liberalism I have identified 
the “individual” and “community” as terms of a fundamental opposition for the field of 
politics. That opposition, I argue, needs to be problematized in order to account for the 
complexities of the arguments that sustain the contemporary ideological debates. Once 
exploded on the semiotic square, that couplet produces four possible configurations of 
political meaning, and crucially one that negates both the prevalent conceptualizations of the 
individual and that of community. What do human nature and social relations look like from 
such a perspective? What political implications can be drawn from it? Can this position 
configure a counter-hegemonic project that would be both alternative to liberalism, and 
crucially also desirable? I try addressing these questions in this section.  
As I argue in Chapters III and IV, liberalism has gained its dominant position in the 
contemporary ideoscape through the concurrent action of two phenomena: 1) the successful 
decontestation of certain key-terms; and 2) the validation of a certain grammar for the 
articulation of political discourse that goes beyond the enforcement of any single set of 
ideological propositions. Both at the level of content, and of expression, the discourse of 
liberalism critically hinges on the depoliticization of the “I:” the “I” of politics, the 
individual; and the “I” of language, the grammatical subject. Jean-Luc Nancy’s intervention 
in the contemporary reflection on community has the potential to destabilize both Is.  
The individual that liberalism assumes as the essential ontological position of human 
beings is for Nancy “merely the residue of the dissolution of community.”311 On the 
semiotic square, one could say, the trajectory of liberalism goes from community, to the 
negation of community (its dissolution), and finally to the individual. Community, on the 
other hand, is for Nancy not a property, but the inclination (clinamen) of the individual.312
                                                 
311 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 1991), p. 3 
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Characteristic of community thus understood is its resistance against immanence: 
“[c]ommunity [...] assumes the impossibility of its own immanence, the impossibility of a 
communitarian being in the form of a subject.”313
In fact, “[c]ommunity is simply the real position of existence:” being itself is always 
already being-in-common.
 In other words, Nancy rejects the view of 
an immanent community, a self-enclosed entity distinct from an outside. On Nancy’s 
account “community” does not designate a group of people to the exclusion of others (i.e.: 
French-Canadians vis-à-vis the rest of Canadian society), and neither does it come to refer to 
the aggregate totality of pre-existing individuals (in a social contractarian notion of society). 
314 There is literally no being outside of being-in-common, 
precisely because being-in-common is the essential condition of being. In a crucial passage, 
Nancy distinguishes between the affirmation of the being of community (the master plan of 
communitarianism), and the acknowledgment of the community of being, the inherently 
shared character of existence: “the question should be the community of being, and not the 
being of community. Or if you prefer: the community of existence, and not the essence of 
community.”315 There can be no essence of community, because essence (being) is always 
already in common among all the entities, the things that are: “That which exists, whatever 
this might be, coexists because it exists. The co-implication of existing [l’exister] is the sharing 
of the world.”316
The logic of being-with also presupposes a notion of singularity. Being-with entails 
“being exposed simultaneously to relationship and to the absence of relationship,” and 
 All the things that are, are; that much they have in common; their being is 
always being-with.  
                                                                                                                                                 
312 J.L. Nancy, The Inoperative Community, pp. 3-4  
 
313 J.L. Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p.15 
 
314 J.L. Nancy, “Of Being-in-Common,” in Miami Theory Collective, ed. by, Community At Loose Ends 
(University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis: 1991), p. 2 
 
315 J.L. Nancy, “Of Being-in-Common,” p. 2 
 
316 Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural (Stanford University Press, Stanford: 2000), p. 29 
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“singularity” designates “that which, each time, forms a point of exposure.”317
 
 Contra the 
fixed immanence that the dominant discourse attributes to the individual subject, therefore, 
singularities are continually reshaped and renegotiated, activated or left in latency.  
As an individual, I am closed off from all community, and it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that the individual – if an absolutely individual being could ever 
exist – is infinite. […] however, the singular being, which is not the individual, is the 
finite being. […] individuation detaches closed off entities from a formless ground 
[…] But singularity does not proceed from such a detaching of clear forms or 
figures.318
 
  
Thus Nancy on the one hand rejects the commitment to the being of community which is 
characteristic of communitarianism, in one form or another. On the other hand, he marks 
the difference between an ontology of individualism and an acknowledgment of singularity. 
Whereas individuals are self-contained cut-outs of community, separate from each other and 
introverted (in the sense of being oriented toward their internal reality, as opposed to the 
external world), singularities continue to carry in themselves the orientation toward 
community which characterizes being-in-common. The oscillation between singularity and 
being-in-common allows Nancy’s philosophy to account for a variety of political phenomena 
with an expressive versatility that is certainly lacking in the project of communitarianism, and 
that might be even superior to the political-expressive armamentarium of liberalism. 
Liberalism needs to “incorporate” non-liberal claims; the inoperative community always 
already contains them. In Benjamin Hutchens’s clear outline:  
 
Communitarianism in Nancy’s view is flawed by its presupposition of substantial 
groups composed of substantial individuals whose essence and being are 
ontologically predetermined (being-as-such) as well as rationally, politically and 
judicially pre-established. He also rejects the communitarian presumption of tradition 
as a necessary and viable means of communal identification. For Nancy, community 
                                                 
 
317 J.L. Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. 7 
 
318 J.L. Nancy, The Inoperative Community,  p. 27 
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consists of the linkages of sharing among radically singular beings whose only 
essence is a common exposure to existence.319
  
 
Moreover, unlike the narrative of community as a social construct, a la Anderson, Nancy’s 
community is real in that it is the real position of existence. The emergence of certain 
alternative political discourses, and in particular of liberalism, might obfuscate the reality of 
community, as I will argue in Chapter VI; but community is never to be socially constructed, 
created, or even restored (as Putnam would believe). Being-in-common and singularity are 
always already the real mode of existence, and overcoming the expressive infrastructures of 
liberalism and communitarianism is a crucial step in acknowledging that. Much like 
Esposito’s critique of communitarianism, then, Nancy’s argument also indicts the substance 
metaphysics that afflicts both communitarian and individualistic discourse. Instead Nancy 
looks at being in its simultaneous and mutually constitutive plural and singular dimensions. 
In doing so he also exposes the inadequacy of grammar to fix the polysemous meaning of 
being. In a passage reminiscent of Judith Butler’s reproof of “unfortunate grammar,” Nancy 
attempts freeing up meaning from the rigid (and distorting) constraints of grammar:  
 
Being singular plural: these three apposite words, which do not have any determinate 
syntax (“being” is a verb or a noun; “singular” and “plural” are nouns or adjectives; 
all can be rearranged in different combinations), mark an absolute equivalence, both 
in an indistinct and distinct way. Being is singularly plural and plurally singular […] 
the singular-plural constitutes the essence of Being.320
  
  
Juxtaposing the semantic fields of being, singular, and plural, without a definite structure of 
grammar to dictate their relations, this passage points to the potential (inherent in much of 
Nancy’s reflection) to overcome the expressive infrastructure of liberal grammar. Much like 
singularities differ from individuals in that they are always already oriented toward being-in-
common, regardless of the specific constraints and prescriptions which preside over 
                                                 
319 Benjamin Hutchens, Jean-Luc Nancy and the Future of Philosophy (McGill-Queen’s University Press, Montreal: 
2005), p. 124 
 
320 J.L Nancy, Being Singular Plural, pp. 28-29 
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interactions among individuals, so the semantic fields of being, singular, and plural are not 
self-contained units of a fixed grammar, in need of definite combinatory rules to associate, 
but they share porous boundaries, and their areas of meaning tend to overlap and to morph 
into each other. Contra what I identified in Chapters III and IV as the first principle of 
liberal discourse (“Individuals own their actions”), Nancy refuses to commit his ontology to 
the very construct of the individual, thus freeing action from its state subordinate to that of 
the individual agent in liberal grammar. Moreover, whereas what I listed as the second 
principle of liberal discourse would characterize the fundamental mode of action of 
individuals as rational, the very fiction of an abstract rationality cannot be reconciled with 
Nancy’s emphasis on the embodied character of the lived experience. Not only is liberal 
rationality left without a stable (if inert) shell, in that the individual is deconstructed; but, 
perhaps more significantly, Nancy also destabilizes the notion that reason takes precedence 
over other modes and motives for action: the passionate, the tactile, the corporeal itself.321 
Finally, contra the humanistic assumption of liberal grammar (which I presented as a third 
principle: “Objects are treated as inert matter”), the inoperative community does not 
necessarily postulate the human as its limit: “it is not obvious that the community of 
singularities is limited to ‘man’ and excludes, for example, the ‘animal’.”322
                                                 
321 See Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus (Fordham University Press, New York: 2008); see also Jacques Derrida, On 
Touching – Jean-Luc Nancy (Stanford University Press, Stanford: 2005) 
 Both the content 
and the expression of “being singular plural,” I argue, can potentially challenge the norms of 
liberal grammar and inspire an alternative mode for the configuration of meaning in the field 
of the political. Though Nancy does not set forth to oppose a positive vision of society and 
politics to the traditional continuum of communitarianism and individualism which he 
regards as inadequate to capture the deep ontology of the world, I argue that by questioning 
the existing coordinates he opens up room for other thinkers to build on his seminal 
intuitions of being-in-common and singularity. 
 
322 J.L. Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. 28 
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Contra the liberal hubris of fully sovereign individuals (a project epitomized by J.S. 
Mill’s confidence in the ability of a fully rational actor to even control and orient the 
development of its own individuality, as I note in Chapter III), singular beings are never 
singular to the exclusion of their being plural, and as such they are always defined by their 
finitude. As Nancy puts it: “Community does not sublate the finitude it exposes. Community itself, in 
sum, is nothing but this exposition. It is the community of finite beings, and as such it is itself a 
finite community [...] a community of finitude.”323 For Nancy “the singular being, which is not 
the individual, is the finite being.”324 Exposition of finitude reveals itself as “compearance,” 
the “appearance of the between as such,” and as such it constitutes “the essence of 
community.”325
An insightful reading of the “trope of finitude” is offered by Georges Van Den 
Abbeele. In Nancy “finitude is not a negativity to overcome, but an event to dwell in and 
upon, the very advent of a thought which can never do more than exscribe its 
compearance.”
 
326 In this sense being-in-common is “not itself a horizon, but the undoing of 
all horizons, namely a community founded upon the compearance of singular beings in the 
commonality of their difference.”327 Van Den Abbeele points to the poetic character of this 
thought, as, like in poetry, being-in-common entails “a making that is simultaneously an 
unmaking, a compearing of community that is also its withdrawal, an advent of sense in 
which sense is eclipsed, a speaking of what cannot be heard.”328
                                                 
 
 Can, however, Nancy’s 
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328 G. Van Den Abbeele, “Lost Horizons,” p. 17 
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“poetics” of community also invigorate a more general project of rethinking the political 
away from the hegemonic paradigm of liberalism and of its communitarian counterpoint?  
I argue that understanding community as “resistance to immanence” can indeed 
advance political discourse beyond the (false) dichotomy of individual and community.329
 
 A 
concrete example is helpful to clarify the sense in which the notions of “being-with” and 
“singularity” differ from those of “community” and “individual,” as they are typically 
utilized: 
To begin with, the logic of being-with corresponds to nothing other than what we 
would call the banal phenomenology of unorganized groups of people. Passengers in 
the same train compartment are simply seated next to each other in an accidental, 
arbitrary, and completely exterior manner. They are not linked. But they are also 
quite together inasmuch as they are travelers on this train, in this same space and for 
the same period of time. They are between the disintegration of the “crowd” and the 
aggregation of the group, both extremes remaining possible, virtual and near at every 
moment. This suspension is what makes “being-with”: a relation without relation, or 
rather, being exposed simultaneously to relationship and to absence of 
relationship.330
 
 
Passengers in the same train compartment; travelers on this train. Nancy’s metaphor of the 
train evokes quite vividly the significance of his intuition on being-with. The train is also the 
background to the unfolding of a remarkable narrative of community as the resistance to 
immanence, conveyed by the especially apt medium of cinema (for viewers in a theater too 
are like passengers on a train, traveling together without being a group through the unfolding 
of the narration). In Train de Vie [1998], the Romanian director Radu Mihaileanu dramatizes 
the tragicomic epopee of a Jewish village in 1941 Europe.331
                                                 
 
 Anxious about impending 
deportation to a concentration camp, the villagers decide to follow the plan devised by 
329 J.L. Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. 35 
 
330 J.L. Nancy, “Of Being-in-Common,” p. 7 
 
331 See film description on: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0170705/, retrieved on Thursday, August 5, 2010 
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Shlomo, the village “idiot:” faking their own deportation by acquiring a train and taking it to 
freedom beyond the border. In the process some of the Jews take on the role of Nazis, and 
eventually start increasingly to identify with their act, a device employed in the film both to 
comedic effects, and most importantly to expose the power of performativity and the 
absurdity of the (real) Nazis’ beliefs and practices.  
In a crescendo of absurdity, meant to underscore the unfathomable absurdity of the 
Nazi theories of race, the self-deporting Jews encounter a community of equally self-
deporting Romas (referred to as “Gypsies” in the film). A series of misunderstandings 
ensues, with the fake Nazis confronting each other to expose their respective inauthenticity, 
until the two communities recognize their respective ploys and decide to join forces. In a 
number of increasingly significant scenes, first the Rabbi allows pork on the train, thus 
contravening one of the basic rules of his community. Then young Jews and Romas become 
erotically involved with each other, thus attesting to the inclination of transcending the 
boundaries of their communities. Finally, in a scene of rare symbolic force, the two 
communities gather around the fire, and start playing their respective instruments in an 
impromptu display of mutual distrust; only to dissolve the very boundaries between their 
communities in an increasingly chaotic jouissance of sounds, chants, and firelight dances.  
On the same train by mere chance, the two communities of rejects come to obliterate 
the being of their respective communities, and to embrace their being-in-common instead. 
Though both Jews and Romas independently symbolize a threat to the Nazi moral order of a 
racially pure community attached to its land and culture, it is in their contamination that the 
Nazi totalitarian delirium is ultimately exposed and ridiculed without appeal. The victory of 
the inoperative community that acquires awareness of itself on the train over the immanent 
community of the Nazis is sanctioned in a coda, in which an extreme close-up of Shlomo’s 
face informs the viewers of the happy outcomes for the characters of the film, with the 
significant detail that most of the Romas end up in Palestine, the destination originally 
chosen by the Jews, and most of the Jews end up in India, where the Romas had planned to 
go, in an elegant deconstruction of the theme of the destiny/destination of community. 
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Except that in the very last scene of Train de Vie the camera zooms out and shows Shlomo 
behind barbwire, the image of bare life, wearing the typical uniform of the concentration 
camps, as a memento of the real atrocities of the Holocaust, and at the same time a 
commentary on the cathartic power of telling stories.  
Thus Train de Vie resists the immanence of community by displaying an alternative (if 
only fictional) politics of being-in-common. The train is the appropriate background for a 
symbolic journey that sublimates in the trajectory from community to non-community, and 
from individual to non-individual. The field of political meaning subtended by the poles of 
non-individual and non-community opens up the space of Nancy’s inoperative community, 
and as such it promises to constitute an alternative to both the discourses of liberalism and 
communitarianism, and a propitious horizon for the definition of a counter-hegemonic 
political project.  
  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have presented a possible account of what an alternative to the 
ideological and meta-ideological hegemony of liberalism might look like. Defining the 
specific characteristics of that alternative is certainly much too ambitious for the scope of 
this project. Nevertheless, I maintain that signaling the possibility of a counter-hegemonic 
political and discursive formation is an exigent task for contemporary political theory. 
Moreover, in my preliminary reflection I have also specified that the formidable challenge 
might be that of identifying a desirable alternative to liberalism. I have argued that Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s philosophy can indeed inspire a radical rethinking of the field of the political 
without trading the hegemony of liberalism for a less attractive one.  
In order to advance this argument, I have started by considering one of the most 
prominent recent formulations of a political project alternative to that of liberalism. To the 
liberal emphasis on the foundational value of the individual I have opposed a discourse 
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centered on the notion of community. In the polyphonic tradition of communitarianism I 
have identified certain key contributors. I have briefly considered Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
critique of the “emotivist self” and Michael Sandel’s critique of the “unencumbered self” as 
clear points of departure from the liberal commitment to an ontology of individualism 
toward notions of community as the reality of shared understandings. I have then presented 
Michael Walzer’s moral theory as a distributive model underscoring values like belonging, 
citizenship, and participation, and ultimately a peculiar argument for the incorporation of 
certain communitarian themes in society. In Charles Taylor’s philosophy, then, I have 
remarked the ambition of adapting the notion of community to the contemporary horizon 
of multiculturalism, and also, crucially, a gesture toward recognition as a dialogic process in 
which the authentic character of a group in society needs to be validated by others. 
Though Taylor’s vision already incorporated an element of social construction (in the 
form of recognition) to the constitution of community, I have argued that Benedict 
Anderson’s work on “imagined communities” represents a clear break from essentialist 
visions of community. Imagined as sovereign and limited, the nation is for Anderson the 
archetype of a community that comes into existence and becomes aware of itself as a system 
of shared understandings because of a complex interplay of historical, cultural, and crucially 
also economic factors. Capitalism and the diffusion of ever more efficient printing 
technologies are of paramount importance for Anderson in allowing the national community 
to be imagined. If economic motives and the emergence of national languages are key factors 
in this version of social construction, on James Scott’s account it is instead the state that 
codifies language in order to make citizens “legible,” thus also promoting the diffusion of 
the idea of the national community. Pascale Casanova, finally, looks at Italy and traces back 
the idea of the national community to the codification of a national language in the literary 
example of Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio.  
In both its essentialist and socially constructed versions, the discourse of community is 
typically presented in opposition to the discourse centered on the individual. I have argued 
that the oppositional couplet individual-community can instead be exploded on the semiotic 
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square thus producing the semantic areas of non-individual and non-community. In this 
sense I have referred to a social arrangement that mobilizes the negation of the individual 
toward the affirmation of community as Gemeinschaft, while Gesellschaft would come to 
designate the negation of community for the affirmation of the individual. Moreover, I have 
argued that the discourse of the American New Right is committed to both the values of 
community and the individual, as Wendy Brown has observed. Rather than being merely the 
function of a contingent alignment, I have argued with Roberto Esposito that this is possible 
because of the common commitment to a substantialist, immanentist metaphysics of both 
the dominant notions of individual and community.  
Finally, I have postulated that a clear political alternative to the contemporary hegemony 
of liberal discourse exists in the semantic area of non-individual and non-community. In this 
context I have introduced Jean-Luc Nancy’s reflection on the “inoperative community” as a 
promising foundation for this counter-hegemonic project. Redressing the emphasis from the 
“being of community” to the “community of being,” Nancy distances himself from the 
tradition of communitarianism, and instead advances a radical view of community as 
resistance to immanence: not the community of “us” vs. “them,” and neither an aggregation 
of primordial individuals. Assuming, with Nancy, “being-in-common” as the real position of 
existence configures “singularity” as a point of exposure of that being. In the oscillation 
between singularity and being-in-common, I have argued, there lies the potential for a 
discourse more versatile than that of incorporative liberalism, and at the same time a political 
horizon radically irreducible to the totalitarian menaces that often haunt critics of liberalism.  
If Nancy’s intuition of being-in-common as the real position of existence is accepted as 
the foundation of an ontology of resistance to immanence, and if the discourse of being-in-
common and singularity can indeed be a taken as a promising point of departure for the 
formulation of an alternative to liberalism, then it becomes the urgent task of contemporary 
political theorists to reflect on how this political project can be implemented, and with what 
kinds of political implications. This is the question that I want to raise in the next chapter. 
Without being able to provide a definitive answer to it, I intend to study the concrete 
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practices of the inoperative community in the complex dynamics subtended by the 
encounter with the other in an experience of migration. Can two communities, the locals and 
the immigrants, transcend the being of their respective communities and embrace their 
being-in-common instead? Under what conditions? At what costs? And, crucially, what 
expressive infrastructure is available for making sense of an experience that unfolds in the 
performativity of actions that cannot be traced back to unitary, immanent subjects? These 
are some of the questions that I raise in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
INOPERATIVE COMMUNITIES IN ACTION 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In this project I have posited that political ideologies can be fruitfully regarded as 
narrative objects. As such, the genre of political ideology exhibits certain recurrent structural 
elements. In particular, as I point out in Chapter I, in the unfolding of ideological discourse 
it is possible to distinguish a descriptive element from a normative one, and finally an action-
oriented component. An ideology typically tells a story about the world of politics that 
moves from the premise of a description of the status quo, aimed at identifying certain 
aspects of it that are deemed unsatisfactory. Then an ideology continues developing its 
argument by juxtaposing to the status quo the view of a different social arrangement which 
can overcome the shortcomings of the present, and which can be realistically attained in the 
future. In its action-oriented dimension, then, an ideology includes a more or less concrete 
plan for implementing its normative goals onto the reality of society. As I note in Chapter II, 
in developing this standard narrative, the discourse of ideology produces effects of truth that 
can be unveiled by adopting instruments of semiotic analysis.  
In Chapters II and III I have observed how, in the contemporary world of Western 
politics, the discursive styles of liberalism exercise a multilayered form of hegemony. On the 
one hand, liberalism is the dominant ideology in its own right: its values, principles, and 
goals seem to be broadly accepted as the norm of political discourse. On the other hand, I 
argue, liberalism is also hegemonic as a meta-ideology: even political positions that cannot be 
reduced to the articulation of liberal content, typically frame their arguments in the language 
of liberalism. Liberalism exercises its hegemony both at the level of political content and, 
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perhaps more fundamentally, at the level of expression. Consequently, I argue, the grammar 
of liberalism, the distinctive configurations of meaning that it employs, become an object of 
political relevance in their own right.  
Adopting the very scheme of ideological discourse that I outline above, I describe the 
hegemony of a liberal constellation as problematic. Challenging the thesis of an inevitable, or 
even natural character of the hegemony of liberal discourse, I reflect in Chapter IV on the 
feasibility and desirability of a counter-hegemonic project. In particular I present Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s musings on the inoperative community as both a clear alternative to the liberal 
ontology of individualism, and, unlike most communitarian positions, also as a desirable one. 
The oscillation between the poles of being-in-common and singularity endows Nancy’s 
formulation with the versatility necessary for articulating a vast repertoire of political 
positions without foreclosing the horizon of what can be said or even thought in the 
universe of the political.  
After having presented my description of the complex hegemony of liberalism, and a 
normative view for a counter-hegemonic project, in this chapter my goal is to reflect on what 
kinds of actions can support the actualization of that project. It should be noted here that 
Nancy’s own philosophy is not presented as a set of normative aspirations. The inoperative 
community is for Nancy always already the real position of existence, and not something to 
create, revive, restore. Nevertheless, I argue that it is possible to draw inspiration from 
Nancy’s ontology and derive from it the genuinely political goal of organizing our 
understanding of social relations according to that paradigm. Though being-in-common and 
singularity are currently obfuscated by the dominant discourses of communitarianism and 
individualism, respectively, I maintain that it is possible to identify social practices and values 
congruent with a deep ontology of resistance to immanence.  
In particular, in this chapter, I consider the principle and the concrete practices of 
hospitality as a sounder alternative to the liberal value of toleration as a strategy for the 
encounter with the other. Whereas toleration remains trapped in the language of immanence 
typical of individualism, I argue that hospitality has the potential to transcend it. On the one 
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hand, whereas toleration congeals the mutual otherness of the tolerating and tolerated 
parties, and thus ultimately gives up on the possibility to fully encounter the other, 
hospitality continuously transcends and renegotiates the boundaries between the two parties. 
On the other hand, whereas the ideal and practices of domination would resolve the relation 
of otherness once and for all, with the eradication of otherness in favor of one party, at the 
expenses of the other, hospitality requires continuously exchanging positions in a dialogic 
and open-ended process. Hospitality constitutes a convenient entry point in the discourse of 
singularity and being-in-common.  
As a concrete example of hospitality I illustrate the case of Badolato, a small town in 
southern Italy, where a group of undocumented Kurdish immigrants landed in 1997. Contra 
the dominant paradigm of toleration, and contra both the dominant discourses of liberalism 
and communitarianism, the local population and the immigrants engaged in practices of 
hospitality that resulted in an ongoing process of mutual constitution and deconstruction of 
their respective otherness. Without either dissolving their otherness in a composite common 
identity, or shielding it from the impact of their interactions, Badolatese and Kurds alike 
embraced the primordial, non socially constructed, ontology of the inoperative community 
and thus showed the promise and the potential of a political discourse irreducible to either 
the content or the grammar of hegemonic liberalism. In this chapter I present some 
reflections based on a series of open-ended interviews that I conducted in Badolato in the 
summer of 2007.  
It should be noted that I do not claim that either the general discourse of hospitality, or, 
a fortiori, the specific case of Badolato can by themselves sustain the effort of rethinking the 
political away from a liberal paradigm. This would not be a sensible claim to make, and 
posing the question of an alternative to the hegemony of liberalism in these terms might 
even prove counterproductive. A discursive alternative to liberalism does not exist in a 
ready-made form, waiting to be discovered. To the extent that it is indeed possible and 
desirable, it needs to be thought into existence (as Slavoj Žižek would recommend), or rather 
written into existence (as both Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy would put it). In 
 195 
 
keeping with the narrative structure of ideology that I have loosely adopted for this project, 
my goal in this final section is to create effects of truth that would question the hegemony of 
liberal discourse, and open up the possibility for alternative formulations of political 
meaning. Whether or not this attempt can succeed, I believe it is the task of political theory 
to engage in this intellectual divertissement, literally a diversion from the main path of 
politics.  
 
 
DRAWING BOUNDARIES, QUESTIONING THEM: FROM TOLERATION TO HOSPITALITY 
In order to understand the specificity of the value of toleration as a strategy for coping 
with otherness, it is necessary to consider the peculiar cultural and historical background 
from which it emerged. Both as an ideal, and as a series of concrete practices, “tolerating 
others” needs to be located in the context of Europe at the onset of modernity. Until the 
inception of modernity, in fact, the very coordinates of the space of Europe seem to resist an 
acknowledgment of otherness. As Michael Heffernan has observed: “The shift from a 
premodern to an early modern consciousness seems to have been accompanied by a 
movement from vertical (religious) conceptions of sacred space to horizontal (secular) 
notions of geographical space.”332
Over the course of the centuries, in fact, a series of profound cultural, political and 
economic transformations literally rotated the dominant orientation of European space. First, 
the diffusion of heretical sects; then, the Anglican Schism; and finally – and decisively – the 
Protestant Reform challenged the religious monolithism that was the logical presupposition 
of a vertical spatiality. Doctrinal fragmentation relativized the uncontested centrality of the 
 The tilting of the main axis of space, from vertical to 
horizontal, from religious to secular, signals a paradigmatic shift in the European 
spatialization of otherness.  
                                                 
332 Michael Heffernan, The Meaning of Europe: Geography and Geopolitics (Arnold, New York: 1998), p. 14 
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Church that called itself “Catholic,” universal, and so introduced an element of horizontality in 
space. 
The introduction of otherness called into question the previous cohesion of the 
religious and crucially political unit of “Christendom,” and recast it into a composite geo-
cultural unit named “Europe.” Faced with the necessity of acknowledging the existence of 
otherness within Europe, whereas they were used to sameness under Christendom, the 
peoples of Europe were left disoriented and unable to make sense of the mutated scenario. 
Frequently they resorted to conflictual means: the annihilation of others became the 
fundamental strategy for coping with otherness.  
A series of Religious Wars ensued on the battleground of France, wrecking the 
continent for more than thirty years in the 16th century, until the promulgation of the Edict 
of Nantes in 1598.333
The logical prerequisite of toleration was the reciprocal recognition of a relation of 
otherness between two (or more) discrete entities. What kinds of subjects does toleration 
presuppose? At the level of the relations among single human beings, the emergent 
discourse of liberalism devises the category of the individual as the ideal repository of rights, 
and significantly the right to be tolerated and to tolerate others in turn. As such the 
 Out of the experience of these wars, a new way of engaging others was 
forged. Tired of killing each other, the peoples of Europe ideally reached a truce and settled 
on a shared value – the simple value of not killing each other in spite of each other’s 
otherness. By reaction to the massacres of the Religious Wars, the practice of tolerance was 
devised. As such, toleration, to the extent that it was codified into a coherent principle, was 
not regarded as a high moral aspiration, but as a concrete modus vivendi, literally a way of 
living, without killing each other. This was a contingent agreement elevated into a sort of 
meta-norm of coexistence. As the etymology of the Latin tolerare attests, it was closer to the 
semantic area of forbearance, endurance, suffering than to a genuine endorsement of 
otherness. 
                                                 
333 See Norman Davies, Europe: A History (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1996), pp. 469-575 
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individual is constructed as the subject of a conscious self capable to entertain relations with 
other selves without threatening the respective indivisibility. As I argue in Chapter III, John 
Locke’s crucial intervention in the articulation of the discourse of liberalism can be 
understood as the formulation of a proposal of “semiotic individualism.” Rational beings 
and sources of valid claims, Lockean individuals derive the ability to access their individuality 
and their rationality from the expressive infrastructure provided by the linguistic 
communities to which they belong.  
In an effort to reconcile a commitment to individual reason with a profound religiosity, 
Locke also advances the classic philosophical justification for toleration. In the Letter 
Concerning Toleration he establishes that “the care of souls does not belong to the magistrate,” 
but that instead “the care […] of every man’s soul belongs unto himself and is to be left unto 
himself.”334
 
 Enforcing religious conformism by political decree, in fact, would not only be 
idle, as the care of souls always requires the genuine adhesion of the individual to that 
project, but it would also be harmful:  
Whatsoever is not done with that assurance of faith is neither well in itself, nor can it 
be acceptable to God. To impose such things, therefore, upon any people, contrary 
to their own judgment, is in effect to command them to offend God, which, 
considering that the end of all religion is to please Him, and that liberty is essentially 
necessary to that end, appears to be absurd beyond expression.335
 
 
In Locke’s reasoning, then, toleration is not just a modus vivendi on this earth; it becomes also 
the best strategy available for pursuing the goal of eternal salvation in the afterlife. 
Toleration, though, cannot guarantee that the outcome of its practices will be the salvation 
of the souls of the parties entering the relation. This is evident in a passage in the Letter in 
which Locke considers the free and reasonable individual that he has postulated and raises 
the question: “But what if he neglect the care of his soul?” to which he responds that much 
                                                 
334 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration [1689] (Bobbs-Merrill, New York: 1955), pp. 29-30  
 
335 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, pp. 35-36 
 198 
 
like “No man can be forced to be rich or healthful, whether he will or no,” so, a fortiori, 
“God Himself will not save men against their wills.”336
As a strategy for coping with otherness at the level of single human beings, then, 
toleration assumes individuals as its subjects, and responds to the goal of leaving those 
individuals intact, unfettered by the encounter with the other. At the level of the relations 
among organized political communities, the principle of toleration also postulates a specific 
category of subjects. In 1576 French jurist Jean Bodin published the fundamental Six Books 
of the Commonwealth, advancing sovereignty as the essential characteristic of the state.
 Toleration, in other words, entails the 
risk that an individual’s soul will not be saved; in fact it ultimately gives up on the possibility 
of saving that soul. In general, in erecting a barrier between the individual and the external 
world, for the sake of the defense of the individual, Lockean toleration gives up on creating 
the conditions for a profound encounter with the other. Though the paradigm of liberal 
toleration clearly evolves since Locke’s original codification of it, this aspect appears to 
remain at the core of the concept.  
337 The 
notion of “absolute and perpetual power” over a defined territory was the natural 
complement to the ideal of toleration. In order to engage another political community in a 
relation of mutual recognition, a state crucially needed to affirm its own identity by 
reinforcing claims to sovereignty. This dynamic, distinctive of a space that had become 
horizontal and parceled, was to find its most notable expression in 1648, with the signing of 
the Peace of Westphalia. The enunciation of the principle “Cuius Regio, Eius Religio” was to 
shape the relations among states in an order dictated by reciprocal toleration, while 
sanctioning the principle of sovereignty as the basic grammar for internal affairs.338
Both at the level of free and rational individuals, then, and at the level of sovereign 
national communities, toleration emerges in the discourse of early liberalism as the 
 
                                                 
336 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, p. 30 
 
337 See: Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty: Six Books of the Commonwealth (Basil Blackwell, Oxford: 1955) 
 
338 See Norman Davies, Europe: A History, p. 485 
 199 
 
distinctively modern modality for dealing with others. In both arenas toleration assumes 
stable subjects to enter and exit the tolerating relation without being affected by it. 
Compared to the practices of domination and possible annihilation of the other, toleration 
certainly represents an appealing alternative. With the advent of a new paradigm of 
liberalism, preoccupied not just with the protection of the individual, but also with its 
development, a conception advanced most notably by John Stuart Mill in the 19th century, the 
availability of difference in society came to be praised as a potential source for the 
improvement of the individual and of society at large.339
However, neither in the original Lockean, protective acception; nor, arguably, in its 
Millite, developmental elaboration, does liberal discourse fully investigate the ethical 
dimension of the encounter with the other. The value of toleration, and perhaps even the 
critical engagement of diversity recommended by Mill, articulate rather an etiquette of 
behavior, a set of norms and rules for encountering the other without risking mutual 
annihilation and, if possible, even enhancing one’s individuality. The ontological primacy of 
the individual remains uncontested, and the possibility of deconstructing the constitutive 
elements of one’s own individuality and recombining them in creative ways is also left 
unexplored.  
 In Mill’s view of society as a 
“marketplace of ideas,” the cultivation of diversity plays a crucial role in allowing good 
arguments to emerge and displace bad ones. Consequently, the existence of particularity in 
the private sphere is to be tolerated or even encouraged, by leaving the carriers of non-
conformist values and models of behavior free to profess their eccentricity. 
Wendy Brown has engaged tolerance in a systematic and rigorous critique. In 
deconstructing the notion of tolerance and its centrality in the liberal constellation of values 
as a “discourse of power,” Brown demystifies the vulgate of tolerating as a high moral 
stance: 
                                                 
339 see C.B. Macpherson, The Life And Times Of Liberal Democracy (Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1977), p. 44 
and ff. 
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Despite its pacific demeanor, tolerance is an internally unharmonious term, blending 
together goodness, capaciousness, and conciliation with discomfort, judgment, and 
aversion. Like patience, tolerance is necessitated by something one would prefer did 
not exist. It involves managing the presence of the undesirable, the tasteless, the 
faulty – even the revolting, repugnant, or vile […] As compensation, tolerance 
anoints the bearer with virtue, with standing for a principled act of permitting one’s 
principles to be affronted; it provides a gracious way of allowing one’s tastes to be 
violated. It offers a robe of modest superiority in exchange for yielding.340
 
  
Looking under that “robe of modest superiority,” Brown finds “discomfort, judgment, and 
aversion.” She finds power wielded by one party over the other, and no attempt at 
renegotiating the boundaries of what might unite or divide the two parties. The discourse of 
tolerance starts by postulating the existence otherness (in religious, cultural, or gendered 
terms) and then devises “a mode of incorporating and regulating the presence of the 
threatening Other within.”341
 
 In other words, “incorporating and regulating” amount for 
Brown to practices of disciplinary power akin to those envisioned by Foucault:  
[the] regulatory individuation of the deviant, the abject, the other, suggests a further 
implication of the normalizing work of contemporary tolerance discourse. Tolerated 
individuals will always be those who deviate from the norm, never those who uphold 
it […] Tolerance can thus work as a disciplinary strategy of liberal individualism to 
the extent that it tacitly schematizes the social order into the tolerated, who are 
individuated through their deviance […] and those doing the tolerating, who are less 
individuated by these norms.342
  
 
The act of tolerating, then, can be exploded into the two structural positions that it 
presupposes: tolerating and being tolerated. The active subject of toleration, often styled as 
magnanimous and “liberal,” in fact disciplines the passive object of toleration by marking it 
with the stigma of not conforming to the norms. As a result, the discourse of tolerance 
                                                 
340 Wendy Brown, Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire (Princeton University Press, 
Princeton: 2006), p. 25 
 
341 Wendy Brow, Regulating Aversion, p. 27 
 
342 Wendy Brow, Regulating Aversion, p. 44 
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“strengthens the hegemony of dominant or unmarked identity.”343
 
 Moreover, toleration also 
reifies concepts of identity and difference that are instead the product of social construction. 
Focusing in particular on the role of the state, Clarissa Hayward has noted: 
Toleration is a decidedly reactive answer to questions of identity\difference; it 
recommends state action and inaction in response to extant forms of social 
difference. By definition, it fails to attend to – indeed it deflects attention away from 
– the role states play in making, remaking, and reinforcing social definitions of 
identity\difference.344
 
 
Toleration does not call into question the articulations of difference that the state constructs. 
However, as Hayward concludes, the state can take a proactive role in “making difference 
differently,” as “[a]n adequate democratic response requires, not simply tolerating, 
recognizing, or deliberating across extant forms of difference, but working to change the 
processes through which difference-defining boundaries are made and remade.”345
From a different perspective, Michael Walzer denounces the risks of what he calls 
“postmodern toleration.” “In immigrant societies,” he observes, “people have begun to 
experience what we might think of as a life without clear boundaries and without secure or 
singular identities.”
 
Questioning the premise that the subjects of toleration be left unaffected by the tolerating 
relation, Hayward points in fact to the overcoming of toleration.  
346 In this context “tolerance begins at home,” and sometimes even 
within “our own hyphenated or divided selves.” 347
                                                 
343 Wendy Brow, Regulating Aversion, p. 46 
 This is problematic because, according to 
Walzer, “in the first generation of mixed families and divided selves […] everyone still 
 
344 Clarissa Hayward, “The Difference States Make: Democracy, Identity, and the American City,” in APSR, 
Vol. 97, No. 4, November 2003, p. 503 
 
345 Clarissa Hayward, “The Difference States Make,” p. 512 
 
346 Michael Walzer, On Toleration (Yale University Press, New Haven: 1997) p. 87 
 
347 Michael Walzer, On Toleration, p. 87 
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remembers, and perhaps longs for, more coherent communities and a more unified 
consciousness.”348
Grounding the debate on toleration in the concrete setting of our immigrant societies is 
undoubtedly a necessary move in today’s world; and Walzer is certainly right in exposing the 
risks that might be associated with changes in the dominant paradigms of toleration. 
Nevertheless, the opposition of toleration and intolerance does not exhaust the possibilities 
disclosed by questioning the value of toleration. If it is possible to question the value of 
individualism without necessarily ending up with outcomes that deny the freedom of single 
human beings, as I have argued in Chapter V, then perhaps it is also possible to question the 
value of toleration without reaching intolerant conclusions.  
 Likely outcomes of this longing are, for Walzer, sentiments of 
fundamentalism and intolerance.  
Once again, the semiotic square may prove helpful in questioning the false dichotomy 
toleration-intolerance, by exploding the possibility of sense entailed by the opposition 
between toleration and the alternative value of hospitality (see Figure 5). The contradictory 
of “toleration,” in fact, does not necessarily imply “intolerance.” “Non-toleration” might as 
well be actualized in the practices and value of “hospitality.” Though liberal discourse often 
employs the rhetorical artifice of overcoding to suggest that outside of toleration there can 
only be intolerance, the discourse of hospitality may displace this misconception.  
 
  
                                                 
 
348 Michael Walzer, On Toleration, p. 88 
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Figure 5. The Semiotic Square: Toleration vs. Hospitality 
 
 
 
 
 
Toleration, in fact, while almost naturalized in the modern episteme by the hegemonic 
discourse of liberalism, is not the only strategy of peaceful encounter with the other that 
Europe has historically conceived. A long, uninterrupted if at times silenced, tradition 
stretches all the way from ancient Greece, where the guest was considered “sacred,” and as 
such protected by Zeus Xénios and Athena Xénia, to contemporary philosophy. Jacques 
Derrida has theorized of hospitality as a project of ethical responsibility. This is how he frames 
the issue: 
 
That is where the question of hospitality begins: must we ask the foreigner to 
understand us, to speak our language, in all the senses of this term, in all its possible 
extensions, before being able and so as to be able to welcome him into our 
country?349
 
 
As such, the concept of hospitality is characterized by a constitutive aporia, an insoluble and 
paradoxical contradiction in its meaning. In Derrida’s own words, “[w]e will always be 
threatened by this dilemma between, on the one hand, unconditional hospitality that 
dispenses with law, duty, or even politics, and, on the other, hospitality circumscribed by law 
and duty.”350
                                                 
349 Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality, trans. R. Bowlby (Stanford University Press, 
Stanford: 2000), p. 15  
 Absolute, unconditional hospitality, that he calls “hyperbolical,” the readiness 
 
350 Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality, p. 135 
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to welcome any number of unknown others, is not, strictly speaking a possibility. Yet, it 
always entertains a relation of tension with the opposite polarity of absolute closure. These 
contradictions, in turn, according to Derrida, do not weaken hospitality, or make it 
impossible, but, on the contrary, are its very pre-conditions. An element of regulation and an 
element of dispassionate openness are the fundamental components of hospitality.  
On the one hand, the prerequisite for hospitality is the mastery of one’s own house, 
country or nation. In order to be hospitable, one needs to have the power to host, one needs 
to be in control. This controlling attitude is deployed both at the level of one’s own self-
identity, and as a form of control over those who are being hosted. On the other hand, a 
suspension of the judgment and control in regard to who is eligible to become a guest is 
itself a constitutive element of genuine, disinterested hospitality. This loss of control calls 
into question the “master-slave” relation that is a necessary condition of hospitality, making 
the whole concept riddled with tensions and contradictions.  
The value of hospitality, one might argue, is not in and of itself incompatible with a 
liberal political order. In fact, one of the most influential vindications of hospitality in 
modern philosophy has been offered by Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace of 1795. Kant 
outlines his program for organizing the world of international relations in accordance with 
the principles of the Enlightenment, thus creating the conditions for solving disputes among 
countries without resorting to violent means. After detailing a series of “Preliminary 
Articles,” the essay culminates with three “Definitive Articles,” intended as the backbone for 
governing the world after the end of all wars. The third definitive article states: “The Law of 
World Citizenship Shall Be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality.” Kant explains: 
 
Hospitality means the right of a stranger not to be treated as an enemy when he 
arrives in the land of another. One may refuse to receive him when this can be done 
without causing his destruction; but, so long as he peacefully occupies his place, one 
may not treat him with hostility. It is not the right to be a permanent visitor that one 
may demand. A special beneficent agreement would be needed in order to give an 
outsider a right to become a fellow inhabitant for a certain length of time. It is only a 
right of temporary sojourn, a right to associate, which all men have. They have it by 
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virtue of their common possession of the surface of the earth, where, as a globe, they 
cannot infinitely disperse and hence must finally tolerate the presence of each other. 
Originally, no one had more right than another to a particular part of the earth.351
 
 
More than an echo of Locke’s argument about the original commonality of the earth for all 
humankind is audible in this passage. “Strangers” are to be treated “without hostility,” unless 
it is possible to “refuse to receive” them without “causing [their] destruction.” Human 
beings, in sum, “must finally tolerate the presence of each other.” In Kant’s liberal 
formulation, then, hospitality seems to amount to a form of toleration enhanced by (limited, 
conditional, temporary) mobility. It is more a “negative” right (visiting other countries 
without impediments) than a “positive” one (encountering the other in the process).  
Derrida’s project of hospitality, on the other hand, acknowledges the inherent tensions 
of the encounter with the other; but unlike the politics of tolerance (or, arguably, Kant’s 
hospitality), it does not purport to overcome these tensions once and for all by “freezing” 
the otherness of the respective parties. With toleration, for Derrida, the actual encounter 
with the other is continually deferred: toleration amounts to avoiding any meaningful 
engagement with the other. There is, instead, a dynamic dimension to hospitality, a dialogic 
interaction in which the “I” and Thou” continuously trade places while constituting their 
relation. Though they do not end up exchanging their identities once and for all (the “I” 
becoming “Thou;” the host becoming guest), through practices of hospitality the two parties 
learn to destabilize their roles, to not take them as necessary features of their identities. The 
two parties engage in a mutual renegotiation of their identities in which their initial otherness 
(“discomfort, judgment, and aversion,” in Brown’s analysis) has the potential of developing 
into a more nuanced appreciation of their singularities and being-in-common. Thus 
Derrida’s hospitality seems to gesture toward Nancy’s inoperative community. 
The action of tolerating, on the other hand, necessarily requires an active, tolerating 
party, and a passive, tolerated party, as Brown indicates. The grammar itself of toleration, I 
                                                 
351 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay (Swan Sonneschein & Co., London: 1905), pp. 137-138  
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add, presupposes a fixed subject and a fixed object. The relation of hospitality, on the other 
hand, prefigures two actants, host and guest, that are both equally active and passive as their 
relation unfolds. The very couplet host-guest can in fact be rendered by the same word in 
some languages, signaling the potential for the transposition of meaning in these two 
positions: hôte in French; ospite in Italian; huésped in Spanish. As Derrida points out, in the 
unfolding of the relation of hospitality, the guest comes to occupy, if only symbolically, the 
position of the host: 
 
So it is indeed the master, the one who invites, the inviting host, who becomes the 
hostage—and who really always has been. And the guest, the invited hostage, 
becomes the one who invites the one who invites, the master of the host. The guest 
becomes the host’s host. The guest (hote) becomes the host (hote) of the host (hote).352
 
 
The boundaries between host and guest thus are continuously transgressed. The host 
becomes guest, and the guest becomes host. In the beginning of a relation of hospitality a 
guest is (literally or metaphorically) invited into the host’s house. At first the guest might be 
shy to even get a glass of water, and might ask permission, thus reinforcing the host’s claim 
to sovereignty. Slowly the guest might start to make herself “at home.” Eventually she might 
choose to thank the host by cooking for him, thus “inviting him over” for dinner, in his own 
house. As the relation of hospitality unfolds such reversals of position may continue, without 
ever settling on a fixed relation between an active and a passive party.  
During the relation of hospitality, moreover, the host and guest (at any point in time) 
are encouraged, if not quite required to engage each other in a process of mutual 
understanding. Much like it would be impolite to attend dinner and not engage in 
conversation with one’s hosts/guests, likewise hospitality presupposes an ethics of curiosity 
toward the other, an inclination to acknowledge the other as a member of the same 
community of being. Toleration, on the other hand, renounces the possibility of 
                                                 
352 Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality, p. 125 
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acknowledging the commonality between one’s self and the other, thus locking one’s identity 
in an artificial, insular universe (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Toleration vs. Hospitality 
Toleration Hospitality 
static dynamic 
fixed transformative 
disengaged engaged 
 
In conclusion, I regard the kind of hospitality envisioned by Derrida as a feasible and 
desirable alternative to the paradigm of liberal toleration. On the one hand, hospitality is 
dynamic: it thrives on the tensions that define it, and transverses them. On the other hand, 
toleration is static: it purports to resolve once and for all the tension inherent in the 
encounter with the other. On the one hand, hospitality can be a transformative relation: it 
starts with a clearly defined host-guest relation, but then continually renegotiates its 
boundaries. On the other hand, toleration is a fixed relation: it shelters the respective 
identities of the tolerating party and the tolerated party in an inherently unequal relation. On 
the one hand, hospitality can be actively engaged with the other, without attempting to deny 
otherness, but continually participating in its undoing and reinvention. On the other hand, 
toleration is disengaged, not curious about the other, and chooses to give up on the 
opportunity of truly meeting the other.  
Hospitality, I argue, is the modality of encounter with the other typical of the 
inoperative community. Hosts and guests, in their continuous transposition of roles, 
maintain their singularities while at the same time experiencing the community of their being 
in the plasticity of their relation. Their mutual engagement, or even curiosity toward each 
other, signals a fundamental inclination toward community. Finally, the dynamic nature of 
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hospitality is congruent with the “resistance to immanence” that defines Nancy’s 
community. Like the inoperative community designs a radical alternative to the liberal 
ontology of liberalism, so hospitality is alternative to the value of liberal toleration. The most 
vivid illustrations of both hospitality and the inoperative community in general, it would 
seem, are to be found where the hold of liberal hegemony is less stringent. To the cultural 
periphery of liberal modernity, and to the geographical periphery of Europe I now turn for 
an illustration of the practices of hospitality in the community of Badolato, in southern Italy.  
 
 
THE HOSPITABLE COMMUNITY: MEETING THE OTHER IN KURDOLATO 
The eponymous myth of Europe evokes the forcible relocation of the Phoenician 
princess Europa, raped by Zeus under the semblance of a bull. A similar pattern of 
expansion, westward and north, marks the route on which clandestine immigrants embark in 
their journey of hope from the Global South toward Italy or Spain and from there to the 
affluent countries of northern Europe. European attitudes towards those unwelcome 
immigrants generally range from outspoken hostility (often times embellished with unhidden 
racist overtones) to compassionate toleration (whose humane concerns often disguise the 
dominant desire of being left alone, not bothered by the others).  
As of the end of 1997, Europeans became aware of a different possibility associated 
with the relocation of foreigners on their continent. The events that were to gather media 
attention from all corners of Europe happened in a forgotten town in southern Italy, one 
stricken with poverty and depopulation, and both geographically and culturally peripheral to 
the project of modernity articulated by liberalism. Founded in the 11th century by the 
Normans of Robert Guiscard, Badolato is a typical village on the top of a hill that thrived for 
centuries and became an important fortress in the defense of the coast from the attacks of 
the Saracens. However, by the end of the 20th century Badolato was experiencing a condition 
of seemingly irreversible decline typical of many small villages in southern Italy and in other 
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areas of the country. Those Badolatese who did not find work in the borgo, or in the newly 
constructed Badolato Marina (a neighborhood located on the Ionian coast about six 
kilometers from the historic center) have emigrated elsewhere, including to the bigger cities 
of the region, the industrial areas of northern Italy, various destinations in northern Europe, 
or as a last resort to Australia and the Americas.  
In general, the history of emigration is an intensely dramatic chapter of the Italian 20th 
century. A social and demographic cataclysm, in many ways it has forged the country, or at 
least most areas if it, more than any other economic, political or cultural transformation. 
Crude numbers certainly fail to convey a sense of the impact of this profoundly disruptive 
phenomenon. Yet, they may suggest the dominant patterns of this epochal shift: 
 
[Emigration] took a number of different forms, the most dramatic of which was 
emigration overseas, to the Americas and Australia. Between 1946 and 1957 the 
numbers of those leaving Italy for the New World exceeded by 1,100,000 the 
numbers of those returning [...] In the Calabrian villages, South America in particular 
was dubbed ’e d’u scuordo, ‘the land of forgetting.’  
Another pattern of emigration, of a rather different sort, was to north Europe. 
Between 1946 and 1957 the numbers heading north exceeded by 840,000 the 
numbers of those who came back: France took the lion’s share (381,000), followed 
by Switzerland (202,000) and Belgium (159,000). The emigrants to these countries 
tended to go for shorter periods, on six-month or one year contracts, and regarded 
work abroad as a temporary rather than a permanent solution to their problems.353
 
  
Whereas in some cases the move to Northern Italy was only temporary and seasonal in 
nature (often regarding young men, both married and unmarried), in the vast majority of 
cases those leaving Badolato were never to return to their hometown. At any rate, the 
population declined dramatically – from 7,000 to 700 people according to some estimates – 
in few decades, as the emptying out of the town only left behind a rearguard of old folks.  
This was to have severe consequences on the social fabric of the community, 
aggravating, if possible, the moral disease already diagnosed by Edward Banfield as “amoral 
                                                 
353 Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy (Palgrave Macmillan, New York: 2003), p. 211 
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familism.” Banfield’s sociological study of the village of Chiaramonte, in the Region of 
Basilicata, in the 1950s, became the standard explanation for the extreme backwardness and 
lack of civic virtues of the South. Amoral familism was defined as “the inability of the 
villagers to act together for their common good, or indeed for any good transcending the 
immediate material interest of the nuclear family.”354
 
 Mass emigration appears to have 
exacerbated the problems of amoral familism: 
Throughout the rural South, family life has been disrupted by migration. Even in the 
1980s the patterns that we noted for the 1960s – of fathers being absent for many 
months of the year, of mothers or even grandparents being left to bring up children, 
of ageing populations – seem to have remained significant phenomena. [....] Kinship 
networks, as Piselli has reiterated, have remained as strong as ever. Yet these [...] are 
networks without collective projects, without a consciousness that transcends family 
interest. Neither from civil society nor from the state has there emerged a new and 
less destructive formulation of the relation between family and collectivity.355
 
   
However, beneath the desolating immobility that seemed to accompany Badolato to a death 
by outmigration, another type of change was occurring. In 1986 a provocative campaign was 
launched by local political and social activists under the name of “Badolato paese in vendita” 
(Badolato Town For Sale).  This was an effort to attract Italian and foreign tourists who 
would invest in the maintenance and remodeling of the houses that the emigrants had 
abandoned without indicating any plan to return to them. The initiative was only moderately 
successful, as a few foreigners, mostly from Switzerland and northern Europe, did buy 
houses and made Badolato their regular vacation destination. However, this was not a 
solution to the problems of a dying community. 
At the end of the century, though, this town plagued by emigration was to find 
unexpected opportunities of resurgence reinventing itself as a land of immigration. So the 
                                                 
 
354 Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Free Press, Glencoe, Ill.: 1958), p. 10  
 
355 Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary Italy, pp. 417-8 
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English daily The Guardian recounts the events of December 1997 in the issue of Wednesday, 
March 22, 2000:  
 
It was December 27, 1997. Boats raced to the ship and ferried its human cargo to 
land. The Kurds were penniless and did not speak Italian, but for the villagers of 
Badolato, on Italy's toe, they had one priceless asset - youth.  
Most of the houses in the 1,000-year-old village, 900ft above the Mediterranean, had 
been abandoned over four decades. A population of 7,000 had dwindled to 700.  
Few babies were being born - most local couples had one child at the most. The 
elementary school had closed, businesses were failing, buildings were crumbling. It 
was just a matter of time before Badolato became a ghost town.  
And then the Ararat arrived: a Russian-made rustbucket that had left Istanbul for 
Rome six days earlier. The perils and £1,500 price tag had deterred elderly Kurds 
from making the journey, so the new arrivals were mostly under 40. They had not 
planned to make a life in Calabria, one of Italy's poorest regions, but that was what 
they were offered.356
 
  
In other words, two days after Christmas, in 1997, the people of Badolato received the 
unexpected present of 825 Kurdish asylum seekers. Equally unexpected for the Kurds was 
the warm reception that the Badolatese reserved them. They had reached the tip of southern 
Italy with no intention of relocating there, but only because it was the most convenient 
landing in their journey to Germany, France, Belgium, and Sweden.   
The Kurdish people is an archetypal example of a “nation in search of a state.” As 
David McDowall notes, the Kurds “inhabit a marginal zone between the power centres of 
the Mesopotamian plain and the Iranian and Anatolian plateaus,” and they have been 
historically “marginalized geographically, politically, and economically.”357
                                                 
356 Rory Carroll, “They were God-fearing people like us, and God knows we needed them,” in The Guardian, 
02/22/’00, retrieved on 02/20/’05 at: 
 Of the 825 Kurds 
that landed in Badolato, the majority were from Turkey. The Kurds in Turkey had 
experienced severe discrimination throughout the 20th century, as the republic that had 
formed after the fall of the Ottoman Empire under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/population/Story/0,2763,184291,00.html 
 
357 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (IB Tauris, London: 2000), p. xi 
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Atatürk, pursued an explicit policy of “turkification” aimed at eradicating the linguistic and 
ethnic specificity of the Kurds and assimilating them into mainstream Turkish society.358
The passengers of the Ararat were leaving behind both economic desolation and 
political discrimination. The Guardian continues recounting the events of December 1997: 
“Central and regional government gave the Kurds food and money and promised to settle 
them in empty houses. Officials promised them work in new enterprises that would make 
the most of their skills.”
  
359
At the beginning of 1999 Famiglia Cristiana, a catholic Italian weekly, expressed its 
appraisal of this experience of peaceful integration. Gerardo Mannello, the Mayor of 
Badolato, explained in an interview that of the original group of 825 Kurds most had left for 
their final destinations, Germany and Switzerland in particular. Yet, the efforts of the local 
administrators and of the population had succeeded in convincing a few of them to stay.  
 In a short time, Badolato had attracted the attention of national 
and international media, and television crews came to report on the strange case of the town 
that welcomed immigration.  
 
So the Pro-Badolato was born, an association of culture and tourism: it restructures 
houses and offers them to the tourists. The Kurds are employed in the works of 
construction and cleaning. They open artisan laboratories and above all the first 
Kurdish restaurant of Calabria, the second in Italy, is inaugurated: the Ararat, where 
one needs to reserve two days in advance. [....] Yusuf, together with Pino, has opened 
a laboratory of ceramic, from which the Carabinieri have commissioned the insignia 
for their headquarter. Ibrahim Sherin works in his new shop of fair trade. Then there 
are those employed in agriculture and construction jobs. The priest, don Vincenzo 
Gallelli, is super-happy: “A blessing for the Church. I have been able to preach 
Solidarity and Misericordia in concrete.” On Easter night he will baptize five Kurdish 
adults.360
                                                 
 
  
358 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, p. 191 
 
359 Rory Carroll, “They were God-fearing people like us” 
 
360 Alberto Bobbio, “Pizza curda e abbasso l’Onu, Badolato non ha paura,” in Famiglia Cristiana, n. 11, 
03/21/’99, retrieved on 02/20/’05 at: http://www.stpauls.it/fc99/1199fc/1199fc59.htm. My translation 
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It is worth noting, albeit in passim, that at this stage the Kurdish experiment in Badolato 
tends to reproduce structures of power all too familiar in the most inveterate practices of 
immigration. At the economic level, the newcomers are typically (but not exclusively) 
employed in “works of construction and cleaning,” an embryonic tertiary sector that caters 
to the affluent (yet sporadic) tourists from Switzerland and Northern Europe. At the cultural 
level, the enthusiasm with which the local priest welcomes the new members of the 
community (an enthusiasm that the reporter for Famiglia Cristiana does not call into 
question), cannot obscure the fact that the Kurds are predominantly of Sunni Muslim 
confession and, presumably, not seeking conversion to another religion. 
However, some complementary reflections may help to refine the first impressions 
about these seeming patterns of economic and ideological domination, by making sense of 
them not in the abstract, but in light of the specific local context. The productive system of 
Badolato, like that of most Calabrian villages, is one that hardly favors the emergence of a 
highly differentiated and dynamic structure of classes. The most meaningful distinction to be 
made here is not between “capitalists” and “proletarians,” as there is little to nothing to 
capitalize on, and the traditional resource of the wealthier strata of population, land, is now a 
much less valuable asset. On the contrary, the subsistence economy of Badolato is a system 
fundamentally based on the rimesse, the money sent back home by the emigrants. In an area 
chronically plagued by unemployment, those who can count on a more or less stable source 
of income, produced locally and independent of the rimesse, are, in a certain way, a privileged 
class. This is the case with the Kurds. 
As for the religious aspect of the integration of the Kurds into the social fabric of 
Badolato, worries about the forcible nature of their conversion to Catholicism are not at all 
preposterous. However, such an interpretation of their baptisms does not take into account 
the peculiar character of traditional religiosity in Southern Italy’s towns. While this is 
obviously an overwhelmingly Catholic environment, it is not one in which religion emerges 
as an identity marker used to differentiate among various communities (as for example it was 
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in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the aftermath of the dissolution of Yugoslavia).  Here religiosity is 
perceived and experienced as one element of a larger picture of “tradition,” not to be 
theorized per se, and whose exercise is better understood as a series of ritualized habits than 
as a coherent set of moral and canonical formulations. As such, Catholicism is not 
necessarily an exclusionary force, as it peacefully coexists with a vast and dynamic 
substratum of alternative beliefs, ranging from a diffuse superstition, to enduring practices of 
magic and divination, to residual particles of pre-Christian religiosity. In synthesis, without 
underestimating its potentially troubling aspects, the commixtion of Muslim elements into a 
Christian community can be taken as an instance of a tendency towards syncretism that 
popular religiosity can exhibit to the extent that it is not rigidly codified.  
Despite some legitimate doubts, then, the case of Badolato came soon to be seen as an 
interesting and largely successful experiment. The people of this small, peripheral town had 
not only passively tolerated the presence of the Kurds on their territory (what in many other 
places would have been a remarkable achievement in and of itself). The locals had actively 
welcomed the guests with signs of concrete hospitality. Badolatese houses were literally opened 
for the Kurds, and the whole population participated in collective efforts to help the 
newcomers establish viable and durable premises for sound, if modest, economic 
subsistence. Sure, the houses given to the Kurds were the humble habitations abandoned by 
Badolatese emigrants, and the jobs that they got may not have been the ones that they were 
dreaming of when leaving Kurdistan; yet this was a robust experiment with feasible 
hospitality, and the risks of its hyperbolic variant had been avoided. In April 2000 a news 
report from BBC asked a very interesting question: 
 
Could this be the answer for Italy’s other dying cities?  
Daniela Trapasso of the Italian Council for Refugees says she was surprised and 
impressed by the welcome the asylum seekers received.  
“I thought the people from the village will be scared of them but it was not like 
this,” she recalls  
“I was very emotional when I saw Italian people give food, bread and oil to the 
Kurdish neighbours.”  
Two years later, that warmth has not diminished.  
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Sitting around the piazza in weak spring sunshine, the old people are happy to talk 
about their visitors.  
“It's lovely to have them around,” they tell me.  
“They never give us any problem and if there is something we can give them, we give 
it to them.”  
“We don't understand them and they don't understand us but they are good, and the 
more people we have around the better it is for everyone.”361
 
 
Especially noteworthy is the last passage of the interview, as it entails an implicit 
endorsement of the value of being-in-common. Contra traditional understandings of 
community based primarily on a shared language, these elderly Badolatese point towards a 
more basic aspect of commonality, one that does not necessarily require shared instruments 
of commun-ication because it is rooted in the acknowledgement of something that is already 
common. To the question of hospitality posed by Derrida: “must we ask the foreigner to 
understand us, to speak our language [...] before being able and so as to be able to welcome 
him into our country?” the Badolatese implicitly respond in the negative. 
However, in spite of such an excited optimism, at traits reminiscent of Derrida’s 
conception of unconditional hospitality toward those that, symbolically, “do not speak our 
language,” Badolato’s experience did not turn out to be the squaring of the circle of the 
immigration and aging population problems. The BBC news report continues:  
 
The promised funds from the government for housing and start-up businesses to 
encourage them to stay have never arrived.  
The Badolato experiment, says Daniela Trapasso, is in bureaucratic limbo.  
“A lot of people came here,” she says.  
“A lot of promises have been made but we have been waiting for this money for two 
years.”  
“This is a big problem. If you talk with our government they will tell you – ‘Ah yes! 
Badolato! - a very good experience. We must learn from Badolato. There, there is 
civilisation.’  
“But then - nothing.”362
                                                 
361 Jake Gilhooly, “Italy: Immigration or extinction,” in BBC News, Wednesday, 19 April, 2000, retrieved on 
02/20/’05 at: 
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/719423.stm. Emphasis added. 
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Swedish based FECL (“Fortress Europe?” Circular Letter), an NGO active in the fields of 
“liberties and human rights, public order and security, policing, justice, data protection, 
immigration and asylum,” has taken a critical interest in the bureaucratic vicissitudes of the 
Kurds in Badolato.363
 
 In particular, in the aftermath of the landing of the Ararat, the 
reactions of the Italian political elites seemed in line with the local attitudes of the 
Badolatese, and in general they seemed inspired by a benevolent and sympathetic 
comprehension. FECL reports that: 
Already on 30 December, Interior Minister Napolitano announced that the 
Government was willing to “examine favourably” the asylum applications of those 
Kurdish boat people who wished to submit an application, while those who 
preferred to refrain from an application in Italy, because they wished to join family 
members already staying in other European countries, would benefit from temporary 
protection in Italy. At his traditional New Year speech to the Italian people, 
President Scalfaro said: “When people come to our country, because they are being 
persecuted, our doors must be wide open.” The following day, Prime Minister Prodi 
said: “We will grant asylum to all Kurds requesting it.”364
 
  
The endorsement of the Kurdish (and Badolatese!) cause, voiced by the top three Italian 
authorities on the matter (the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, and the Interior 
Minister) was not to be echoed by their European colleagues. In fact, public officials in 
Germany, France and Austria publicly issued their formal complaints. “The German Federal 
Interior Minister, Manfred Kanther, openly accused Italian authorities of lax border controls 
and demanded that Italy introduce random police controls on its national road network, in 
                                                                                                                                                 
362 Jake Gilhooly, “Italy: Immigration or extinction” 
 
363 see http://www.fecl.org  
 
364 “Italy And The Kurdish Refugees: No Panic,” in FECL 53, January/February 1998, retrieved on 02/20/’05 
at http://www.fecl.org/circular/5305.htm.  
Note: FECL cites as sources: ‘Boat-People aus Kurdistan’, January 98, publ. by the Office of Ulla Jelpke, MP 
PDS at the German Bundestag; Migration News Sheet No.178/98-01; WochenZeitung, 8.1.98, 22.1.98; Neue 
Zürcher Zeitung, 3/4.1.98; Der Standard, 8.1.98; CEDRI-release on the reception of Kurdish refugees in 
Badolato, 30.1.98; our interviews with Massimo Pastore, Torino (26.1.98) and Christopher Hein, CIR, Rome 
(4.2.98). 
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order to stop ‘illegal immigrants’ from reaching Germany and other target countries.”365 
Similarly inspired by a sort of psychosis of the new barbaric invasions, “Austrian Interior 
Minister Karl Schlögl vehemently accused Italy of ‘dumping the problem [of illegal 
immigration] on others’.”366
The Italian openness toward extra-communitarians (i.e.: non-EU immigrants) was 
threatening the very fabric of the European Union. The constitution of Europeanness once 
again proved intolerant of any contamination with non-Europeanness, let alone hospitable. 
‘Strongly encouraged’ by its Northern partners, Italy had to reconsider its policy of “friendly 
hospitality.” By 1999 the majority of the undocumented immigrants were placed in gated 
camps, under strict police surveillance: the infamous “Welcome Centers” had been created, 
soon to be followed by the even more infamous CPTs, Centers of Temporary Permanence 
(Centri di Permanenza Temporanea). The Kurds who had already settled in Badolato 
escaped normalization, at this time; but the perspectives for the social experiment that they 
represented looked now gloomier than ever. 
 As a result, Italy’s adhesion to the Schengen treaty was called 
into question and passport checks at the Italian border were reintroduced on a temporary 
basis by both France and Austria. In this European context of “zero tolerance” toward 
clandestine immigration, the Badolatese experiment of hospitality was hardly to be seen as a 
step in the right direction. 
A team of scholars and researchers of the Department of Sociology and Political 
Science of the University of Calabria has conducted an accurate field study of the 
functioning and dynamics of the “Welcome Centers:” 
 
On June 2nd 1999, the “Welcome Center” (Centro di Accoglienza) S.Anna at Isola 
Capo Rizzuto becomes operative. The center is conceived in order to welcome 
hundreds of people at any time and is greeted by the representatives of the local 
                                                 
 
365 “Italy And The Kurdish Refugees: No Panic” 
 
366 “Italy And The Kurdish Refugees: No Panic” 
 218 
 
institutions as an efficient and rational solution to the problem of “first reception” 
(“prima accoglienza”).  
[....]  
The presence of the Center S.Anna determines two main effects: 1) the refugees are 
reduced to an entity alien (corpo estraneo) to the territorial context that surrounds the 
“Welcome Center;” 2) the local institutions and the civil society are 
deresponsabilized of the handling of the phenomenon. This explains the almost 
complete absence of policies for the reception of the asylum seekers taken by the 
regional institutions and the little relevance of initiatives undertaken by the tertiary 
sector. This is a reason, if not the main reason, for the reduction of Calabria to an 
area of transition, and of the social dispersion of the refugees.367
  
 
Commisso and De Franco clearly identify in the “politics of segregation” enacted by the 
“Welcome Centers” the main reason for the failure of the project of cultural, economic and 
demographic mestizaje envisioned in the early days of the Badolato experience. Another 
research conducted by University of Calabria sociologist Elisabetta Della Corte also 
describes patterns of more endogenous malfunctioning: 
  
[I]n the case of Badolato too, the lack of funding has determined a reduction of the 
training activities. The only course activated (March 2003) is that of Italian language, 
that has classes scheduled for two hours two days a week.  
In 2001, instead, the vocational offer included a course of Italian language, a course 
in basic fashion design (three months, four hours, two days a week) for a total of 92 
hours, and a course in basic computer science (72 hours).368
  
 
Both in Commisso and De Franco’s analysis and in Della Corte’s reconstruction, the 
perspectives for the social experiment of hospitality and being-in-common in Badolato 
seemed quite dim, in 2003. Armando Gnisci, Associate Professor of Comparative Literature 
at the University “La Sapienza” of Rome, specialized in Postcolonial African Literatures, has 
studied the cultural effects of immigration in Italy. In 2003 he published a provocative 
                                                 
367 L. Commisso and M. De Franco, ed. by, “Richiedenti Asilo E Strutture Di Accoglienza In Provincia Di 
Crotone,” (Rende, maggio 2003), p. 3; retrieved on 02/25/’05 at http://www.isolarifugiati.org/unical.htm. My 
translation  
 
368 Elisabetta Della Corte, ed. by, “Inserimento Socio-Economico Di Richiedenti Asilo E Rifugiati In Calabria” 
(Rende, maggio 2003), p. 11; retrieved on 02/25/’05 at http://www.isolarifugiati.org/unical.htm. My 
translation 
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volume entitled Creolizzare l’Europa, in which he analyzed the “literature of migration” in the 
poetic context that he calls of the “European decolonization.”369
The failures of this experience are analyzed without that sense of fatalism and that 
perverse fascination with defeat that scholars in the tradition of Banfield and Putnam have 
imputed to the anthropological type of the Southern Italian villager. Rather, Gnisci and 
Rafele point to the absence of an adequate set of laws for regulating the demands and the 
needs of political refugees: 
 Significantly, a section of 
the book (written in collaboration with Badolatese researcher Rosa Rafele) is dedicated to 
the case of Badolato.  
 
In fact, Italy is the only European country without a law on political asylum: a draft 
was stuck for years in the Parliament, without definitive approval until the end of the 
last legislature. The norms currently applied are the Geneva Convention and, for 
administrative matters, a law on immigration (Legge 40/’98). But since this is a 
generic law on immigration, not specific for political refugees, it presents many 
problems in its practical application.370
 
   
Just like Derrida theorized, “hyperbolic hospitality” cannot endure as such, and it needs the 
limits and specifications that a good law can provide. Had the inadequacy of the Italian 
bureaucracy really destroyed the radical potential that the encounter with the other in 
Badolato had disclosed? In order to assess whether or not anything of the spirit of 1997 had 
survived, albeit in a mutated environment, I decided to do field research in Badolato. I 
resolved to conduct open-ended interviews with a number of subjects, divided by the 
subsets “Badolatese” and “immigrants to Badolato.” In both cases I chose to recruit my 
interviewees through face-to-face interactions and “snowball” techniques. I took notes 
during my interviews, and then re-elaborated them into more systematic reflections.  
                                                 
369 Armando Gnisci, Creolizzare l’Europa (Meltemi Editore, Roma: 2003), p. 9. My translation 
 
370 Armando Gnisci, Creolizzare l’Europa, p. 163. Also available at: 
http://www.disp.let.uniroma1.it/kuma/rubriche/intercultura/rafele.htm  
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At the end of the summer of 2006 I made a first trip to Badolato.  I found a sleepy 
town: in the midday sunshine, only a few people walked slowly in the piazza, between the 
two cafés. I met with Daniela Trapasso, the coordinator of the Calabrian section of CIR 
(Italian Council for Refugees). Created in 1990 under the patronage of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, CIR defines its basic mission as: “to defend the rights of 
refugees and asylum-seekers in Italy.”371
Nevertheless, she pointed to a complex pattern of hospitality, in which the host-guest 
relation frequently switched. In many instances, members of one of the two communities 
had participated in ceremonies and religious practices of the other group. Exploring each 
others’ traditions, Badolatese youths had crossed the fire like their Kurdish counterpart did 
as a ritual of initiation into adult life. Funerals had also been an occasion for encounters, and 
many had incorporated rituals of both traditions. In an especially vivid example of 
engagement with the other, minor altercations had involved young men of both groups, 
mostly in relation to women. These disputes were of the kind that is not uncommon among 
young men, regardless of their ethnicity. To the extent that they should be classified as 
instances of “hostility” between Kurds and Italians, it is worth noting, with Derrida, that the 
concept of hostility too is semantically contiguous with hospitality. Whereas toleration 
prevents the rise of hostile relations by preventing the rise of meaningful relations altogether, 
hospitality acknowledges the possibility of agonistic human interactions. In Badolato the 
occasional hostilities among locals and immigrants never escalated into enmity, and in the 
 The conversation that we had in the office of CIR 
was an extremely helpful introduction to Badolato’s social reality. From the vantage point of 
her institutional position, but especially from the perspective of an active social worker, Ms. 
Trapasso was careful to define the relationship between the immigrants and the local 
community not in abstract terms of integration, but, much more realistically, as a form of 
coexistence.    
                                                 
 
371 http://www.cir-onlus.org/chisiamo2.htm 
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end they too served to strengthen community ties: the acknowledgment of the other as part 
of the same community of being which also involves the potential for hostile engagements.   
An area of special interest to me was the linguistic contamination between the two 
communities. While the Kurds had been learning Italian from the locals, the Badolatese had 
also started to use Kurdish terms in their daily parlance, greeting the elderly in the deferential 
manner typical of the newcomers. Misunderstandings had not been uncommon, like when a 
Kurdish man had asked a shopkeeper for a “gas bomb” (bomba a gas), rather than for a much 
more innocuous “gas tank” (bombola a gas)… Unfortunately, in the climate of excitement and 
optimism typical of the early days of this experience, more serious mistakes were made too. 
Unconditional hospitality and generosity were bestowed onto the newcomers, in ways that 
made it difficult to eradicate expectations that were to prove unreasonable in the long run. 
On my first visit to Badolato I also met with Vincenzo Squillacioti, a local historian and 
cultural animator. His perspective was also extremely helpful in delineating the social and 
cultural impact of the new arrivals on the community, both in the case of the “Badolato 
Town For Sale” initiative, and more recently with the Kurds. That very afternoon, as I was 
walking down a street, I heard a Muslim prayer coming from a window, and the British 
accent of a young lady coming from the next balcony. Neither would have been a likely 
occurrence in nearby towns; the proximity of the two added to the peculiar character of the 
phenomenon. Badolato wasn’t just a haven for asylum seekers, nor was it simply the 
destination for wealthy northern European tourists. It was both, and at the same time it also 
remained alive with its Italian residents: both the ones that lived there year round, and the 
emigrants that returned for the summer and sometimes for the winter holidays as well. 
When I returned to Badolato in the summer of 2007 I brought with me a set of 
questions for open-ended interviews (see Appendix). I classified my interviewees in four 
groups: A1) resident Badolatese; A2) returning emigrants; B1) immigrants; B2) tourists. In the 
subset of the “hosts” (A1 and A2) I expected to find a social stratification between the 
returning emigrants, who enjoyed greater exposure to culture and diversity in their places of 
work, and the resident Badolatese, who presumably lacked those experiences. Similarly, I 
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expected a marked difference between the perspectives of those who had immigrated to 
Badolato under economic or political concerns, and those who had elected it as their holiday 
destination. 
On my second visit to Badolato I knew that on a hot, sunny day most people were likely 
to spend at least some time at the beach, in Badolato Marina, returning home in time for 
lunch. So I spent the morning re-familiarizing myself with the streets and sights of the town.  
I also took notice of the cars’ license plates: alongside the local ones there were quite a few 
from central and northern Italy, as well as Swiss, German, French, Swedish ones, some 
belonging to returning emigrants, some to the new house buyers.  
Around 4:30 pm the roar of the first Vespas headed down to the beach announced the 
end of the siesta. I observed small clusters of middle-aged and old men as they started 
assembling, some sitting in the shade on the piazza’s benches, some playing cards and 
sipping soda in the cafés. Elderly women gathered on the church’s stairs, then got inside and 
started praying before the mass. Tourists followed the Vespas to the beach; young 
immigrants, mostly males, took the benches that were left in the piazza.  
As I started talking to people, I noticed that some were at least as eager to talk to me as 
I was to listen to them. At first some people felt unprepared to answer my questions, and 
pointed to their educated neighbors. My reassurance that I was not looking for accurate 
historical information, but for their personal experiences, was able to convince most of 
them. Also, as I asked the questions that I had carefully phrased while planning my research, 
I realized that they were most useful as a starting point for free-floating conversations, rather 
than as a rigid grid to impose on my interviews. 
I spent several days in Badolato, and met with over fifty people, of whom around thirty 
I identified as “hosts” (both resident Badolatese and returning emigrants), and around 
twenty as “guests” (both immigrants and tourists). I met with a very loquacious priest and 
with an equally talkative old communist, a living testimony of the strength that the party of 
Antonio Gramsci once enjoyed in that district of landless laborers. From the perspectives of 
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their different systems of beliefs, these two interviewees agreed on many points, in ways that 
might have sounded surprising to observers less familiar with the dominant mentality, a 
centuries-old concoction of fatalism, hospitality, attachment to one’s own roots. I asked 
them whether the recent influx of immigrants had been advantageous or disadvantageous for 
Badolato, and both responded that the new element in the community had been a valuable 
addition. One emphasized the role of immigrants as workers; the other framed welcoming 
others as a Christian precept. “The name of Badolato is more widely recognized now, and 
that is a good thing because more money is trickling into town,” said the communist, and he 
added: “the Kurds are a valuable addition to our workforce, they are workers, they are not 
idlers.”372 “It is our moral duty as Christians to welcome others as brothers in Christ,” 
argued the religious figure, and he commented: “our community has suffered from the 
plague of emigration, and therefore we understand the necessities of these immigrants. Many 
Badolatese still live in Argentina, USA, Europe.”373
One of the questions that raised more attention in all my interviewees, of all the subsets 
alike, was: “Would you prefer to be richer elsewhere, or poorer in Badolato?” It generated an 
overwhelming majority of answers in favor of being poorer in Badolato. “Poorer!” shouted 
an interviewee, “I am the wealthiest person in the world here, not in money but in other 
values.”
   
374
                                                 
372 Interview A2 – 1: “Il nome di Badolato e’ conosciuto adesso, e questo ha portato soldi. I kurdi sono una 
buona aggiunta per la manodopera locale, sono lavoratori, non sono vagabondi.” My translation from the 
original Italian into English.  
 The allure of material wealth was much less attractive than the appreciation of 
values like health, friendship, tradition and especially the feeling of “belonging” to a place 
and community. To this constellation of civic values, the priest also added the sense of 
mission that characterized his vocation as an apostle among his people: “I have already 
 
373 Interview A1 – 15: “E’ il nostro dovere morale come Cristiani di accogliere gli altri come fratelli in Cristo 
[…] La comunita’ di Badolato ha sofferto per la piaga dell’emigrazione e percio’ noi capiamo le necessita’ di 
questi immigrati adesso. Molti Badolatesi ancora vivono in Argentina, in America, in Europa.” My translation 
from the original Italian into English.  
 
374 Interview A2 – 6: “Piu’ povero! […] Sono il piu’ ricco del mondo qua, no di soldi, ma di altri valori.” My 
translation from the original Italian into English. 
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chosen Badolato, with its context of poverty […] I had appealing proposals to move 
elsewhere, but I always refused.”375
Additionally, while a general consensus emerged on the fact that Badolato had changed 
dramatically in the last few decades, the exact nature of the transformation was the object of 
much disagreement among my interviewees. At one extreme, a strongly nostalgic mood 
permeated some holographic reconstructions of an idyllic past, one in which the town had 
been economically self-sufficient, if not affluent, and especially one in which the moral fiber 
and the demographic composition of the Badolatese population had been much sounder. An 
elderly man lamented: “The town is becoming depopulated, it is on its way to dying. And 
this makes me sad.”
   
376 Two elderly women convened: “[The situation] is much worse now. 
Things were better when they were worse. There is no respect, no affection for each 
other.”377 “The youths are lazy, good manners have been lost,” pointed out another 
interviewee, tapping into the perennial trope of the young as the embodiment of what is 
wrong with the new.378 On the other hand, some of my informants were more ready than 
others to recognize the amazing progress that improved communication, transportation, and 
education had represented for Badolato. Thus reminisced a returning emigrant: “People 
starved to death, once, now everybody has got something to eat. There was the war, there 
was poverty, in 1951 there was a flood. Then things started to improve.”379
                                                 
 
 Somebody else 
375 Interview A1 – 15: “Ho gia’ scelto Badolato, con il suo contesto di poverta’ […] Ho ricevuto proposte di 
sedi allettanti, ma ho sempre rifiutato.” My translation from the original Italian into English. 
 
376 Interview A2 – 3: “Il paese si va spopolando, va a morire. E questo mi dispiace.” My translation from the 
original Italian into English. 
 
377 Interviews A1 – 22 and A1 – 23: “[La stuazione] e’ peggiorata. Si stave meglio quando si stava peggio. Oggi 
non c’e’ rispetto, non c’e’ affetto tra le persone.” My translation from the original Italian into English. 
 
378 Interview A2 – 5: “I giovani sono vagabondi, si e’ persa l’educazione.” My translation from the original 
Italian into English. 
 
379 Interview A2 – 10: “Si moriva di fame, prima, adesso qualcosa da mangiare ce l’hanno tutti. C’era la guerra, 
c’era la miseria, c’e’ stata un’alluvione nel 1951. Poi le cose hanno iniziato a migliorare.” My translation from 
the original Italian into English. 
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explicitly pointed out the recent changes in Badolato: “It has been rediscovered, 
repopulated.”380
The priest was to be found in the first camp, and he expressed his sorrow at the ailing 
town quite profusely: “The town is getting depopulated, the ones who stay are mostly old 
and ill. There is numerical poverty, but also religious poverty: few people participate in the 
activities of the church. The agricultural sector has been largely abandoned too. We are not 
self-sufficient any more. There was more ‘poetry,’ once: artisans, shopkeepers, street 
vendors, they all used to sing traditional songs. There was joy in their singing.”
  
381 The old 
communist activist espoused a rather different view: “There has been development. We 
moved from tilling the soil to going to school. There has been moral progress too. Now 
young people can choose by themselves with whom they want to get engaged, there is no 
jealousy. There is also more wealth.”382
The main focus of my interviews were the issue of co-existence and the practices of 
hospitality that characterized it. The Badolatese who had emigrated to escape poverty and 
unemployment, and who had now returned to their hometown, whether seasonally or 
permanently, were split on the issue of whether the arrival of the immigrants had benefited 
or harmed Badolato.  Some tended to sympathize with the newcomers, recognizing that they 
performed valuable social functions, taking jobs that Italians would have refused: “they take 
 In fact, both camps concurred on a narrative of 
modernization, but evaluated it differently. 
                                                 
 
380 Interview A1 – 28: “E’ stata riscoperta, ripopolata.” My translation from the original Italian into English. 
 
381 Interview A1 – 15: “La citta’ si va a spopolare, quelli che rimangono sono per lo piu’ vecchi e malati. C’e’ 
poverta’ numerica, ma anche religiosa: poche persone partecipano alle attivita’ della Chiesa. L’agricoltura e’ stata 
abbandonata, per la maggior parte. Non c’e’ piu’ autosufficienza. Una volta c’era piu’ ‘poesia’: artigiani, 
bottegai, venditori ambulanti, tutti cantavano canzone tradizionali. C’era gioia nel loro canto.” My translation 
from the original Italian into English 
 
382 Interview A2 – 1: “C’e’ stato sviluppo. Siamo passati da zappare la terra ad andare a scuola. C’e’ stato anche 
progresso morale. Adesso i giovani scelgono loro con chi si vogliono fidanzare, non c’e’ gelosia. C’e’ anche piu’ 
ricchezza.” My translation from the original Italian into English. 
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jobs that Italians don’t want any more.”383  Others resented the fact that the immigrants now 
received assistance and in some cases subsidies, while their early years in Switzerland or 
Germany had been marked by social marginalization and inadequate economic 
remuneration: “they were given a house, they were given assistance.”384 Almost all of my 
interviewees were careful to characterize their positions as non-racist, answering in the 
negative the question on whether they would have preferred that more Italians (as opposed 
to foreigners) had relocated to Badolato: “It’s not important where they come from, but 
whether or not they are good Christians.”385 Some went so far as to say that they preferred 
having foreigners relocate to town rather than Italians, as the former offer better 
opportunities for cultural cross-pollination and an overall evolution of the local mentality: 
“foreigners have travelled more, they are more open-minded.”386 A rather exuberant elderly 
man exclaimed: “Foreigners are good, but they have to keep their traditions, their customs. 
Italians are phony, it would take a Saddam with them, the end of the world!”387
                                                 
383 Interview A2 – 37: “Fanno lavori che gli italiani non vogliono fare piu’.” My translation from the original 
Italian into English. 
 Beside this 
rather extreme endorsement of the cause of immigration and the repopulation of Badolato 
(and possibly Italy in general) by foreigners, the more mainstream non-racist disclaimers 
sounded genuine, for the most part; other informants echoed the frustration at their own 
alienation in the big cities of the north by showing little warmth for the newcomers.  
 
384 Interviews A1 – 22 and A1 – 23: “Gli hanno dato una casa, gli hanno dato assistenza.” My translation from 
the original Italian into English. 
 
385 Interviews A1 – 22 and A1 – 23: “Non ha importanza da dove vengono, ma se sono bravi crisitani.” My 
translation from the original Italian into English. 
Note: in the context of southern Italy, “Christians” (cristiani) is a colloquial expression for “people, folks.” It 
does not carry any explicit religious connotations.  
 
386 Interview A1 – 28: “Gli stranieri hanno viaggiato di piu’, hanno una mentalita’ piu’ aperta.” My translation 
from the original Italian into English. 
 
387 Interview A2 – 6: “Gli stranieri sono buoni, ma devono conservare le loro usanze, i loro costumi. Gli italiani 
sono falsi. Ci vorrebbe Saddam, la fine del mondo!” My translation from the original Italian into English. 
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Not surprisingly, the category of the “guests” was a much more heterogeneous one. It 
included both homebuyers from elsewhere in Italy and Europe, and underprivileged 
immigrants from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Despite the obvious socioeconomic 
differences, these two groups shared the important experience of being a part of Badolato’s 
community without having been born into it. In a way they were in a privileged position for 
partaking in the community of being that was becoming evident in Badolato, without being 
invested in the being of community. In particular, most immigrant interviewees underscored 
the fortuitous nature of their move to Badolato: “I was sent here by a community aid 
program,” said one, referring evidently to the Italian Council for Refugees.388 Virtually no 
one had chosen it deliberately, and few had even heard of it before relocating: “It was never 
my intention to move here […] I had never heard of this place,” stated a young man from 
Nigeria.389 A homebuyer from Florence explained the circumstances of his relocation as: “an 
incredible series of coincidences.”390
The attachment to Badolato might not be as strong among the immigrants as it is 
among the locals. Yet several people commented enthusiastically on the help that they 
received as they adapted to the new conditions, and showed a degree of affection toward the 
town. To my question: “Have the people in Badolato helped you to adjust to the new 
conditions?” an informant from Colombia responded: “So very much! That’s why I don’t 
leave. Now I work in Badolato Marina, and the neighbors help me with my kids.”
 Paradoxically, this parallels the condition of Badolato 
natives who had not chosen to be born in that specific community. 
391
                                                 
388 Interview B1 – 9: “Mi hanno mandato qua… un programma di aiuto comunitario.” My translation from the 
original Italian into English. 
 From a 
 
389 Interview B1 – 47. Original in English. 
 
390 Interview B2 – 31: “Una serie incredibile di coincidenze.” My translation from the original Italian into 
English. 
 
391 Interview B1 – 51: “Tantissimo! Per questo non me ne vado. Adesso lavoro a Badolato Marina, e I miei 
vicini mi aiutano con i bambini.” My translation from the original Italian into English. 
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very different perspective, the same attitude was echoed by a homebuyer: “So very much! 
They [the Badolatese] are very open, hospitable. I think of them as my Calabrian cousins.”392
The immigrants that I interviewed also appreciated the lack of pressures to conform. 
Specifically, they enjoy being able to keep their traditions, language, food, religion. Many 
strongly associate this sense of liberty with life in Badolato: “here I don’t have to be afraid 
when I pray.”
  
393 However, others, like one young man from Nigeria who voiced his intense 
frustration about the conditions and limitations of his relocation, lamented the isolation of 
Badolato, its small size, the lack of opportunities for both work and entertainment, and the 
lack of a fast, reliable Internet connection: “I expected it [Badolato] to be better. There is 
nothing here. It’s hard to go to the train station, it’s hard to watch TV, it’s impossible to get 
fast Internet.”394
During the course of my interviews, I learned with some disappointment that no one 
from the original nucleus of Kurds was left in town, as in the long run they had all preferred 
to join their relatives in Germany or Switzerland. Nevertheless, the narrative of the Kurds’ 
migration had been destabilized. The plans that they had made (relocating to Germany, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium) had been called into question by the emergence of an 
unexpected social phenomenon: hospitality. The trajectory that they had envisioned for the 
deployment of their agency had been interfered with by the hospitable practices that had 
made them part of the same community with the local Badolatese. Though the pull of the 
 While he had no regrets about leaving his country, he was ready to go 
somewhere else. But is this really just a case of unsuccessful immigration, or is there more to 
this story? Aren’t many young Badolatese similarly fed up with life in a small town, and 
itching to get out of it? All in all, this might be the ultimate, albeit ironic, proof of 
integration. 
                                                 
392 Interview B2 – 31: “Tantissimo! Sono molto aperti, ospitali. Per me sono come dei cugini calabresi.” My 
translation from the original Italian into English. 
 
393 Interview B1 – 50: “Qua non devo avere paura quando prego.” My translation from the original Italian into 
English. 
 
394 Interview B1 – 47. Original in English. 
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economic opportunities in other areas of Europe had ultimately proved impossible to resist, 
in the face of bureaucratic problems and the impoverished reality of southern Italy, that 
political experiment had not been just a literary divertissement on an otherwise stable 
narrative. In the spirit of Žižek’s admonishment, the “hegemonic ideological coordinates” 
had been questioned. That action would not unproblematically adapt to the new space 
should not be surprising, nor should it be disheartening for the perspective of reconstituting 
the discourse of immigration around new coordinates. The legacy of the original nucleus of 
Kurdish immigrants had stayed behind, both in the experience of the Italian Council for 
Refugees, and in the nickname of “Kurdolato.” The encounter between locals and 
immigrants, with its dynamic practices of hospitality and the creative renegotiation of the 
host-guest relation, illustrates in Badolato the political promise of adopting Nancy’s 
description of the inoperative community as a normative goal. Alternative to both the 
discourse of liberal individualism and toleration, on the one hand, and to the dominant 
paradigms of communitarianism, on the other hand, the acknowledgment of being-in-
common as the real position of existence can reorient the field of politics away from the 
currently hegemonic narratives. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have presented my reflections on how the concrete world of politics 
might be impacted by a normative view inspired by Jean-Luc Nancy’s theorization of the 
inoperative community. Though Nancy explicitly presents it as an ontological account, and 
not as a political project, I argue that the discourse of being-in-common and singularity can 
express political meaning with such versatility as to qualify it as an alternative to the 
dominant paradigm of liberalism. Moreover, unlike other versions of communitarianism, 
Nancy’s position rejects any essentialism, both at the level of the individual, and at the level 
of any specific community.  
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I have argued that the discourse of liberalism crucially relies on the value of toleration as 
the paramount modality for dealing with otherness. Both at the level of free and rational 
individuals, and at the level of sovereign national communities, toleration shields discrete 
entities from each other. In so doing, it also gives up on the possibility of truly realizing the 
encounter with the other. To the principle of toleration I have juxtaposed the value and 
practices of hospitality. Hospitality, I argue, requires an active engagement with the other, as 
the roles of host and guest are continuously renegotiated, and their boundaries redefined.  
Moreover, as Jacques Derrida has pointed out, I also argue that hospitality can be a feasible 
political project, to the extent that it rejects both the pole of absolute closure toward the 
other, and the pole of absolute openness, of hyperbolic hospitality. Though hospitality is not 
a panacea for all the contemporary social and political ills, I argue that its practices have the 
potential to enfeeble the current hegemony of liberalism, thus clearing the ideological fog 
away from the inoperative community. 
In order to show a concrete example of hospitality and being-in-common, I have 
presented the case of the encounter between immigrants and locals in Badolato, a small town 
in southern Italy. The landing of 825 undocumented Kurdish immigrants in 1997 activated a 
series of initiatives that transcended the simple practices of toleration, and qualified instead 
as a genuine case of hospitality. Rather than engaging in a confrontational politics of “us” vs. 
“them,” or congealing their otherness, the two communities, the locals and the immigrants, 
questioned their boundaries, and without dissolving their specificities in an artificially 
composite unit, ultimately came to access the community of their being.  
Though the original nucleus of Kurds soon relocated elsewhere, Badolato started to 
attract other immigrants, and as such it kept the experiment with hospitality and the 
acknowledgement of being-in-common alive. In this chapter I also presented the results of 
the research that I conducted there in the summer of 2007. Without romanticizing the 
peculiar experience of a very peripheral reality, it is possible to draw general lessons from the 
case of Badolato, and to draw inspiration from hospitality and being-in-common for 
envisioning a discourse alternative to the current hegemony of liberalism.  
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CHAPTER VII  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
A reflection on the connections between politics, language and ideology seems to be 
both a perennial preoccupation for political thinkers of various extractions and an especially 
urgent task for contemporary political theorists. Though a liberal constellation appears to 
exercise a virtually uncontested hegemony in much of the West today, its political vision 
remains highly problematic both with regards to the theories that justify it, and with regards 
to the practices that it promotes. Analyzing the discourses that sustain the articulation of a 
liberal project can prove both instructive in reconstructing the reasons for its success, and 
helpful in deconstructing the assumption of inevitability that accompanies some of the 
boldest arguments for liberalism. It is my contention in this project that, though the field of 
the political is currently dominated by liberal arguments, it is possible to resist their attraction 
and to imagine an alternative, more desirable political universe instead.  
In order to purse the goal of questioning the hegemony of liberalism, I argue that it is 
first necessary to understand its modes of operation. This, in turn, requires a general theory 
of ideology and a method for studying concrete examples of ideological discourse. The 
intellectual status of the study of political ideologies has often been questioned from various 
corners within the social sciences. I argue in this project that supplementing the traditional 
methodologies for analyzing the production, contestation, and displacement of ideological 
discourse with instruments of semiotics can provide this effort with both the rigor and the 
adaptability that are necessary for advancing robust arguments in the field of inquiry of 
political phenomena. Ultimately, the aspiration of this dissertation is twofold: both unveiling 
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the deep discursive structures that contribute to explaining the hegemony of liberalism; and 
envisioning an alternative discourse for the articulation of a more desirable political project.  
In Chapter I I have introduced the object of my study. Political ideologies, I argue, are 
akin to narrative objects of a particular genre. Similarly, Michael Freeden has devised his 
morphological approach to the study of ideology. Freeden insightfully calls attention on 
how, through distinctive discursive practices, ideologies decontest units of meaning (liberty, 
equality, gender, etc.) thus shaping the world of politics through the exclusion of certain 
concepts from the arena of contestation. While I regard this intuition as a crucial 
advancement over some of the traditional debates on ideology, I also argue that alongside 
with decontesting meaning, ideologies also employ specific expressive structures that affect 
the definition of the political at a deeper level. Ultimately, I argue that grammar itself is to be 
recognized as a political object, and that a specific grammar of liberalism contributes to 
explaining its hegemony.  
In regarding ideologies as narrative objects, I move from the premise that an ideology 
simply tells a story about politics. The standard narrative formula of ideology mobilizes a 
tension between the description of a problematic status quo, and the normative vision of an 
alternative, more desirable future. The peculiar element of the narrative genre of political 
ideology is its orientation to action: in its pragmatic dimension, an ideology presents a plan 
for transitioning from the status quo to the desirable future. Not only do specific political 
ideologies differ with regards to what kind of political content they regard as desirable or 
undesirable; crucially, I argue, political ideologies also exhibit regularities with regards to how 
they express their arguments.  
As I note in Chapter I, however, in many of the historical debates on ideologies, their 
arguments have been discredited as either false or irrelevant. While this position has enjoyed 
much success within the intellectual traditions of Marxism, Antonio Gramsci valorized the 
study of ideology as a fundamental component toward the definition of a comprehensive 
political project. Further refining an understanding of how ideological discourse works, 
though rejecting the term and category of “ideology,” Michel Foucault reoriented the debate 
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from some extra-discursive, metaphysical notion of “Truth” toward the fully discursive 
phenomenon of the production of “effects of truth.” 
In Chapter II, then, I have engaged the notion of effects of truth, and I have presented 
some basic concepts of semiotics for studying their functioning within ideological discourse. 
Ideology, I argue, can be studied as a narrative object similar (but not fully reducible) to 
rhetorical discourse. Though they are both engaged in the art of persuasion, ideological 
discourse is more insidious as it presents the “truths” that it produces as necessary and 
objective. Studying ideological discourse, I argue, requires understanding the processes for 
the formation of these effects of truth, and not their congruence to an external Truth. I 
borrowed from the repertoire of semiotics three basic instruments for unveiling the 
production and deployment of effects of truth in the specific genre of political ideology. 
First, I introduced the concept of abduction, with the specific case of overcoding. 
Effects of truth are produced in discourse when inferences are made about certain portions 
of a field of meaning. The conclusions of those inferences are then presented as natural and 
necessary. I argue the categories of abduction and overcoding refine the understanding of 
the phenomenon that Freeden terms “decontestation.” Secondly, I argued that the profound 
structures of language allocate agency in ways that produce effects of truth in the field of 
political meaning. In particular, I have noted, a grammar of subject-verb formations in which 
the subject pre-exists its action and chooses them, is congruent with the liberal ontology of 
individualism. Thirdly, I presented the semiotic square as a useful device for tracing the 
development of arguments within ideological discourse. In opposing a desirable future to a 
problematic status quo, I argue, ideologies mobilize two contrasting concepts or values, and 
then proceed as their narrative unfolds from one to the other, in ways that the semiotic 
square visualizes more clearly than other modes of analysis. Semiotics, I argue, can 
systematize the study of how ideological discourse works, both by analyzing the production 
of effects of truth within a liberal paradigm, and, potentially, by inspiring the articulation of 
political meaning in counter-hegemonic projects.  
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To an analysis of the contemporary hegemony of liberalism I have turned in Chapter 
III. I argue that, though explaining this hegemony would undoubtedly require a very 
complex, multicausal story, a crucial role is also played by the structures of liberal discourse. 
In particular, I maintain that the political content organized by liberalism is especially 
intuitive, intelligible, and ultimately convincing because it replicates certain structures of 
grammar. The correspondence between the “I” of the grammatical subject and the “I” of 
the liberal individual generates a joint effect of truth on the notion of that I that gets 
reinforced virtually at every instance of discourse. In order to trace the construction of that 
“I” in liberal political theory, I have considered the contributions of three of the most 
influential thinkers in the liberal canon. 
First I have discussed the political vision advanced by John Locke in the Second Treatise of 
Government in light of his work on knowledge, language, and the human mind in An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding. Contra the prevailing accounts of Locke’s thesis as either 
individualistic or communitarian, I argue that his position is best described as a politics of 
“semiotic individualism.” On the one hand, Lockean individuals “own” the actions that they 
undertake and the narratives that they produce; on the other hand, they acquire 
consciousness of themselves and of the world via the medium of the language of their 
community. A “semiotic contract,” which originally organizes the field of meaning (a 
vocabulary) and provides rules for combining units of meaning (a grammar) is the logical 
prerequisite for Locke’s political theory.  
Secondly, I have considered John Stuart Mill and the liberal ideology defined in On 
Liberty, as well as elements of his thought from Utilitarianism and A System of Logic. Mill, I 
argue, departs from Locke’s balance between individualistic and communitarian themes in 
his politics by formulating a theory of “sovereign individualism.” To Mill’s systematic 
preference for the individual over the social corresponds an equal predisposition in the fields 
of science and logic for the particular over the general and for induction over deduction. The 
unifying character of Millite liberalism, I have argued, is a very prominent emphasis on the 
values of reason and progress. 
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Thirdly, I have commented on John Rawls’ concept of justice as fairness and its 
evolution from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism. Rawls’ version of liberalism, I argue, 
constitutes a form of “tempered individualism:” tempered both in the sense that it mitigates 
the anti-social bias of certain other liberal thinkers, but also in the sense that, in so doing, it 
ultimately strengthens its commitment to the value of the individual. Moreover, while Rawls’ 
project resolutely advances the discourse of liberalism toward its limits, by incorporating a 
distinctive emphasis on social obligations, it still remains trapped within the liberal pattern of 
excluding from full political citizenship those who do not meet the requirements for being 
“normal” individuals.  
In sum, I have identified three general principles of liberal discourse:  
1) Individuals own their actions; 
2) The mode of action is rational;  
3) Objects are treated as inert matter (and human beings can be treated as objects too). 
In Chapter IV, then, I have argued that these principles explain how liberalism 
functions as a meta-ideology by exercising its discursive hegemony over competing political 
positions. Not only is liberalism dominant at the level of political content in much of the 
West today; it also provides the field of politics with the expressive “infrastructure” that 
allows a variety of claims to be articulated. As I have noted, liberalism, in other words, sets 
the table at which other ideologies sit and argue with each other. By participating in a 
conversation hosted by liberalism, on liberal (expressive) ground, non-liberal ideologies do 
not fully conform to a liberal worldview: it is sufficient that their differences and peculiarities 
be made compatible with the language of liberalism and with the three principles of liberal 
discourse in particular. By attracting other ideologies in its meta-ideological orbit, I argue 
that liberalism effectively “incorporates” some of their extra-liberal content and expels their 
most irreducibly illiberal claims. I have discussed three examples of “liberal incorporations” 
from contemporary political theory.  
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First I have considered Will Kymlicka’s work on multiculturalism. What he calls “right 
to culture,” I argue, is in fact the translation into liberal discourse of the non-liberal content 
of a communitarian defense of minority rights. Kymlicka’s narrative of migration is 
especially clear in that it explicitly presents relocating to different countries as the free choice 
of individuals, and not as a complex socio-economic phenomenon. In employing the 
grammar of liberalism toward the description of multicultural phenomena, then, Kymlicka is 
also able to justify liberal arrangements of political values and resources, thus attesting to the 
power of grammar in forging the world of politics.  
Secondly, I have presented Robert Putnam’s definition of the concept of “social 
capital.” An antidote to the social disease of atomization, more than an alternative to a liberal 
structure of society, I argue that Putnam’s social capital translates the theme of community 
into the language of liberalism. Consequently, Putnam does not question the ontology of 
liberalism, but simply purports to reconcile it with a more efficient social arrangement based 
on a more pronounced emphasis on values of cohesion and mutual trust. Assigning agency 
to individuals, and explaining social capital as a function of the rational actions that they 
undertake, ends up corroborating the liberal narrative of the social contract as the coming 
together of free and independent individuals.  
Thirdly, I have discussed Philip Pettit’s formulation of a “neo-republican” public 
philosophy. I argue that Pettit’s view of liberty as “non-domination” neither questions the 
deep ontology of liberalism, nor does it offer a clear alternative to the liberal order and 
institutions. Pettit’s theory of language, moreover, also confirms the premises of liberal 
discourse. Ultimately, I regard Pettit’s proposal as an example of liberal incorporation in that 
it bends republican themes to a discourse in which pre-formed individuals only engage in 
political activity to preserve their pre-political freedom.  
Confronted with what appears as such a pervasive meta-ideological hegemony of 
liberalism, the search for a desirable systemic alternative needs to be guided by a creative and 
imaginative sensibility. I argue in Chapter V that Jean-Luc Nancy’s concept of the 
inoperative community can indeed inspire a radical reconsideration of the paradigm of 
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liberalism. Moreover, I maintain that, unlike the alternative posed by the prevalent versions 
of communitarianism, Nancy’s philosophy of “resistance to immanence” can indeed 
overcome the rigidity of the liberal ontology of individualism without sacrificing its 
commitment to the freedom of single human beings.  
In order to explain the specificity of Nancy’s view, I first illustrated some of the most 
prominent themes in the tradition of communitarianism. Both Alasdair MacIntyre’s critique 
of the “emotivist self” and Michael Sandel’s critique of the “unencumbered self” configure 
radically alternative projects to the descriptive and normative value of individualism within 
the discourse of liberalism. However, they trade the rigid substantialism of a view centered 
on the individual for an equally rigid view of the foundation of the political on the essential 
value of community. Other authors have attempted relaxing these essentialist undertones of 
communitarianism. Michael Walzer, for instance, has emphasized the values of belonging, 
citizenship, and participation as conducive to his argument for a just arrangement of society. 
Charles Taylor, moreover, has concentrated on the contemporary reality of diverse, 
multicultural communities, in which minority groups strive for recognition from the state 
and from society at large.  
Further rejecting the essentialist thesis, Benedict Anderson has described nations as 
“imagined communities.” A product of social construction, the national community is 
imagined into existence as a system of shared understanding at a time in history when the 
development of capitalism and the technological innovations of printing create the 
conditions for national languages to serve as vehicles for the creation of national 
communities. James Scott, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of the state in codifying 
language for the ultimate purpose of making citizens “legible.” With a standardized national 
language in place, then, the idea of the national community becomes available to the people 
of that nation. Pascale Casanova, finally, has adopted a postcolonial outlook to assess the 
role of a national literature in providing the model for a national language in the case of Italy, 
and ultimately in opening up the possibility for imagining the national community before 
and in absence of a political embodiment of it.  
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I argue that, contra both these essentialist and socially constructed notions of 
community, Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy has the potential of radically resignifying the field 
of the political away from both a liberal and a communitarian vocabulary. In fact, Nancy 
rejects both the notions of “individual” and “community” as irredeemably compromised 
with the discourse of immanence. Instead, he founds his ontology on the idea that “being-in-
common” is the real position of existence, and that “singularity” is a point of exposure of 
that being. Being is, in other words, what is common to all the things that are; this 
commonality is exposed in each singular instance of that being. Singularities, therefore, are 
not simply reflections of being-in-common, as individual members of a community might 
be. Likewise, the inoperative community exists always already as such, and is not the creation 
of individuals forming a society. With two “engines,” one propelling being-in-common and 
the other singularity, and without ever settling for one or the other, or a static combination 
of the two, I argue that Nancy’s philosophy can sustain a counter-hegemonic both 
alternative to the discourse of liberalism (and of the dominant forms of communitarianism) 
and desirable.  
In Chapter VI, finally, I have harnessed Nancy’s musings on the inoperative community 
toward the analysis of the actual political experience of the encounter with the other. In 
particular, I have discussed the value of hospitality envisioned by Jacques Derrida as a 
feasible and desirable alternative to the liberal notion of toleration. Whereas toleration 
presupposes the existence of a tolerating party and a tolerated party interested in shielding 
their individuality from possible interactions with others, hospitality assumes as its point of 
departure the instability of the roles of host and guest. As the host and guest in a relation of 
hospitality trade places and transform their identity in the process, they also destabilize the 
notion of the individual on which toleration relies. Moreover, I argue that Derrida’s 
hospitality, unlike other formulations of the concept, corresponds to the inclination of the 
individuals toward community that Nancy also discusses. In transcending the artificial 
boundaries that the discourse of liberalism erects in the notion of the individual, and then 
fortifies in the notion of toleration, hospitality discloses the realization of being-in-common, 
while at the same time allowing the free interplay of different singularities.  
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I have discussed concrete practices of hospitality and a possible vision of the 
inoperative community in the encounter between migrants and locals in Badolato, a small 
town in southern Italy. Ever since 1997, when a group of 825 undocumented Kurdish 
immigrants landed on its shores, Badolato has exhibited its original politics of welcoming 
others, thus creating space for the emergence of a strong feeling of being-in-common among 
both the communities of the locals and of the immigrants. Though a series of bureaucratic 
vicissitudes eventually halted the social experiment that had become known as “Kurdolato,” 
I argue that a distinctive politics of coexistence between locals and immigrants continues to 
characterize that reality. In concluding Chapter VI I have presented some reflections based 
on the ethnographic research that I conducted in Badolato in the summer of 2007. By 
interviewing both locals and immigrants I gathered valuable information on the 
opportunities and challenges of framing the encounter with the other outside of a liberal 
paradigm.  
In general, as the goal of this project entailed reflecting on both the hegemony of 
liberalism and the possible formulation of a counter-hegemonic alternative, it is apparent 
that such ambitions far exceeded the scope of this work. Nevertheless, I argue that calling 
attention to the political significance of the expressive infrastructure of liberalism, and in 
particular on how a liberal grammar contributes to the meta-ideological hegemony of 
liberalism, is a necessary complement for the prevailing attitude in contemporary political 
theory to privilege the content of politics over its form. Additionally, I maintain that 
assuming the notion of the inoperative community as a source of inspiration for the 
formulation of a desirable alternative to the discursive hegemony of liberalism is a promising 
starting point for rethinking the dominant paradigms of contemporary political ideologies. 
On both accounts, much more work needs to be done, and much more intellectual creativity 
needs to be devised. Yet, it would be a remarkable accomplishment for this project, or for 
any engagement with contemporary political theory, to destabilize the notion that there can 
be no alternative to the contemporary hegemony of liberalism.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS: ENGLISH VERSION 
 
 
Questions for subset “hosts:” 
 
1) Were you born in Badolato? 
2) Did you live most of your life in Badolato?  
3) If you spent portions of your life elsewhere, why did you come back to Badolato? 
4) If you spent portions of your life elsewhere, did you miss Badolato? If so, why? 
5) Would you prefer to be richer elsewhere, or poorer in Badolato?   
6) When you compare Badolato in your youth and Badolato in its current conditions, what 
are some of the changes that you notice?  
7) Do you believe that the influx of immigrants has helped or hindered Badolato? 
8) Would you prefer that more Italians, rather than foreigners, had relocated to Badolato?  
9) Are you curious about the immigrants’ language, food, traditions, religion? 
10) Do you interact with immigrants? If so, how? 
11) When you think of your life in Badolato before the immigrants came, and compare it to 
your life in Badolato now, do you think that the interactions with others have changed 
who you are? If so, how? 
12) What would you think if you/your daughter/your son wanted to marry an immigrant? 
 
Questions for the subset “guests:” 
1) Where were you born? 
2) Why did you leave your country/town? 
3) How did you happen to relocate to Badolato? 
4) Had you heard of Badolato before? 
5) What, in particular, do you miss of your life before you moved to Badolato? 
6) How did you expect your life to be after you relocated? 
7) Have the people in Badolato helped you to adjust to the new conditions? 
8) Would you prefer to be richer elsewhere, or poorer in Badolato? 
9) Being in Badolato, have you been able to preserve your language, food, traditions, 
religion? 
10) Being in Badolato, have you been curious about other languages, food, traditions, 
religions? 
11) Do you interact with Italian Badolatese and/or other immigrants? If so, how? 
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12) What would you think if you/your daughter/your son wanted to marry an Italian 
Badolatese, or another immigrant? 
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APPENDIX B 
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS: ITALIAN VERSION 
 
Domande per la categoria “hosts:” 
1) Lei e’ nato/a a Badolato? ∗
2) Ha vissuto la maggior parte della sua vita a Badolato?  
 
3) Se ha trascorso parti della sua vita altrove, perche’ ha deciso di tornare a Badolato? 
4) Se ha trascorso parti della sua vita altrove, le mancava Badolato? Se si, perche’? 
5) Preferirebbe essere piu’ ricco altrove, o piu’ povero a Badolato?   
6) Se paragona la Badolato della sua gioventu’ alla Badolato nelle sue condizioni 
contemporanee, quali sono alcuni dei cambiamenti che lei nota?  
7) Ritiene che l’arrivo degli immigrati abbia beneficiato o ostacolato Badolato? 
8) Preferibbe che piu’ Italiani, e non stranieri, si fossero trasferiti a Badolato? 
9) E’ curioso/a rispetto alla lingua, cibo, tradizioni, religioni degli immigrati? 
10) Ha interazioni con immigrati? Se si, come? 
11) Se pensa alla sua vita a Badolato prima dell’arrivo degli immigrati, e la paragona con la 
sua vita a Badolato adesso, ritiene che le interazioni con gli altri la abbiano cambiata? Se 
si, come?  
12) Cosa penserebbe se lei / o sua figlia / o suo figlio volesse sposare un immigrato / 
un’immigrata? 
 
 
Domande per la categoria “guests:” 
1) Dove e’ nato/a? 
2) Perche’ ha lasciato il suo paese/citta’? 
3) Come ha scelto di trasferirsi a Badolato? 
4) Aveva sentito parlare di Badolato in precedenza? 
5) Che cosa, in particolare, le manca della sua vita prima che si trasferisse a Badolato? 
6) Come si aspettava che la sua vita sarebbe stata dopo essersi trasferito/a? 
7) La gente di Badolato l’ha aiutata ad adattarsi alle nuove circostanze? 
8) Preferirebbe essere piu’ ricco altrove, o piu’ povero a Badolato? 
9) Vivendo a Badolato, le e’ stato possibile preservare la sua lingua, cibo, tradizioni, 
religione? 
                                                 
∗ Note: the most formal modality of address is employed in these questions. Actual interaction may vary 
slightly to take into consideration social expectations about the deference and/or friendliness. 
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10) Vivere a Badolato ha suscitato la sua curiosita’ riguardo alla lingua, cibo, tradizioni, 
religioni degli altri? 
11) Lei ha interazioni con Badolatesi di origine italiana e/o con altri immigrati? Se si, come? 
12) Cosa penserebbe se lei / o sua figlia / o suo figlio volesse sposare un/una Badolatese 
italiano/a, o un altro immigrato / un’altra immigrata? 
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